A COMPENDIUM Of the ART of LOGICK AND RHETORICK *in the English Tongue.*

Containing
All that PETER RAMUS, ARISTOTLE, and *Others* have writ thereon:
WITH
Plaine DIRECTIONS
for the more easie understanding and practice of the same.

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To the Courteous Reader.

BEnevolent Reader, I do here present this small work, hoping it may produce good effects. Certainly it hath assai'd before time to thrust it selfe into the world, but that it found so kind friends, who considering the unworthynes, were pleased to suppresse it, and keep it prisoner in the Jail of their own houses. Howbeit now it is adventured abroad, and with the spring beginneth to spring afresh. It's Winters imprisonment is like to better it's Summers conditions; for I have laboured, so far as I could, to prune and lop off the former errours, that it may be the more plausible. I have also adorned it with a new weed, to wit, of a Dialogue, or Questions and Answers, that so my Book may even learn to stoop to the weakest capacities. If it shall be thought to come in a new fashion, may you please to look into the

world, you may see abundance in this habit, our common Catechismes wear this gown; yea, Mr. *St. Egerton* of the *Black Fryers* in *London*, hath contracted the same treatises of Mr. *Rogers* into this form. For my part, I hold it more easie then the former tract, neither greatly prejudiciall to the Authour.

This adorned, I have given this my second sonne full liberty to be a freeman, banishing my first and worst labours from the view (so far as I can) of all men. For seeing it would not, when I would, I hold it not fit, that now it should be published. Touching that work, it flowed so inconsiderately from my penne, and slipped so rashly out of my hand, that it escaped not without many defaults, imperfections, obscurities and blemishes: that with the Egyptian Grashopper, it will not only consume some part, but utterly eat up and waste the golden season, and happy hours of the curteous Reader. Let this last work then, kind Reader, find favour in thine eyes: if that winter bird should be seen, it would appear like a Cuckow at *Christmas*, or

like

like the Owle, which is the admiration of other birds. I will only now shew thee the causes producing this last work, and the use thereof, and so leave it to thy discreet judgement. The causes are manifold, first to stoppe the springing of that *Abortive* fore-spoken of, that so it might not thrive to the discredit of it's parent. Secondly, that the gratuity and thankfulnesse to my Unkle aforesaid, might not to be buried in oblivion; for *Tritum est pervie, quod facis ingrato.* Thirdly, for the benefit, as I said, of the simplest capacity. And finally, for the zeal I bear to mine own Countrey, being willing and desirous, that not onely men, but even women should exercise themselves in the studie of the sacred Arts.

If any shall demand what benefit shall redound hereby? or what may be the use hereof? I answer, it will avail greatly, not onely for Civil, and Moral discourse, but also for the overthrowing of all Errors, either in Manners or Doctrine, for saith *Ovid*,

Adde quod ingenuas didicisse fideliter artes,

Emollit mores, nec sinet esse feros.

But may some say, I live privately, converse not in the world; what need have I of this Science? It seemeth to consist chiefly in disputing, but I imploy my self most in silence and meditation. Well friend, thou mayst have great benefit by this Science, even in that likewise: an example of which, word for word, I have here produced out of Mr. Egerton's Treatie aforesaid, that so thou mightest know how to benefit thy self by this science, even in thy Meditation.

What thing is this, O my soul, that doth so befot thee? or what manner of thing may it be, wherewith thou art so delighted, or rather bewitched? And how doth the Holy Ghost in the Scripture define it, and set it forth? who are sinners but they that rebel against God, and against his holy will revealed in his Word? And what other thing is sin, but a breach and transgression of the Law of God, 1 *John*, 3.4. A turning out of the way of life, as the phrase of the Old Testament doth import; and a swerving from the

right

right mark and end, as the word useth in the New Testament to signifie, viz. The glory of God, and thine own salvation.

This cursed thing called sin, is not of one sort or kind; it is as a Monster of many heads, and (as it were) a beast of many Horns.

It is both original, bred and born with us; and actuall springing out of us from that venomous root of our Original Corruption.

Again, it is either inward, lurking, and boiling in the heart; or outward, shewing it self in the life and conversation; sometimes it onely inhabiteth and dwelleth in us, and oft-times it doth reign and over-rule us; sometimes it is but an error and infirmity, and sometimes, it is a wilful and presumptious evil, *Psal.* 19. 11, 12. Sometimes it is pardonable by the Free Grace and Mercie of God, to them that truely believe and repent; and sometimes it is utterly unpardonable, and never to be forgiven, being such, that it is impossible that the Committers thereof should be renewed by repentance, *Matth.* 12. *Heb.* 6. Sometimes

it rusheth mediately, and directly against God; and sometimes it reacheth more properly to the hurt of our neighbour.

But who is able to reckon up all the Branches of this most bitter and venomous Tree; wherefore (to look more nearly unto it) whence proceedeth this deadly poyson? what may be the cause whereof it cometh? and the Fountain from whence it springeth? Surely, my Soul, it is even thy self: thou art the Root that bringeth forth all this bitterness; thou art the Fountain from whence all this deadly Venome doth arise. For every man is tempted to sin, and he is drawn away of his own Concupiscence, and enticed.

Beware, therefore, O rebellious Soul! that thou lay not the blame upon the Lord; neither make him the Author of thy sin: For thou, O God, as thou canst not be tempted to evil thy self, so thou tempteſt no man to commit sin, being a thing which thou so strictly forbiddest to all, and so severely threatnest in whomsoever it is found; and for which thou so grievously

vously plaguest the wicked, and so sharply correctest thine own Children, *James* 1,13,14. *Heb.* 12. 7,8. Thou, O Lord, art holiness it self, and the Fountain thereof; And there is none eternally, and unchangeably good, but thee alone, *Matth.* 19. Thou madest man good at the beginning, but he sought many inventions, *Eccles.* 12. So all the imaginations and thoughts of his heart became onely evil continually, or every day, Sabbath and all, *Gen.* 6. 5.

True it is indeed, That the Divel that old Dragon, using the subtil Serpent for his instrument, did offer the first occasion of sinning, whereby he became an external cause of sin, and is called a Mutherer from the beginning, and the Author and Father of all deceit, *John* 8.44. Yet man had power to have resisted him if he would, which he not doing, became the true and proper efficient cause of Corrupting himself, and all his posterity; who likewise, by means of the poyson derived from his Loyns, became also the proper and immediate causes of their own sins.

Mark well then (*O* my Soul) the Root of this evil; and further consider, what unsavory and cursed fruit it bringeth forth; surely, even such as it self is, for such as the Tree is, such are the fruits: as is the root, so are the branches: a poysoned fountain, casteth forth no wholesome streams, *James* 3. And who can bring (as the *Wiseman* saith) a clean thing out of filthiness? surely there is not one, but onely he who is holiness it self, *John* 14. 4. And without all Controversie, the reward and wages of sin, is death; and that not onely temporal, and bodily, which is a separation of the body from the soul for a season, but also spiritual and eternal, both of soul and body for ever and ever. Is any good thing with-held from us? let us thank our sin for it: is any plague or punishment laid upon us? be sure that sin is the cause, or at the least (even in the dearest Children of God) the occasion of it. Is any good blessing of God made of no force, or even turned to a Curse to us? we may be sure that it is by reason of our sin: for (as the Prophet saith) *The Lords hand is not shortned*

ned that it cannot save, nor his ear heavy that it cannot hear, but your iniquities separate betwixt us and your God, and your sins do hide his face from us that he will not hear, Esay 59. 1, 2. Finally (as Job saith) *Misery springeth not forth of the dust, neither doth affliction spring out of the earth, but man is born to labour as the sparkles fly upward*, Job. 5, 6, 7. As if he should say, Man is as prone by nature to sin against God, and consequently to pull Gods judgements upon himself, as the fire (which is a light Element) is naturally prone to ascend and mount aloft.

And to the end that thou (my soul) maist see upon what an ugly monster thou hast set thy delight, dost dote upon, and art bewitched withall, consider how fair and how amiable piety and vertue are; for as they make a man lovely and honourable, so sin maketh him loathsome and contemptible: *The fear of God* (saith Solomon) *makes the face of a man to shine and be beautifull*; but impiety and profanesse do deface and disfigure the image of God in him, and cause both God and all good men to loath & detest him as a polluted and filthy

filthy thing. *Favour* (saith the same Wise-man) *is deceitfull, and beauty is vanity; but the woman that feareth the Lord, shee shal be praised, Prov.* 31.39. *A vile person is contemned* (that is, a prophane man and basely esteemed, how great soever he be in the world) *in the eyes of him that feareth God, Psal.* 15.4. And piety is the only beauty that the Lord himselfe is delighted with, *1 Pet.* 3.4. Therefore it is clear in the contrary part, that he loatheth and abhorreth impiety and sin. And yet my soul, to bring thee further out of love with this most ugly monster, consider whereunto it is like, and to what it may be compared. It is like (saith *Esay*) to filthy raggs, that are cast aside upon the dunghill, and detested of all the passers by. It biteth as a serpent, and stingeth as a Coccatrice, creepeth as a gangrene or deadly canker, that eateth to the heart and cannot be cured; and though it seeme sweet in the beginning, yet it is most bitter in the end, and that which relisheth like hony in the mouth, will prove ranke poyson in the bowels. Finally, O my soul if thou peruse the holy Scrip-

Scriptures, thou ſhalt find no book, no leafe, no chapter, nor ſcarce any verſe, wherin there is not ſome precept, ſome prohibition, ſome promiſe, ſome threatning or ſome example which ſeems not very fitly and profitably to ſhew forth the amiableneſs of vertue, and the uglineſſe of ſin, and with what care, zeal, watchfulneſſe, &c. the one is to be ſhunned, and the other to be imbraced. Thus far Mr. *Egerton*, Lib. 3. Cap. 6.

Now that thou maiſt attain (kind reader) unto this ſweet delight of meditation, or to the top of whatſoever felicity thou aimeſt at by this art, uſe my book in this manner following.

It conſiſting only of rules and examples, will be no great burthen for thee to commit it all to memory; and ſo, whether thou meditateſt or diſcourſeſt of ſin or piety in the generall, or any vice or vertue in the particular, thou ſhalt find from the head of this Art, after the example foreſhewed, abundance of matter to furniſh thy meditation. So, *cum paucis ſapientibus*, I commit my labour to thy diſcreet and favourable conſtruction, and with equall reſpect to all indifferently reſt.

R. F. *Junior.*

PETER RAMUS to the READER.

ARchymedes (*O Reader*) *would have the reason of the Spheres and Climates* (*in which Invention hee had more vehemently laboured*) *ingraven upon his ſepulchre. And truly, ſhouldſt thou ask me of my vigils and ſtudies, I deſire a pillar to be raiſed upon my grave from the inſtructions of the Art of* Logick. *Touching the cauſe of the wiſh; they anſwer, firſt to the accurateneſs of the Art: the books of invention of Arguments, and their diſpoſition to be judged, not onely from* Ariſtotle *Organicall, Rhetoricall, Phyſicall: but from* Cicero *and* Quintilian, *and ſo many*

many Orators. In all which wee have strived with all study and diligence, by all reasonable wayes to contract them briefly into these two Books, that no particle, or the least shadow of Logick *might be there confused, whose truth might not be expresly delivered. And this shall be first made known touching* Archymedes *his Probleme. They answer secondly to the use of* Logick, *the elegance and dignity of all the parts to be explicated, to stir up Logicall meditations, as well the popular phrases of Poets, Orators, Historiographers; as also the liberall and ingenuous arts of a new Body, delivered in a new form to the studious, adorned with excellent indowments: And lest any should fear left they should happen to be strangers, they are given and committed to the liberall custodies*

of

of their schools. This shalbe secondly made known touching Archymedes his problem. These therefore shall be witness of so many day and night watches, touching the truth and utility of Logick, and shall answer for the cause of our wish; shall also admonish thee (Reader) as I hope, of I know not what madnesse is in most Academies of Europe, disputing of their sophisticall precepts, how that they are far unlike both to the verity and utility of Logick, and shall also inflame thee to the study of the more true and profitable Faculties. But beside this, there is objected, a great company, exstructed with theatricall reproaches, threatning pains of tribunal judgment, condemnation at the least of filthy ignorance and calumny, will thrust us from the whole Kingdom of Philosophy, as strange and unheard

unheard of prescription; both with hands and tongue. Whither will they forbid the small cause of our wish? what freedom was obtained by King Henry *from the envie of so mad a Judg; or to the more solid judgment of a milder Censurer? What afterward (when this Logicall order had set foot in the cause of Religion) was a more great offence, the life and health of us being aimed at by those three civill wars? will these shew no cause of our wish? yea, rather they do admonish, That we give great thanks to the Almighty, who hath ayded and protected the course of our studies hitherto, neither would suffer them by any means to be interrupted. Therefore I witnesse, that this light of* Logick *will avail greatly to the studious in setting forth the truth, as also to adorn the ingenuous*

Arts,

Arts; as chiefly the illustrating the heavenly mysteries of the sacred Doctrine: I pray that it may grow up more and more to these things; and that this Book may be happily concluded, to the glory of God.

A TABLE OF THE Chapters in the two Books of *Peter Ramus* his DIALECTICA.

In the first Book.

1. *The definition of Dialectica.*
2. *The parts and kinds of arguments.*
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4. *The Efficient alone, and with others.*
5. *The Efficient by himself, or an Accident.*
6. *The Matter.* 7. *The Form.* 8. *The End.*
9. *The Effects.* 10. *The Subject.*
11. *The Adjunct.* 12. *Diverses.*
13. *Desperates.* 14. *Relates.*
15. *Adverses.* 16. *Contradicents.*
17. *Privants.* 18. *Equalls.* 19. *Greaters.*
20. *Lesses.* 21. *Likes.* 22. *Dislikes.*
23. *Conjugates.* 24. *Notation.*

25. *Di-*

25. *Distribution.*
26. *Distribution of the Causes.*
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1. *Of Judgement.*
2. *Axiomas affirming or denying.*
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4. *The simple Axioma.*
5. *The copulate Axioma.*
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15. *The first disjunct Syllogism.*
16. *The second disjunct Syllogism.*

17. *The*

17. The onely method according to Aristotle.
18. The first illustration of Method by examples of arts.
19. The second example of Poets, Orators, and Historiographers.
20. The secrets of Method.

In

In Laudem Scientiæ Dialecticæ sacræ.

THe sacred Sciences do Praise deserve,
And merit Laud, because that they conserve,
The use of Manners also do declare
What things in Man most acceptable are.
But 'mongst them, all there's none so high in Reach
As Dialectica, which reasoning doth teach.

This as the first from God Almighty came,
From Heaven descended this bright shining flame.
God Reason taught, and Man he did inspire

With Faculties, which Logick *doth*
require.
The Matter, Precepts, Form
Methodical,
The end is Reasons use, to teach
th unlearned all.

Th' effects are divers, which I cannot
tell,
Except I had a tongue which did
excell.
The Artes before confusedly did
lie,
Till Logicks *use compos'd them*
curiously.
But what do I discoursing of this
thing,
When Praises to the worth the
Learned cannot sing?



THE FIRST BOOK OF PETER RAMUS His DIALECTICA of *Invention*.

CAP. 1.

What Dialectica is.

Question.

WHat is Dialectica?

A. Dialectica is the art of disputing well, and in that sense is called Logick.

CAP. 2.

The parts of Dialectica, and kinds of Arguments.

Q. *How many parts hath Dialectica?*

A. Dialectica hath two parts, Invention and Judgment.

Q. *What is Invention?*

A. Invention is a part of Dialecti-

ca of inventing Arguments.

Q. *What is an Argument?*

A. An Argument is that which i affected to argue any thing: ſuch a are all reaſons conſidered a part and b themſelves.

Q. *What be the Kinds?*

A. Artificiall and Inartificiall.

Q. *What is an Artificiall Argumen*

A. That which argueth of it ſelf.

Q. *What be the Kinds?*

A. Firſt, or derived from the Firſt

Q. *What is Firſt?*

A. Firſt is that which is of its own Originall.

Q. *What be the Kinds?*

A. Simple or Comparative.

Q. *What is Simple?*

A. Simple is that which is conſide red ſimply and abſolutely.

Q. *What be the Kinds?*

A. Agreeing or diſagreeing.

Q. *What is Agreeing?*

A. That which agreeth with t thing which it argueth.

Q. *What be the Kinds?*

A. Agreeing abſolutely or after certain manner.

Q. *What is agreeing abſolutely?*

A. T

Cap. 3.

The Efficient, Procreant, and Conſervant Cauſe.

Q. *What is the Cauſe?*

A. The Cauſe is that by whoſe force the thing is.

Q. *What is the Profit of it?*

A. This firſt place of invention is the foundation of all knowledge: and he is beleeved to know, of whom the cauſe is held.

As the Poet ſayeth worthily:

The man ſure happy is, who cauſe of things doth know.

Q. *How is the Cauſe divided?*

A. Into two kinds, Efficient and Matter, or Forme and End.

Q. *What is the Efficient Cauſe?*

A. The Efficient Cauſe is that from which the thing is.

Q. *How many kinds hath it?*

A. There appeareth to us no true Kinds, yet the great plenty of it is diſtinguiſhed by certain means.

Q. *What is that which effecteth by the firſt means?*

A. That which procreateth or dependeth.

Q. *Give me an example out of ſom*
Poet.

A. Ovid 1. *Remedio Amoris.*

Therefore when thou ſhalt look in this ou
medcinall Art
My admonition do, ſet Idleneſſe apart.
This cauſeth thee to love, this doth defen
it ſtill;
This is the cauſe of joy, as meat ſomtime
breeds ill. (*is loſt*
Take laſtly ſloth away, God Cupids bow
His torches loſe their light, contemn'd
away they'r toſt.

Q. *Give me a more familiar example.*

A. The Father and Mother procreate, the Nurſe defendeth.

Q. *Give an example of this out of ſome Poet.*

A. 4. Æneid.

Th'art not Gods Child, ne Dardanus
his ſon,
Thou rather from the ſteep hard rocks
didſt come
Of Caucaſus: it ſeemeth of that breed,
Hyrcanian Tygers thee with breſts did
feed.

Æglog. 8.

Now what this whorſon love is I well wot
It is a little buſie boy, begot

Not

Not of mans ſeed, ne like to one of us;
But fartheſt Garamants and Iſmarus,
Or rockie Rhodope, as it ſhould ſeem,
In their rough ragged hils ingëdred him.

Q. *Do not builders and governours of Cities come under this head?*

A. Yes: *Romulus* the builder of the City of Rome, alſo all other Kings, Conſuls, and Emperors are defenders and keepers.

Cap. 4.

The Efficient alone and with others.

Q. *What is that which effecteth by the ſecond means?*

A. That which effecteth alone, or with others.

Q. *What are thoſe others?*

A. Some oftentimes are Principall, others are helping and Miniſters.

Q. *Give an example of the Cauſe that effecteth by it ſelf.*

A. *Æneid. 6. Niſus* calleth back both the blame and the puniſhment of the Slaughter, from *Euryalus* upon himſelf, becauſe he was the only Author.

Loe here I am who only did this deed,
Latians, againſt me turn your ſwords with ſpeed.

'Twas my deceit: He could it never do,
Ne would his courage ſerve him therunto.

Q. *Give an example of the ſolitary Cauſe, with Principalls and Fellows out of ſome Orator.*

A. The ſolitary cauſe with many both Principalls and Fellows, is diverſly ſet forth *pro Marcello.* For the warlike Praiſes (ſaith the Orator) they are wont to extenuate truly by words, and to detract them from their Leaders, to communicate them with many, leaſt they ſhould be proper to their Commanders: and certainly in war; the ſtrength of the Souldiers, opportunity of places, help of fellows, ranks, proviſion do much availe. But Fortune (as it were) by her own right, challengeth the cheifeſt part to her ſelf, and whoſoever is proſperouſly carried, that altogether ſhe leadeth. But yet of this glory (ô *Cæſar*) which a little before thou didſt obtain, thou haſt no companion: all that, how much ſoever it is, (which truly is the chiefeſt) all (I ſay) is thine. The Centurion, Preſident, Ranks and Companies have taken from thee none of this praiſe: Yea, even the Lady of humane affairs, For-

tune

tuneoffereth not her ſelf into the ſociety of this glory, to thee ſhe giveth place, and confeſſeth it all and wholly to be thine.

Q. *Are not Inſtruments numbred among helping Cauſes?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give an example of it?*

A. By this Argument the impious Epicure diſputeth that the world was never made. *Primo de Nat.* For by what eys of the minde (ſaith he) could your *Plato* behold the frame of ſo great a work, whereby he maketh it conſtructed and builded of God? what labour? what iron Ingine? what Leaver? what Deviſes? what Miniſters were there of ſo great a work?

Cap. 5.

The Efficient by it ſelf, or an Accident.

Q. *What is that which effecteth by the third meanes?*

A. That which effecteth by it ſelf, or an Accident.

Q. *How effecteth it by it ſelf?*

A. When it effecteth by its own faculty.

Q. *How effecteth it by its own faculty?*

A. When it effecteth by Nature or Counsel.

Q. *Give an example of that which effecteth by Nature.*

A. The Efficient of the windes is Naturall. Æneid. 1.

The East and South winds on the Sea do blow,
They rush through deep, till on the top they show.
The Africks oft with these his blasts conjoynes,
And so the floods are cast up by the Winds.

Q. *Give some example of that which effecteth by counsell.*

A. That confession of *Cicero*, touching himself, is an example of Counsell. The war taken in hand (ô *Cæsar*) waged also for the most part; not constrained by any of my Judgment and Will, I came forth to those wars which were undertaken against thee.

Q. *How doth the Efficient Cause effect by an Accident?*

A. When it effecteth by an external faculty.

Q. *How doth it effect by an externall faculty?*

A. When it is done by Necessity or Fortune.

Q. *How*

Q. *How by Neceſſity?*

A. When as the Efficient is conſtrained to the Effect.

Q. *Give an example of this.*

A. There is one in the excuſe of the Pompeians. But to me truly (ſaith the Orator) if there may be ſought out a proper and true name of our evil, it doth ſeem, that we are faln into a certain fatall calamity, that hath occupied the unprovident minds of men; that none ſhould wonder how humane Counſel is overcome by Divine Neceſſity.

Q. *How by Fortune?*

A. When ſomwhat happeneth beyond the Scope of the Efficient.

Q. *Give an example.*

A. So the caſe chanced, ſaith *Tullius* (*tertio de Nat. deo.*) That *Pherius* the enemy was profitable to *Jaſon*, who opened his impoſtume with his ſword; which the Phyſicians could by no means heal.

Q. *May not imprudence be numbred amongſt theſe kinds of Cauſes?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give an example.*

A. Ovid. de Triſt. 2.

Why hurtfull light or ought elſe did I ſee?

The fault was mine, & not unknown to me.
Wise Acteon Diana *naked saw, (man.*
And food became to's doggs devouring
Blind fortune amongst the Gods is surely blamed,
Ne pardon gets, the Gods she hath so harmed.

Q. *Do not Deprecations then proceed from hence?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give an example.*

A. Pro P.L. Pardon ô Father: he hath erred: he is slipped: he thought not: if ever hereafter. And a little after, I have erred: I have done rashly: it repenteth me: I flie to thy clemency: I aske pardon for mine offence: I intreat thee that thou wilt pardon me.

Q. *What first causeth the name of Fortune?*

A. The ignorances of the Causes hath feigned this name: for when as somthing happened beyond Counsell and Hope, it was called by the common people Fortune.

Q. *What is* Juvenals *opinion of it?*

A. Wise if we were, no God should want but Fortune,
We place thee high, & ofte thee importune.

CAP.

Cap. 6.

The Matter.

Q. *What is the Matter?*

A. The Matter is the cauſe of which the thing is.

Q. *Give an example out of ſome Poet.*

A. By this feigned Argument, the houſe of the Sunne is compounded of gold, carbunkles, Ivory and Silver.

Ovid. 2. Metamorph.

The Suns high place was built with pillars tall,
The gold did ſhine, Carbunkles flames let fall.
The top thereof was layd with Ivory neat,
And ſilver doors in portall ſhined feat.

Æglog. 3.

A merry Muſor fram'd of beecken-tree,
Carv'd work, by hand of divine Alcimeden,
'Tis round impaled with a ſcattring trail
Of tender Vine, and over all between,
A pale green Ivy, wherewith as a vale,
The thick diffuſſed cluſters ſhaded beeu.

Q. *Give an example out of ſome Orator?*

A. Cæſar 1. *Bel. Civil. Cæſar* commanded his ſouldiers to make ſhips of that

that kind, which in former years the use of the Brittains had taught him: first they made the Keel and Pins of light matter, the rest of the body of the ship being knit together with Osiers, was covered over with Leather.

Cap. 7.

The Forme.

Q. *The first kind of the Cause, in the Efficient and Matter being expounded; the second followeth, in the Forme and the End; What therefore is the Forme?*

A. The Forme is the Cause by which the thing is that which it is.

Q. *What is the benefit of it?*

A. From hence the thing is distinguished from all other things, and the Forme is ingenerated together with the thing it self.

Q. *Give some example of it.*

A. A reasonable soul is the form of a man, because by it a man is a man, and is distinguished from all other creatures thereby. The form of the geometricall figures is in traingles and quadrangles. Heaven, Earth, Trees, Fishes are the form of Physicall things. From whence the chief explication of

things

things, as it is by nature, ſo (if it may be found out) it ſhall be, as in artificiall things it is more eaſily met with-all.

Q. *Give example out of ſome Orator.*

A. Cæſar lib. 7. But all the French walls are almoſt of this form; the beams long and plain, with equall diſtance between themabout two foot, are placed upon the foundation. Theſe are bound within, and faſtened very ſtrongly: for thoſe ſpaces (of which we ſpeak) are filled up to the top with great ſtones. Theſe placed and knit together, an other row is alſo added, that the ſame might keep the ſpaces: neither do the beams touch one another, but being diſtant by equall ſpaces, all of them are ſtrongly faſtened, great ſtones being placed between them. And even ſo is the whole work knit together until the juſt height of the wall be fulfilled. This work therefore is not deformed, as well for the comlineſſe and variety, beams and ſtones being by courſes, which keep their rows in right lines; as, becauſe it hath the cheif ſtrength for profit and defence of Cities, becauſe it doth defend both from the miſchiefe of

ſtones,

ſtones, and the materiall ram, which with its forty feet, being oft bound to the long beams inward, can neither be broken or drawne back again.

Q. *Give an example out of ſome Poet.*

A. *Æneid.* 1. *Virgil* deſcribeth the forme of this port.

Between two ſeas, two Ilands there do lie,
Sidwayes they'r made, the waters run
faſt by. (*heaven,*
Huge double Rocks that do reach up to
Under the which the ſea lie ſtil and calm:
And by that place the green woods there
are growing,
Forth from the ſame comes great black
darkneſſe flowing.
Under which rock a den's made very fleet,
Wherein's rich living ſtones and waters
ſweet, (*there laid,*
Houſes for Nymphs and chains for ſhips
Which would not by the Anchor chains
(*beſtaid.*

CAP. 8.

The End.

Q. *What is the end?*

A. The end is the Cauſe for whoſe ſake the thing is.

Q. *Give*

Q. *Give example.*

A. To Phyſicall things the propoſed end is man: to man, God. There is ſome cheif good and laſt end of all Arts: as to ſpeak well, of Grammer: to plead well, of Rhetorick: to diſpute well, of Logick.

Q. *Give example out of ſome Poet.*

A. Æneid. 1. *Juno* aſſumeth the end of Marriage when as ſhe promiſeth *Deiopeia* to *Eolus*, to wit, for ſolace and childrens ſake.

Nymphs ful fourteen I have of bodies rare;
But whoſo is moſt beautiful and faire,
Even Deiopeia, *I to thee do give (live,*
Her year in Marriage ſtate with thee to
Thee to reward for thy love unto me,
And cauſe thine off-ſpring beautiful to be.

Q. *Give an example out of ſome Orator.*

A. Cicero pro Lig. Urgeth *Tubero* his accuſer, whenas he preſſeth the end of the wars taken up againſt *Cæſar*. And truly (ſaith he) he is come forth armed againſt *Cæſar* himſelf. But what did this *Tubero* his ſword do in the Pharſalian Army? whoſe ſides did the ſharp point aime at? who was to feel the force of thy weapon? where was thy minde, eyes, hands, courage? what didſt thou

deſire

desire? what didst thou wish?

Cap. 9.

The Effect.

Q. *What is the Effect?*

A. The Effect is that which ariseth from the Causes, whether begotten or corrupted, or whether any thing be moved by any means. Here the motion, and the thing done by motion, is called the Effect. Of this place are praises and dispraises, of which sacred and profane books are full.

Q. *Give example of this out of some Poet.*

A. *Æneid 6.* The facts of divers people are compared to the praises of the Romans.

Some finly carve upon the boyling brasse,
They'l on the marble grave a living face:
They wish the causes better, they'l descry
Heavens shining parts, and tell the stars i'th sky.
Remember thou Romes people brave to rule,
These things shal be thine Art, peace to impose,
To spare thy subjects, and subdue proud foes.

Q. *What else cometh under this head?*

A. Hitherto are speeches and writings referred.

Q. *Give an example?* A. Pe-

A. Pericles and *Hortentius* did celebrate the praise of pleading well and by the same argument also *Demosthenes* and *Cicero* of writing well.

Q. *What farther?*

A. To this place are referred counsels and deliberations, although not brought to their end.

Q. *Give an example.*

A. Permenio and *Phylotus* were beaten to death, because they were suspected to be of the conspiracy against *Alexander*, as *Curtius* and *Arianus* have remembred touching *Lentulus*, *Cethegus* and others, the complices of *Catiline*; they suffered punishment by judgment of the Senat.

Q. *Have not vertue and vices their Effects also.*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give an example.*

A. Horace after this manner describeth the Effects of drunkennesse.

Secrets it shews, & hope it doth command,
Unto the wars it drives, although unarmd:
It takes the burden from the carfull man,
It teacheth Art to all that will or can.
Who ere was drunk that wãted Eloquẽce?
Was any poor that used this defence?

CAP.

Cap. 10.

The Subject.

Q. *The argument agreeing after a certain manner succeedeth, what is that then?*

A. The Subject and Adjunct.

Q. *What is the Subject?*

A. The Subject is that to which any thing is adjoined.

Q. *Make this plainer by examples.*

A. The minde is the Subject of science, ignorance, vertue, vice, because these happen beside the being. The body, of health, sicknes, strength, weakness, beauty, deformity. Man is the Subject of riches, poverty, honour, infamy, apparell, company. The place is the Subject of the thing placed.

Q. *How prove you this last by testimony and example?*

A. The Philosophers attribute a place to divine beings, although wanting part and greatnesse. So the place of Geometry, and the difference of places is in Geometricall things: so of physick, it is more diligently considered in physicall things: In the world, in simple elements, in compound things.

Q. *Give*

Q. *Give example out of ſome Poet.*

A. So *Virgil* in his Georgicks admoniſheth that the place be diligently ſought out for things propoſed, as corn, trees, plants, paſtures.

Before we paſſe into a ſea unknown,
Know we the wind and various manner of
Heaven:
Our native ſoyle and every habitation,
What will refuſe or grow in any nation.
Some beareth corne, th'other with grapes
doth paſſe, (*graſſe.*
Some with tall trees, the reſt with unſown

Q. *Proceed further in explicating the ſubject?*

A. The Subjects of ſenſes are called ſenſibles; of vertues or vices, things propoſed to vertues or vices.

Q. *Give an example of the former.*

A. Colour is the ſubject of the ſight, ſound of the hearing; becauſe theſe ſenſes are occupied and exerciſed in the ſenſibles.

Q. *Give an example of the later.*

A. Vertues and vices are ſet forth in morall Philoſophy by this argument: temperance and intemperance, by pleaſure: magnanimity and ſloth, by danger: liberality and covetouſneſſe, by riches.

Q. *Expli-*

Q. *Explicate the Subject further?*

A. So things numerable of Arithmetick: miserable (as I may say) are the Subjects of Geometry.

Q. *Give example of the Subject out of some Orator.*

A. By the same Subject *Cicero* (second *Agra*) disputeth that there was no contention amongst the people of Campania, because there was no honour. They are not carried (saith he) with the desire of glory: because where there is no publick honour, there the desire of glory cannot be. There is no discord, neither by contention nor ambition: for there is nothing for which they should strive, nothing for which they should war, nothing for which they should contend.

Q. *Give example out of some Poet.*

A. Propertius useth this argument.

Of winds the Saylors talk, the Husbandmen of Bulls,
The souldiers of their wounds, and Shepherds of their woolls.

CAP. 11. *The Adjunct.*

Q. *What is the Adjunct?*

A. The Adjunct is that to which any thing

thing is subjected: which argument, though it be lighter then the subject, yet more copious and frequent: therfore of its signes *Ovid* speaketh 2. *Rem. Am.*

Some man (for such there be) may count this small: (all.
Yet that helps somewhich doth not profit

Q. *Make this plainer.*

A. Those things which are called good and evil of the mind, body, and the whole man, are the Adjuncts of the mind, body, man: also whatsoever happens without the Subject is the Adjúct.

Q. *May not Time also be reduced unto this head?*

A. Yes, as Place was in the Subject, so is Time in the Adjunct, *viz.* the indu-ring of things past, present, to come.

Q. *What further is comprised under this head?*

A. All those Qualities beside the Causes adjoyned to the Subject, whether they be proper or common.

Q. *What is Proper?*

A. That which agreeth only & wholly with the subject, as laughing with a man, neying with a horse, barking with a dog.

Q. *What is Common?*

A. That which is not Proper after this manner.

Q. *Give*

Q. *Give example of the Adjunct o*
of some Orator.

A. By this kind of argument, *Cice*
in the defence of *Roscius* the Comedia
cavilleth with *Fanius Chereus.* Do
not his head and eye-brows, altogeth
bald, seem to savour of malice, and c
out of deceit? doth he not seem to be
compounded from the foot to the hea
(if a man may conjecture by his shape
of frauds, fallacies, lyes? Who ther
fore is altogether bald on the head an
eye-brows, lest he should be said to ha
one haire of a good man.

Q. *Give example out of some Poet?*

A. So *Martial* lib. 2. mocketh *Zoil*
Red haire, black mouth, short feet and i
squint-eyes, (lie
'Tis marvell Zoilus *if goodnesse in th*

Q. *What further may be reduced u*
der this head?

A. Garments and company are A
juncts.

Q. *Give example.*

A. By this kind of circumstanc
Dido going a hunting is magnificent
set forth, *Æneid:* 4.
The morne appear'd, Dido *forsook the se*
The day stir up, to th' heaven youth gui
the way. B

Both nets and gins with pickstaves all were ready, (greedy:
Messalian horse with hunting dogs so
Princes did wait, the slow queen did expect,
With fair clad horse, her way for to direct.
Forth cometh she at length with mighty traine,
In her long robe with many a long seame:
Her horse down trapt, with gold her haire was tress'd,
Her robes with golden hooks she close did (wrest.

Q. *What is the benefit of Adjuncts?*

A. There is great use of Adjuncts to the Subjects by which they are occupied.

Q. *Give example.*

A. By this argument *Plato* foretold those Cities to be miserable, where the multitude of Physicians and Judges were wanting: because, of necessity, there was conversant in those cities both intemperance, and injustice.

And thus much for the place of agreeings, from whence every agreeing argument may be said to be one or the same: and all manner of unity and (as I may say) identity are referred hither

hither as the first and simple fou
taines.

Cap. 12.

Diverses.

Q. *You have expounded the first agre
ing Argument: the disagreeing follower
What then is Disagreeing?*

A. That which disagreeth from t
thing.

Q. *How are Disagreeings manifeste*

A. Disagreeings are equally man
fested amongst themselves, and equal
argued one of another, although the
do more clearly shine in their Dis
greeings.

Q. *What are the kinds of Dis
greeings?*

A. Two, Diverse and Opposite.

Q. *What are Diverses?*

A. Diverses are Disagreeings whi
disagree only in reason.

Q. *What are the most frequent not
of speech for this Argument?*

A. These; Not this, but that; a
though, yet.

Q. *Give example from some Orato*

A. Pro Pompeio. He carried not t
victory, but the ensignes of the victo

Q. Gi

Q. *Give ſome other examples?*

A. Ovid. ſecund. Art. Amand.

Ulyſſes *was not fair but Eloquent.*

Æneid. 2. (*death,*

This Priamus *though held in duſt of*

Yet ceaſed not.

Alſo this of the like matter, *Pro. Lig.*

Calleſt thou that wicked (*ô Tubero*)?

Why, he hath not hitherto deſerved this name. For ſome called error, ſome fear; that which more hardly, hope, deſire, hatred, pertinacy; the moſt grave, temerity: none wicked, beſides thy ſelf.

Cap. 13.

Deſperates.

Q. *What are Oppoſites?*

A. Oppoſites are diſagreeings, which diſagree in reaſon and thing; therefore cannot be attributed to the ſame, according to the ſame, and at the ſame time.

Q. *Make this plain by example.*

A. So *Socrates* cannot be black and white of one and the ſame part; Father and Son of the ſame man; whole and ſick at the ſame time; but he may

be white on the one part, black on ano-
ther; Father of this, Son of that man
sound to day, sick to morrow.

Q. *It should seem by this, that th*
one being affirmed, the other is denied.

A. So it is.

Q. *What are the kinds of Opposites?*

A. Disparates or Contraries.

Q. *What are Disparates?*

A. Disparates are opposites, where
one is opposed equally to many.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Green, Ash-color, Red, are mean
between White and Black, which ar
Disparates, both with the extreams, an
among themselves. So liberality an
covetousnesse are disparates amon
themselves. So a man, a tree, a ston
and infinite of this kind are Disparate
neither can one thing be a man, a tre
a stone.

Q. *Give example out of some Poet.*

A. Virgil. (*Æneid.* 1.) disputeth
this Argument.

O virgin, how shall I remember thee,
Whose countenance not mortal seems to be
Thy voyce is sure above the humane reach
Both which thee Goddess proves, and so
teach.

CAP. 14.

Relates

Q. *What are Contraries?*

A. Contraries are Oppoſites, whereof one is oppoſed to one only.

Q. *What are the kinds of it?*

A. They are either affirming, or denying.

Q. *What is affirming?*

A. Affirming is that of which both of them affirme.

Q. *How many kinds hath it?*

A. Two, Relates and Adverſes.

Q. *What are Relates?*

A. Relates are Contraries affirming; of which one conſiſteth of the mutuall affection of the other: and from hence they are named Relates.

Q. *Make this plain by example.*

A. The Father who hath a Sonne; and the Sonne who hath a Father, are Relates.

Q. *They may ſeeme by this, to be together by nature.*

A. So they are: ſo that he which perfectly knoweth the one, knoweth alſo the reſt.

Q. *Give ſome examples of Relates.*

A. Pro Marc. By which thou truly understandest how much praise there is for the benefit given, when as for the receiving, is so much glory, *Marc.* against *Sosib.*

Sosibian, thou yeeld'st thou wast born thrall,
When flattering thou thy Father Lord do

So *Quint.* lib. 5. cap. 10. If it be honest to place himself at Rhodes, and to lodge at Hirmaereon. After which manner *Tullius*, in the perfect oration. It is therefore dangerous (saith he) lest any should think it dishonestly, to teach that in the great and glorious Art to others, which it was honesty for him to learn.

Q. *Doth not earnest affection sometimes flow from these Relates?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example out of some Orator.*

A. Cicero in his oration hath brought forth a certain earnest affection from these Relates. Now these are grave (saith he) wife of the son in law, stepmother of the son, and baud of the daughter.

Q. *Give example out of some Poet.*

A. All this *Ovid* hath affected ma-

nifest

nifestly in his description of the Iron age. *Met* 1.

Ne doth the guest safe in his Inne remain,
His host him troubles who doth him retain:
Sisters ev'n from their brethren are not free, (to see.
The husband longs the death of's wife
She hateth him, and 'gainst him doth conspire;
The cursed stepdame's alwayes in an ire.
The sonne ere's time doth's fathers years inquire.

Q. *But the argument of such relations hath nothing contrary: yea it rather argueth mutuall causes: as, thou art my Father, I therefore am thy son. How then appeareth the Contraries?*

A. When I say I am thy father, I am not therefore thy son, then are the Contraries true.

Cap. 15.

Adverses.

Q. *What are Adverses?*

A. Adverses are Contraries affirming, which are perpetually adverse among themselves.

Q. *Give example out of some Poet.*

A. Æneid. 11.

No health in war, we all desire peace.

Q. Give further example.

A. White and black, hot and cold, vertue and vice, are opposed.

Q. Give example out of some Orator.

A. Parad. 1. Cont. Epe. Yet they do hold strongly, and defend accurately, that pleasure is the chief good: which to me truly doth seem to be the voyce of beasts, not of men; when as, whether God or Nature (as I may say) the mother of all things, hath given thee a soul, then which nothing is more excellent, nothing more divine; dost thou so cast and throw down thy self, as that thou thinkest there is no difference betwixt thee and the four-footed beasts?

Q. Wherein consists the force of this example?

A. Cicero hath opposed beasts and men, Adverses: pleasure is the good of beasts, and therefore of men.

Q. Give another example out of some Poet.

A. So liberty and servitude in *Tib. lib. 2.*

So servitude I see prepar'd for me,
Yet, parents, freedom would far better be.

Q. Give example out of an Orator.

A. Pri-

A. Pro Marcell. For temerity is never joyned with wisdom, neither is chance admitted to counsell.

CAP. 16.

Contradicents.

Q. *Having spoken of Contraries Affirming, we are come to Contraries Denying: What are they then?*

A. Contraries denying are such, of which one saith, the other denyeth the same.

Q. *What are the kinds?*

A. They are Contradicents or Privants.

Q. *What are contradicents?*

A. Contradicents are contraries denying, of which one denyeth every where.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Just, not Just; a creature, not a creature; it is, it is not: These are Contradicents.

Q. *Give example out of some Orator.*

A. Pro Murena. The sentences of *Cato* and *Cicero* are Contraries; this of the Stoicks, that man of the Academicks. The Dialogue is in these words;

Thou haſt known nothing: yea ſom-
things, but not all things. Thou haſ
done nothing meerly for thanks; yet re-
fuſe not thanks when as thine office an
truſt requireth it. Be not moved with
mercy in condemning; But yet there
is ſome praiſe of humanity. Stand in
thine own opinion: except a better
ſhould overcome.

Q. *Give example from ſome Poet.*

A. Mart. lib. 2.

Th'art fair Fabulla, *rich, & alſ' a maid,*
Can you deny tis truth that I have ſaid?
But if thou boaſteſt of thy ſelf too much,
Th'art neither fair, a virgine, nor yet rich.

Q. *Give another example out of ſome*
Orator.

A. Cicero (primo Tuſc.) forceth *Atticus* the Epicure by this argument to confeſſe, That the dead were not miſerable, if they were not at all, as the Epicures beleeve: I had rather (ſaith he) thou ſhouldſt fear *Cerberus*, then ſpeak ſo inconſiderately. *Attic.* Why? *Marcus*, That which thou denyeſt, that thou ſayeſt. Where is thy wit? For whenas thou ſayeſt, He is miſerable; thou then ſayeſt, He *is*, which is *not*. Then after long diſputation *Atticus* ſaid, Go to,

now

now I grant, that those which are dead are not miserable; because thou hast forced me to confesse, that they be not at all, lest they should be miserable.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. Terrence in Ev. Phedria frameth his speech to *Dorus*, when as he had affirmed that which hee denyed afterwards. After a manner (saith he) he saith; after a manner he denyeth.

Cap. 17.

Privants.

Q. *What are Privants?*

A. Privants are Contraries denying, of which one denyeth in the same Subject only, in which the Affirmative (of its own nature) is.

Q. *What is the Affirmative called?*

A. The Habit.

Q. *And what the Negative?*

A. Privation.

Q. *Make this plainer.*

A. Motion and Rest, Drunkenness and Sobriety are comprised under this head.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Mart. lib. 3.

Th' art drunken sure; sober thou would not do's.

Q. *What may further be under this head?*

A. To be blind, and to see.

Q. *Give example.*

A. *Pro Celio.* There is therefore one of this family, and he truly is greatly blinde: For he shall take no grief who shall not see her.

Q. *What may further be under this head?*

A. Poverty and Riches are thus opposed.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Mart. lib. 5.

Poore shalt thou be, Emilian *if poore:*
Wealth's never given but to th' rich before.

Q. *What further?*

A. Death and Life.

Q. *Give example.*

A. *Cont. Mil.* Sit ye still, O revengers of this mans death; Whose life, if you thought you could restore, would you?

Q. *What further?*

A. Silence and Speech.

Q. *Give example.*

A. *Prim*

A. Primo Cat. What expectest thou the authority of the speakers, whose silence thou beholdest to be their pleasures?

Q. *What more?*

A. Mortality and Immortality.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Pro Marc. I grieve when as the common-wealth ought to be immortal, that it consisteth of one mortal life.

And this sufficeth to be spoken of Disagreeing, from whence every thing may differ from another by certain means.

Cap. 18.

Equals.

Q *Simple arguments were Agreeings & Disagreeings; we are now come unto Comparatives. What are Comparatives therefore?*

A. Comparatives are those which are compared amongst themselves.

Q. *How are they manifested?*

A. Although they be equally known by the nature of Comparison; yet one to another is more known and illustrated then another: and oftentimes are judged

judged by ſhorter notes, ſomtimes di-
ſtinguiſhed by fuller parts.

Q. *What may theſe parts be call'd?*

A. They are named the Propoſi-
on and Reddition.

Q. *May not Comparatives alſo argu-
fictions?*

A. Yes, Comparatives doe argu
feigned things, and doe cauſe truſt.

Q. *What be the kindes of Compari-
ſons?*

A. Compariſon, is in Quantity, o
Quality.

Q. *What is Quantity?*

A. Quantity is that whereby i
ſhewed how much the thing compa-
red is.

Q. *What be the kindes of Quantity?*

A. Equals or Unequals.

Q. *What are Equals?*

A. Equals are thoſe of which there
is one quantity.

Q. *What is an Equall argument then?*

A. An equall argument is, when
an Equall is explicated by an Equall.

Q. *What are the notes of it?*

A. Even, equall, like, the ſame,
that, ſo much the more, how much
the more, by ſo much, by how much

ſo

so much, how much, not more nor lesse.

Also *Æneid.* 2. Equall with light windes. Æneid. 3.

And now't should grow in equal age with thee, Æneid 6.

Behold this thing, Great Rome with earth is even:
The spirit of man shall also equall heaven.

Q. *What further is necessary to these Equills?*

A. A proposition or Reddition doth distinguish them.

Q. *Give example out of some Orator.*

A. Quart. Cat. Whose things done, and the vertues to the same; by which things onely the course is contained in its regions and bounds.

Q. *Give example out of some Poet.*

A. Æneid 4.

As well a bruter of things false that be,
As messenger of truth and verity.

Cat.

By how much I am worst of poets all,
By so much thee men best of Patrons call.

Ovid de Trist. 4.

As many shels on shore, as roses sweet;
As many sleeps as men by poppy get;

As

As many beasts in woods, fish in sea lie;
As many birds as in the ayr do fly;
So many griefs me pass, which could I tell,
Icarian *waters I might number well.*

Q. *Proceed to further examples.*

A. Phil. 9. Neither had he more skill of the Law then of Justice: therefore those things which the Laws had brought forth, chiefly the civill, he always referred to ease and equity: neither had he rather approve actions of strife, then take away controversies.

Ovid. *de Art. Amand.*

'Tis no less vertue for to keep then get.

Pro Mur. I acknowledge this to be equall for *Lucius Murena*: and so equal, that neither he shall be overcome by dignity, neither by dignity shall overcome thee.

Phil. 2. Whose burthen being common, why not a common pay of them?

Ter. in Adelph. When as I care not for thine, care not thou for mine.

Q. *What may further be comprised under this head?*

A. Of this place are those that follow derived truely from Contraries, but treated of in the place of

of Equalls; as this of *Mart.*

Solibat, thou yeeld'st thou wast born thrall,
When flattring thou thy father Lord dost call.

Ovid 1. Fast.

There's price in price, the Censors honors give;
He giveth friendship: poor alone do live.

Q. *But are they not more frequent from Adverses?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. *Cicero Syl.* Neither do I understand my self to have been angry. But if I defend him whom thou accuseſt, why ſhould I not be angry with thee, who accuſeſt him whom I defend? he ſaith, I accuſe mine own enemy: and I ſaid, I defend my friend. So, *primo Tuſc.* But when they confeſs that there is force enough in vices to cauſe a miſerable life; why ſhould it not be granted, that there is force enough in vertues to effect a bleſſed life?

Q. *it ſhould ſeem by this, that Contraries are ſequences of Contraries.*

A. So they are.

Q. *What may further be compriſed under this head?*

A. Som-

A. Somtimes there is put forth like for like.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Such is the contention of the ſhepherds in *Virg. Eclog.* 3. *Dametas* firſt of all putting forth this riddle;

Tell in what place (and I will reckon thee
For great Apollo's *ſelf) the welkin large*
Iuſt three ells broad & no more ſeems to be.

And *Menalcas* anſwering in this other riddle;

Tell in what place the flowers have their marge
With kings names in their leaves inſcribed plain,
And to thy ſelf take Phillis *for thy pain.*

Q. *Give example of feigned Equalls.*

A. Feigned equalls are ſuch as is in *Æſchines Sacraticus*, wherein *Socrates* ſheweth *Aſpatia* ſpeaking to *Xenophons* wife, and *Xenophon* himſelf. Tell me I pray thee, thou wife of *Xenophon*, if thy neighbour ſhould have better gold then thou, whether hadſt thou rather have hers or thine? Hers, ſaid ſhe. And if ſhe have a gowne, and other womens garments of a greater price then thou, whether hadſt thou rather have hers or thine? Hers, ſaid ſhe.

ſhe. Go to then, If ſhe have a better husband then thou, hadſt thou rather have hers? Here the woman bluſhed. But *Aſpatia* ſpake to *Xenophon* himſelf; I pray thee (ſaid ſhe) if thy neighbour have a better horſe then thou, hadſt thou rather have his or thine? His, ſaid he: but if he have better ground then thou, whether hadſt thou rather have his? His, ſaid he: *viz.* the beſt. But if he have a better wife then thou haſt, whether hadſt thou rather have his or thine? And here *Xenophon* alſo himſelf held his peace.

CAP. 18

Greaters.

Q. *What are unequals?*

A. Unquals are thoſe of which the quantity is not one.

Q. *What be the kindes of unequals?*

A. Unequall is greater or leſſer.

Q. *What is Greater?*

A. Greater is that which quantity exceedeth.

Q. *What be the proper notes of it?*

A. Not only, but alſo; I had rather this then that.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Cicero pro Mur. There is taken from amongst us not onely that verball counterfeit of prudence, but also the Lady of things, Wisdom it self: The thing is carried by force; not onely the hatefull Orator in pleading, or the prattler, but also the truly good is despised. A horrid souldier is loved.

Q. *Is not a certain logicall gradation sometime joyned with a rhetorical climax, taken from hence?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Shew example.*

A. Pro Mil. Neither did he so handle himself to the people onely, but also to the Senate; neither to the Senate only, but also to the publick President and souldiers: neither to these alone, but also to the power of those, to whom the care of the Senate, souldiers, and the whole common-wealth of *Italy* was committed.

Q. *Give a poeticall example.*

A. Ju. Sat. 8. against a proud nobleman.

Rather had I Thirses thy Sire should be,
Whil'st that Æacides is like to thee:
And that thou should'st with Vulcan your make,

Then for Achilles *son men should thee take,* (ses be.
Or that thy feature should like Thir-

Q. Proceed to further example.

A. Pro. Marc. Having more admiration then glory. Æneid. 1.

O fellows, we these evils knew before;
God will them end, we greater far have bore.

Cic. pro Mur. Be not so unjust, that when as thy fountains are opened by thine enemies, our rivers should be stopped up even by our friends.

Q. Give an example of a gradation, without a rhetorical climax.

Ter. *Thr.* But doth *Thais* give me many thanks for it? *Gn.* Many. *Thr.* Sayest thou so? is she glad? *Gn.* Not so much for the gift it self, as that it was given by thee: for that she triumpheth in good earnest.

Q. Are not also Greaters feigned?

A. Yes, and of great force.

Q. Give example

A. Ter. *Heut.* A Noble-man, if he be made a Lover, can never undergo the charges: much lesse thou then.

Æneid. 5.

O great Æneas, although Jove should not

Promise

Promiſe to help or aid me now one jot,
I hope that Italy ſhall reach to heaven,
The winds once chang'd, their forces are
have driven,
Ariſing from black night i'th city caſt,
Our pow'r is weak, our greateſt ſtreng
(but waſ

Cap. 20.

Leſſers.

Q. *What is Leſſer?*

A. Leſſer is that whoſe quantity is exceeded.

Q. *How is a Leſſer judged?*

A. Oftentimes by proper notes.

Q. *What be theſe notes?*

A. Not only: But not all: Rather this then that: Whenas; As alſo.

Q. *How elſe?*

A. By Grammaticall compariſon.

Q. *How laſtly?*

A. By the denying of parts.

Q. *Give example of the notes out of ſome Orator.*

A. Cic. *ſecund. Cat.* No man, not onely of *Rome*, but in no corner of all *Italy* was ever oppreſſed with ſo great a Tax, as that he once knew of ſo incre-

dible

dible a *Cesar*. *Cat.* 1. Thou canst rather as an Exul tempt, then as a Consul vex the Common-wealth. *Ag.* 2. Which, when to all it is very hard, and an evill reason, then truly to me above the rest.

Q. Give poeticall examples.

A. Ovid. Trist. 1. *(be*
More fierce then Busiros, *more fierce then*
Who in slow fire his ox burnt furiously.

Ovid. 1. de Remed. Amor.

Thy body to redeem, bear sword and fire,
Ne drink to cool thy thirsty hot desire:
To save thy soul wilt thou not all forbear?
This part exceeds the other price by far.

Q. Give example of those which are done by the denying of parts.

A. Phil. 9. All in all ages who have had the understanding of the Law in this city, if they might be brought together into one place, are not to be equalled with *Servius Sulpitius*. *Cat.* 2. Although those which say that *Catilina* is gone to *Messilia*, do not so much complain of it, as fear it.

Q. Is it not somtimes without notes?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Pro Mur. Thou art so much wanting

wanting from the perfection of gre[illegible] works, as the foundation, which tho[illegible] thinkest thou hast not yet layd. *Pr[illegible] Arch.* The stones and desarts oft[illegible] times answer to the voyce, wild beas[illegible] are tamed and subdued by singing [illegible] shall not then the instructions of th[illegible] Poets in the best thing move us?

Q. Is there not also a gradation fro[illegible] Lesses?

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Ver. 7. Is it a great act to over-throw the city *Rome*, to beat a knave, to kill a Parricide? What shall I say? to hang him upon the gallows?

Q. Are not Lessers also somtimes feigned?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Virg. Eclog. 1.

The light heel'd Hinds in th' air shal feed (therfore
And in the Ocean all the fishes die
For want of water, on the naked shore:
The wandring Parthian *first shall drinken dry*
Huge Araxis; *and gusling* Germany
Suck down their thirsty throats swift Tigris *tide,*

Er[illegible]

Ere his sweet face shall from my bosome slide.

Q. Give another example.

A. Phil. 2. O filthy thing, not only to the sight, but also to hear of! If it had happened to thee amongst thine inhumane pots, who would not have accounted it filthy? but in the assembly of the *Romans* about publick affairs, the Master of the Horse, to whom it is not comely to belch, he vomiting a crust of bread and wine, filled his lap and all the Tribunal with stink.

CAP. 21.

Likes.

Q. You have expounded Comparison in Quantity, Comparison in Quality followeth. What therefore is Quality?

A. Quality is that whereby the things compared are said to be such.

Q. What are the kindes of Quality?

A. Like or Dislike.

Q. What are Likes?

A. Likes are those of which there is the same quality.

Q. What are Likes called?

A. Like is called Proportion, as

the

the Likes are proportionable.

Q. *What are the notes of Likenes whereby it is concluded in one word?*

A. Like, effigies, in that manner; as also denials of dislikenes.

Q. *What be they?*

A. Such as this; Not otherewise.

Q. *Give example of the first sort.*

A. *Æneid.* 1. His mouth and shoulders being like to God. *Phi.* 9. Though *Servius Sulpitius* could leave no clearer monument then his son, the effigies of his mãers, vertues, constancy, piety, wit.

Q. *Give example out of some Poet.*

A. Ovid. Trist. 1. (*wound*

For he or none, even he that made the Onely Achilles *'tis can make me sound.*

Q. *Proceed to farther examples.*

A. *In Phis.* There was one day, which was to me the likenes of immortality, wherein I returned to my country. *Ver.* 1. But presently from the same likenes of a man, as it were by some *Circean* pot, he is made a Beare. *Pr. Pomp.* Therefore all in this place do behold *Cons. Pompeius* not as one sent from the city; but fallen from heaven. *Æneid.* 3. They do not that which I have commanded. *Ter.* I am not, neither

have

have beene otherwise then he.

Q. What is the partition of likenes?

A. Disjoyned or continued.

Q. What is a disjoyned similitude?

A. A disjoyned similitude is when as foure termes are distinguished to the thing.

Q. Give example.

A. Eclog. 5.

So me thy song as sleep on grass doth please
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.

Q. What is the force of this example?

A. The *songs* to the *hearers*, as *sleepe* to the *weary*, are foure distinct termes.

Q. Give another example.

A. Ad fratrem: As the best governours cannot overcome the force of the tempest, so the wisest men oftentimes cannot overcome the violence of fortune.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. Here are four termes, as the *governour* to the *shippe*, so *wise men* to *fortune*.

Q. Proceed to farther examples.

A. Trist. 1.

As yellow glod in flaming fire is seen,
So men may trust in time that's sharp and keen.

Cic. Phil. 2. But even as those who in a great sickness do not taste the sweetnesse of meat; so the lustfull, covetous, wicked have not the taste of true praise. *Virgil* made these Verses;

All night it rain'd, next day the signes were seen. (tween.
Th' Empire's parted Cesar *and* Jove *be-*

Battillus arrogated them to himself, and obtained a great reward: therefore *Virgil* in these Verses mocketh *Battillus*:

I made these rhimes, another had the land,
So Birds, you nests not for your selves have made:
So you, ô Bees, make hony not for you:
So you, ô Sheep, bear wool, but not for you:
So you, ô Oxen, plough, but not for you.

Q. Are not the notes sometimes omitted?

A. Yes, somtimes there is no note at all.

Q. Give an example.

A. Virg. Eclog. 2.

Ah my fair boy, trust not thy hue too much

Hurt'ed,

Hurtles, though black, by every handſome hand (to touch;
Are pluck'd; while Dayſies none vouchſafe
Though they be white, yet ſhed they as they ſtand.

Q. *What is continuall likeneſs?*

A. A continuall likeneſſe is when as the firſt terme is to the ſecond, ſo the ſecond to the third.

Q. *Give an example.*

A. De Leg. 3. See you not that this is the Magiſtrates power, that he ſhould rule and preſcribe right, profitable, and agreeing things with the lawes? for as the lawes do govern the Magiſtrates, ſo the Magiſtrates do rule the people.

Q. *What is the force of this example?*

A. Here are three terms, Laws, Magiſtrates, People.

Q. *Have not feigned likeneſs equal force with theſe above?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. It appeareth chiefly in this explicated ſimilitude of *Eſope* his Apology, taken out of *Horace, Epiſt.* 1.

But if Romes *people ask me happily,*
Why not 'mongſt Iudges on the bench ſit I,

And do that which they love, fly that they hate?
I answer as the crafty Fox of late,
When toth' sick lion he this message sent,
Fain would I come, to that thing was I bent;
But that I saw the steps of many feet
That way to go, none back again to get.

CAP. 22.

Dislikes.

Q. *What are dislikes.*

A. Dislikes are comparatives, whose quality is diverse.

Q. *What are the proper notes of dislikes?*

A. Dislike, different, another.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Pro Plan. Although the paying of mony and thanks be unlike. *Æneid.* 1. O ancient house! O how unlike for that Lord to govern! *Cæs. Pri. Bel. Gal.* All these differed in their tongues, instructions, lawes. *Agra.* 2. One is known by his countenance, another by his voyce, another by his gate. *De Nat. Deo.* 2. Because I have begun to do otherwise then I had said in the beginning.

Q. *Art*

Q. Are not dislikes also knowne by denying the likes?

A. Yes.

Q. Give an example.

A. De orat. 2. Philosophy is not like the other artes. *Æneid* 2. But he was not of that seed wherein thou remembrest *Achilles*, such was *Priamus* his enemy. *Lor. Epist.* 1. There is not the same age, the same minde. *Ad frat.* 1. So thy ring is not as a certain vessel, but as thy self. *Phil.* 3. This certain day he is wont to expect not so much of sacrifice as counsel.

Q. Give some poeticall examples.

A. By this argument the shepherd confesseth his error, *Æclog.* 1.

Ah fond friend Melibe, *I whilom deem'd*
That famous city which I now and then
In common chat amongst our country men,
Have heard denoted by the name of Rome
For all the world like to our homely home.

And by and by;

——so did I dare (dams,
Kids liken to their Goats, whelpes to their
And Moul-hills wont to mountains to compare.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. As neither the whelpes to the

dogges, nor kids to their dams; so n
ther is *Mantua* like to *Rome*.

Q. Be not notes of dislikes sometime wanting?

A. Yes, oftentimes, and the dislike-nes is more clearly explicated.

Q. Give an example out of some Orator.

A. Quint. l. 1. *c* 11. *Brutus* slew th children of the traitors: *Muntius* di punish by death the vertue of his sonn

Q. Give another example.

A. Cat: the sunne sets and riseth a gain: but when our little light se teth, there is a perpetual night.

Cap. 23.

Conjugates.

Q. Hitherto you have expounded th first arguments, those derived from th first follow; What are they then?

A. Those derived from the first ar these, which are even to that whic they argue, as the first from whenc they are derived.

Q. What be the kinds of these arg ments?

A. A Conjugate, a Notation, a Distri-

Distribution, and a Definition.

Q. *What are Conjugates?*

A. Conjugates are names drawn diversly from the same principle.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Justice, just, justly.

Q. *Is there not a symboll in conjugate of agreeing arguments?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Propert. *lib.* 2.

Because in love there is no liberty,
Who ever loves, that man can ne'r be free.

Q. *Shew the force of this example.*

A. Here liberty is the cause why we should be free.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. *Cic. Nat. Deo.* 2. Where he speaketh of *Dionysius* the Tyrant. He commanded that the tables of silver in which were the images of the gods, should be taken away; in which, after the manner of the *Græcians*, should b ingraven, *The goods of the gods*; saying, that he was willing to use of their goodness.

Q. *Shew the force of this example.*

A. The Gods are good, therefore their goodnesse is to be used; here

from the Effects it is directed to the Causes.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. Ter. I am a man, no humane thing is strange to me.

Q. *Is it not sometimes from the subject to the adjunct?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Phil. 2. I will not handle thee as a Consul, lest thou handle me as one standing for the Consulship. *In Pis.* When as all the cause was of the Consul's and Senate, both the Consuls and Senate had need of my help.

CAP. 24.

Notations.

Q. *What is notations?*

A. Notation is the interpretation of a name.

Q. *What are names?*

A. Names truely are notes of things.

Q. *May there not be rendred a reason of the names?*

A. Yes, either from the deriation or composition, if they be made by

by true notation, from some first argument.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Homo ab humo. Ovid. Fast. 6. *Sat vi terra sua, vi stando vesta vocatur.*

Q. *Shew the force of this example.*

A. This is a notation from the cause.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. At focus à flammis, & quod fovit omnia dictus.

Q. *Shew the force of this example.*

A. This is a notation from the effects.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. Vir. 4. O Verrea præclara! quid enim accessisti, quo non attuleris tecum istum diem? & enim quam tu domum, quam urbem adiisti, quod fanum denique, quod non eversum, atque extersum reliqueris? quare appellentur sanè ista Verrea, quæ non ex nomine, sed ex moribus, naturâque tuâ constituta esse videantur?

Q. *Shew the force of this example.*

A. This is also a notation from the effects.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. Ovid. Fast. 1. *(hæc est,*
Prima dies tibi carna datur, dea cardinis

Nomine clausa aperit, claudit aperta suo.

Q. Wherein is the force of this example?

A. This is a notation from the subjects in the inward, about which the deity of this goddesse is exercised.

Q. Give another example.

A. From the adjuncts there is a notation from *Bambalion*, *Phil.* 2. Quia balbus & stupidus: hinc igitur cavillatio in Antonium generum. Tuæ conjugis, bonæ fœminæ, locupletatæ quidem certè, *Bambalio* quidem patre, bono nullo numero, nihil illo contemptius, qui propter hæsitantiam linguæ stuporémque cordis, cognomen ex contumelia traxerit.

Q. Shew the force of this example.

A. This is a notation from adjuncts.

Q. Are there not notations also from disagreeings?

A. Yes.

Q. Give example.

A. Quint. lib. 1. cap. 6. Lucus, quia umbra opacus parum luceat: & ludus, quia sit longissimè a lusu; & dis, quia minimè dives.

Q. May not notation be also from comparatives? *A.* Ye

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Pyropus, quod ignis flammam imitetur.

Q. *But is there not, as to the notation to his name, so an affection of the name to the notation?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Animi plenus, ergo animosus.

Q. *Shew the contrary.*

A. Animosus, ergo animi plenus.

Cap. 25.

Distribution.

Q. *What are the other derived arguments?*

A. Distribution and Definition.

Q. *Is there not a reciprocall affection in both these?*

A. Yes.

Q. *What is the affection in the distribution?*

A. Of all parts with the whole.

Q. *What is the affection in the definition?*

A. Of the Definition with the things defined.

Q. *What*

Q. *What is a Distribution?*

A. A Distribution is, when the whole is distributed into parts.

Q. *What is the whole?*

A. The whole is that which containeth parts.

Q. *What are parts?*

A. Parts are those which are contained of the whole.

Q. *It should seem then that the distinction of the whole into parts, is Distribution.*

A. So I said.

Q. *What is then the collection of the parts to the making up of the whole?*

A. It is called Induction.

Q. *Whence is Distribution taken?*

A. Distribution is taken from arguments altogether agreeing, but disagreeing amongst themselves: therefore it shall be by so much more accurate, by how much the agreeings of the parts shall be with the whole, and the disagreeing among themselves.

Cap. 26.

The destribution from the cause.

Q. *Whence is the First Distribution?*

A. The

A. The first distribution is from absolute Agreeings.

Q. *What are these absolute Agreeings?*

A. The Causes and Effects.

Q. *What is distribution from the Causes?*

A. Distribution from the Causes, is when the parts are causes of the whole. Here the distribution of perfect into its members is greatly praised.

Q. *What is Perfect?*

A. Perfect is the whole, to which the parts are essentiall.

Q. *What is a member?*

A. A member is a part of the whole.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Grammer is divided into Etymology and Syntaxis; Rhetorick, into Elocution and Action; Dialectica, into Invention and Judgment: for those Arts are constituted of those parts.

Q. *What is the principall Distribution?*

A. When the explication of a longer thing is received.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Georg.

A. Georg. 1.

What makes glad corn, and how to till the ground, (sound:
How to plant elms, that be so strong and
How to guide oxen, cattell how to tend,
And how the little pretty Bee defend,
I will declare.——

Q. *Give another example.*

A. Cic. pro Mur. I understand, O you Judges, that the whole accusation hath three parts; one of which is in reprehension of life, another in contention of dignity, the third touching the fault.

Q. *How is the second kinde of handling this kinde of argument?*

A. Either from the Parts to the Whole; or from the Whole to the Parts.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Cat.

Quintia is faire to many, so to me,
I will not therefore this same thing deny;
But wholly faire I will not say she's not,
True beauty in her there is not a jot.
Lesbius faire in every part, most fine,
Venus adorn'd her, cleer did make her shine.

CAP. 27.

The distribution from the Effects; also the Genus and Species.

Q. *What is the Distribution from the Effects?*

A. The Distribution from the Effects, is when the Parts are Effects.

Q. *Give example.*

A. In a ship the sea-men, some scale the masts, some run in at the doors, some draw water, the Governour holdeth the rudder in the ship.

Q. *May not distribution of Genus into Species be comprised under this head?*

A. Yes, distribution of Genus into Species doth here excell.

Q. *What is Genus?*

A. Genus is the whole essential in parts

Q. *What is Species?*

A. Species is the parts of Genus.

Q. *Give example.*

A. We say, A living creature is the genus of a man, and a beast; for a living creature is the whole of that effect; *viz.* a corporall living substance, which commonly pertaineth to the beasts and men: We say, the species of a man and

a beast is living, because they are parts of a living subject, which living essence they have common: We say, A man is the genus of every man, and a lion the genus of every lion; but contrary, every man the species of a man, every lion of a lion.

Q. *What is the kinds of the Genus?*

A. The Genus is most generall, or subalternat.

Q. *What are the kinds of the Species?*

A. The Species is subalternate, or most speciall.

Q. *What is the most generall Genus?*

A. The most generall Genus, is that of which there is no kinds.

Q. *Give example.*

A. In Logical Invention, an argument is the most generall genus of artificials, and inartificials.

Q. *What is the subalternate Genus, and the subalternate Species?*

A. The subalternate Genus, as also the subalternate Species, is that which is the species of this, but the genus of that.

Q. *Give example.*

A. The Cause is the species of an absolute arguing Argument, but the genus of the Matter, and Form.

Q. *But*

Q. *But what is the most ſpecial Species?*

A. The moſt ſpeciall Species is that which is individable into other ſpecies.

Q. *Give example.*

A. The matter and forme ſingly.

Q. *What are the Genus and Species notes of?*

A. Of the Cauſes and Effects.

Q. *Give example.*

A. In a living thing there is a corporeal eſſence, which in the matter is belonging commonly to the ſpecies, as alſo the faculty of life & ſenſe, which in the form pertaineth commonly to the ſpecies.

Q. *It ſhould ſeeme that the Genus contains the cauſes which attain to the ſpecies of it; and therefore contrarily, the Species contains the Effects of their Genus.*

A. So it is.

Q. *From whence then is that univerſall famouſnes and excellency?*

A. From hence, becauſe it declareth the cauſes.

Q. *Shew ſome example now of the diſtributions of the Genus into Species.*

A. Diſtribution of Genus into Species is very excellent truly, but hard and ſeldom found; yet we wil bring what illuſtrations and examples wee can

can. *Ovid.* (*Met.* 1.) divideth living creatures into five Species; Starrs, Birds Beasts, Fish, Men: hee giveth life to the starrs, as the Philosophers doe.

No region is without some living thing,
Stars in the skies, the forms of gods being,
Birds in the aire in abundance be,
Beasts on the earth, and fishes in the sea.
But yet 'mongst these a creature more divine,
Who may them rule & govern all, in fine.
There wanted much, until the man was
born.

So *Cic.* (*Offic.* 1.) divideth vertue into four Species, Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance; but all that is honest springeth out of one of these four parts; for either it is conversant in the knowledg and skill of the truth, or in the defending the society of men, and giving every one his owne; Also in trust of things bargained, or in a high mind and admirable greatness and courage. Or lastly, in all things which are made and called order and means, in which is modesty and temperance.

Q. *What is distribution of the Genus into the formes of the Species?*

A. Distri-

A. Distribution of the Genus into the formes of the Species is the same; because the forme with the Genus, constitute their Species.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Of living creatures, one is speaking, another dumb.

Q. *May not Genus and Species be handled apart and severally?*

A. Yes, Genus and Species are not only handled after this simple forme of division, but also apart one from another.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Pro Arc. But least any should wonder that we say so, that there is a certain faculty of wit, and this reason or discipline of speaking; neither that we have truly given our selves altogether to this study: For all Arts which pertain to humanity, have a certain common hand, and are contained (as it were) in a certain knowledg amongst themselves.

Q. *Shew the force of this example.*

A. Art is the Genus, Poesie and Eloquence the Species.

Q. *Is not the Genus handled also by the Species?*

A. Yes

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Ovid de Trist. 4. (grau.

Fill thy sad matter with thy vertue
Hot glory doth decay, it none can save.
Who had known Hector, *if* Troy *wa*
had been? (seen
Through publick vices way to vertue
Thine Art, ô Typhis *lyes, if in the sea*
There be no floods: if men be well, truly,
Then Phœbus *Art decayeth instantly.*
That which they hid, and is not known fo
good, (steed
Appears at last, and shews where evi

Q. *But are there no speciall example fitted to this kinde?*

A. Yes, such as this. *Attic.* 7. Wi thou leave the city? what if the Frenchmen come? The common-weal (he saith) is not in walls, but Alta and Religion. *Themistocles* did th same, and a whole host of *Barbarian* were not able to take one city. Bu *Pericles* did not so, who in the year almost before fifty, when he kept nothing but a wall; our city before being taken, they kept the tower notwithstanding.

CAP.

Cap. 28.

Distribution from the Subject.

Q. *What is the other distribution?*

A. The other distribution is of Agreeings after a certain manner.

Q. *What are Agreeings after a certain manner?*

A. The subjects and adjuncts.

Q. *What is the distribution from subjects?*

A. The distribution from Subjects, is, when the parts are subjects.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Cat. *(ween,*
Thy maiden-head's not wholly thine, I
One part thy father gave, the part between
Thou of thy mother had'st; so that to thee
None but the third remaineth for to be:
Therefore resist not two, cast not away
The thing thy parents gave to thee, I say.

Q. *Give example out of some Orator.*

A. Cic. Tusc. 1. There are therefore three kindes of good, as I understond from the *Stoicks*, to whose use, oftener then I am wont, we give place. There are therefore those kindes of

good

good, which may be externally enjoyed of the body: Also because others are to be undertaken, they are therefore called good. There are other divine things which do more nearly concern us, and are heavenly; so that those who have attained them, why may I not call them after a manner blessed, yea most happy?

Cap. 29.

Distribution from adjuncts.

Q. *What is distribution from Adjuncts.*

A. Distribution from Adjuncts is when the parts are Adjuncts.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Of men, some are sound, some sick, some rich, some poor.

Q. *Give a poeticall example.*

A. *Virgil (Georg.* 1.) divideth the world into five parts; the middle scorching hot, the other two extream cold, the two last temperate.

Five zones the heavens do hold, the middle hot,
The sun there burns, cold in it the is
But on the right and left ha there
seen

Rain, frost and cold, that's bitter, sharpe and keen.
The two last temperate, yet in them is Mortality, and many sicknesses.

Q. *Give an Orators example.*

A. Cæs. Bel. Gal. 1. All *France* is divided into three parts; of which, one the *Belgians* inhabite, the other the *Æquitans*, the third those who in their tongue are called *Cetts*, in our language the *Gaules*.

CAP. 30.

Definition.

BODLEIANA BIBLIOTHECA

Q. *What is definition?*

A. Definition is when it is explicated what the thing is, and that interchangeably may be argued with the thing defined.

Q. *What are the kinds of Definition?*

A. A Definition is perfect or imperfect.

Q. *What is the Perfect definition called?*

A. This is properly called a Definition.

Q. *What is the Imperfect called?*

A. A Description.

Q. *What*

Q. *What is a perfect Definition?*

A. A Perfect definition is a definition consisting of the onely Causes which constitute the Essence: such as the causes comprehended by the genus and form.

Q. *Give example.*

A. After this manner is a man defined, *viz.* by the genus (a living creature) we understand (as it is said) a Corporeal Essence full of life and sense, which is the Matter, and a part of the Form of a man; to which, if thou addest *reasonable*, thou comprehendest the whole form of a man, by the whole faculty of his Life, Sense, Reason.

Q. *It should seem then that the Perfect definition is nothing else then an universall symbol of the Causes constituting the Essence and Nature of things?*

A. So it is.

Q. *Give an example.*

A. the Arts have such definitions; Grammer, of well speaking; Rhetoricke, of pleading well; Dialectica, of disputing well; Arithmetick, of numbring well; Geometry, of measuring well.

Cap.

Cap. 31.

Description.

Q. *What is Description?*

A. Description is a definition defining the thing from other arguments also.

Q. *Give example.*

A. This is the description of a man; A man is a living creature, mortall, capable of discipline.

Q. *Are not proper circumstances also mingled with common causes sometimes?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Then it seemeth that succint brevity is not alwayes in this kinde.*

A. No, oftentimes it desireth a clearer and greater explication.

Q. *Give an example out of some Orator.*

A. In Mil. Glory is described. But yet of all rewards of vertue (if there be a reason of rewards) the greatest is glory; this one comforteth us touching the shortness of our life, causeth that we are present with the absent; of

dead, maketh us to live. To conclude; by these steps we do seem to ascend into heaven.

Q. *Give a poeticall example.*

A. *Æneid.* 4. Fame is described.

From Lybians *temple cometh forth great fame,* (*this name,*
Nought swifter then ill news which beare
Moving she goes, by going strength she gets; (*she fleets,*
She feares at first, at last with windes
VValkes on the earth, her head she lifts to th' skie; (*angery;*
Earth brought her forth, the gods were
In Cœus *and* Encelladus *his land*
She was at last, as I do understand;
Her feet were swift, her wings most hurtful were,
A horrid monster, wicked, ful of feare.
As many feathers as upon her are,
So many eyes attend her every where,
So many tongues, so many mouths do sound,
So many ears do listen her around.
In night she flies through heaven, and in the shade
About the earth she goes, no noyse is made:
She sitteth by the light on houses high,
And causeth townes to quiver fearfully;
As well a bruiter of things false that be,

As

As messenger of truth and verity.

Q. *Procced to further example?*

A. Such are the descriptions of plants and living creatures, in Physicke: also of rivers, mountains, cities, in Geography and Historie.

Cap. 32.

Divine testimony.

Q. *You have expounded the Artificial arguments, the Inartificiall followeth; Tell me then what an Inartificiall argument is?*

A. An Inartificiall argument is, that which argueth not by its own nature, but taketh force from some artificiall argument.

Q. *It seemeth by this, when a hidden truth of things is more subtily searched for, that this argument hath small force of proofe.*

A. So it is: but in civill and humane things oftentimes this argument effecteth the greatest trust from the moving arguments, if wisdome, vertue, and good will be present.

Q. *What is it called?*

A. In one name it is called Testimony.

Q. *What are the kindes of Testimony?*

A. Divine or Humane.

Q. *What may be compriſed under the head of Divine Teſtimony?*

Q. Not onely the miracles of the gods, but alſo the anſwers of prophets and fortune-tellers are counted amongſt divine Teſtimonies.

Q. *Give example.*

A. All theſe are brought forth, *Cat.* For that I may omit (ſaith the Orator) the fires ſeen in the night from the Weſt, and the burning of heaven, as alſo lightning, and earthquakes, with other many things done to us Conſuls, as thoſe which are now done, do ſeem to proclaime the gods immortality. And a little after; At which time, when the *Araſpatians* were come together out of all *Hetruria*, they ſaid that ſlaughter, burning, periſhing of the lawes, civill and domeſticall war, and the fall of the whole City and Empire approached, unleſs the immortall gods (pleaſed by all reaſon) by their power ſhould change thoſe deſtinies. At length, when he had ſaid that they mocked at the anſwer of the *Ariſpatians*, and that they did more regard the ſigns

signe of *Jove* turning to the East; He then said; But is not he so present, that it should seem to be done at the beck of the mighty *Jove*, that when this, morning before my doore, by my command and conjuration, the Judges being then in the house of *Concordia*, at the same time there appeared a signe which being turned towards you and the Senate, both you and the Senate saw manifestly laid open, who they were that were against the health of all men?

Q. *Give another example.*

A. That of *Tibullus* is more short.

But if that oracles true things do tell,
Then this in our name see thou do declare:
That he doth promise Delius *to give*
To be thy spouse, with whom thou'lt happy live.

CAP. 33.

Testimony from humane law and sentences.

Q. *What be the kindes of humane Testimony?*

A. Humane Testimony is common, or proper.

Q. *What is common?*

A. Law, and a famous Sentence.

Q. *What is legall testimony?*

A. Legall testimony is both unwritten and written.

Q. *Bring forth authority for this.*

A. Pro Mil. For there is (O ye Judges) a law not writtē, but born with us, which we have not received, learned, read; but taken, drawn, expressed from Nature: as if our life should be in some hazard, force, danger either of theeves or enemies, all honest reasō were to be sought of safety; but if the twelve Tables will have the night theefe, yea the day theef too, if he defend himself after any manner, killed without punishment; who is there that will thinke him that is slain to be punished, when as there is a sword reached to us, to kill that man by the Lawes themselves?

Q. *What are famous Sentences?*

A. Proverbs.

Q. *Give example.*

A. They be such as these. *Pares cum paribus facillimè congregantur. Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna.*

Q. *What may further be under this head?* *A.* Say-

A. Sayings of wisdome also.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Nosce teipsum. Nequid nimis. Spondepraestò ad detrimentum.

Q. *What is Proper testimony?*

A. Such as this of *Plato.* 1. *ad Quint. fratr.* And then truely, *Plato* the Prince of wisdome, and learning, thought those cõmon-wealths blessed, if either learned and wise men governed them, or those that did govern, placed all their study in wisdome and learning.

Q. *Proceed to further example.*

A. Such were in the Poets, *Æneid* 4 Learn justice and admonitions, and contemn not the rich. So in *Homer.*

Αἴας δ' ἐκ Σαλαμῖνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νῆας.

Ajax led out of *Salamina* 12 ships. The *Magatenses* were overcome by the *Athenians.*

Q. *What are testimonies of the living?*

A. Testimonies of the living, are not only when it is inquired of ground, felling of wood, and such like business; but also there are testimonies of obligation, confessing, oath.

Q. *Give an example of obligation.*

A. Phil. 5. For I dare bind my faith (*P.C.*) to you and the people of *Rome*, that truly, when no force constrained me, I durst not do; and I feared an opinion of temerity, in a thing greatly hurtfull; I promise and swear (*P.C.*) to become alwayes such a citizen to *Cesar*, as he himself is, and as we ought chiefly to wish or desire.

Q. *Have we not an obligation set forth sometimes with a pledge?*

A. Yes: *Virg. Eclog.* 3.

Wilt then by turnes, we hand to hand do try (deed?
What either can, and prove each by our
Ile pawn this heifer (which left thou deny)
She twice hath come already to the payle,
And two twins suckles at this time. Now say, (tervail.
What pawn thou'lt gage with her to coun-

Q. *What are the kindes of confession?*

A Confession is free, or extorted by torments.

Q. *What is this later properly called?*

A Aquestion.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Such

A. Such an argument there is against *Milon*, whom *Cicero* derided. Go to then, VVhat, or how is the queſtion? how? where was *Roſcius*? where was *Caſca*? Doth *Clodius* lay ſnares for *Milon*? he hath done, ſurely the gallows. He had done nothing.

Q. *What further may be reduced hitherto?*

A. Hitherto may be referred the argument which weuſe when we bring forth our approbation, and experience of our affirmative.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Ver. 4. Even *Volcatio*, if he had come freely, would he have given a little book? he ſhall come, he ſhall be tryed; no man truely receiveth it. *Ter.* Spend thy time in letters, in the woods, in muſick: It is meet for youth to know theſe liberal things. I will give diligence.

Q. *Give a poeticall example.*

A. Ovid. Triſt. 3.

The which, that thou mayſt better credit me,
Try thou my pains, beleeve it then to be.

Q. *Give an example alſo of the Teſtimony of an oath.*

A. Æneid. 6. (seen,
I swear by th' gods, and all in earth un-
I have departed from thy shore, ô Queen.

Q. *This reciprocation seemeth to be more obscure, as because the testimony is true, the witnes is also true.*

A. So it is: and thus much sufficeth to have spoken of Invention, the first part of the science *Dialectica.*

THE SECOND BOOK OF *PETER RAMUS* His DIALECTICA *of Judgement.*

CAP. I.

What Judgement is.

Q. HItherto *the first part of Dialectica in* Invention *hath bin expounded; the other part followeth, in* Judgment.

ment. *What then is Judgment?*

A. Judgment is the second part of Logick, of disposing arguments to be judged well.

Q. *How are they judged?*

A. Every thing is judged by a certain rule of disposition.

Q. *It may be thought then, that this part of Logick is called both Judgment and Disposition from hence.*

A. So it is.

Cap. 2.

An affirmative or negative Axioma.

Q. *What are the kindes of judgment?*

A. Judgment is Axiomatical, or Dianoeticall.

Q. *What is an Axioma?*

A. Axioma is the disposition of an argument with an argument; wherein somwhat is judged to be, or not to be.

Q. *What is it called, and whence receiveth it the name?*

A. In the Latin of *Enuntiatum*, it is called *Enuntiation*; of *Pronuntiatum*, *Pronuntiation*. Q. *What*

Q. *What are the the affections of an Axioma.*

A. An Axioma is Affirmative, or Negative.

Q. *What is affirmative?*

A. Affirmative is when the force of it is affirmed.

Q. *And what Negative?*

A. When it is denied. From hence ſpringeth the contradiction of Axiomas, when the ſame argument is affirmed or denied.

Cap. 3.

True and falſe.

Q. *What may be a ſecond kinde of the affections of an Axioma?*

A. An Axioma ſecondly is true or falſe.

Q. *How true?*

A. When it pronounceth as the thing is.

Q. *How falſe?*

A. Contrary.

Q. *What are the affections of a true Axioma?*

A. A true Axiomas is contingent or neceſſary.

Q. *How*

Q. *How contingent?*

A. When it is so true, that it may somtimes be false.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Fortune helpeth the bold; for it may be that which is true to day, to morrow may be false: and therefore the judgment of this contingent verity, is called Opinion: those things of the time past or present, may be certain to a man; but of time to come they cannot by nature, although with God all things are present. Therefore *Martial* doth worthily mock *Priscus.*

Priscus, thou often ask'st what I shall be;
If now most rich, hereafter what, truly?
Things for to come canst thou not tel them me?
If thou a Lion art, what wilt thou be?

Q. *How necessary?*

A. When it is alwayes true, neither can be false.

Q. *What is this affirmative called?*

A. This affirmative is called καθολικὸς, of every thing.

Q. *How impossible?*

A. Contrarily, where it can be true of nothing.

Q. *What belongeth to an Axioma of the artes?*

A. An

A. An axioma of the arts ought to be καθαπαντὸς; as also Homogene & Catholick.

Q. *What is an homogene axioma?*

A. An homogene axioma is when the parts are essentiall among themselves: as the form to the thing formed, the subject to its proper adjunct.

Q. *What is this called?*

A. This Genus of the Species is called καθ' αὐτὸ, by it self.

Q. *What is a Catholick axioma.*

A. A Catholick axioma is when the consequent is alwayes true of the antecedent; not onely in every thing and by it self, but also reciprocally.

Q. *Give example.*

A. A man is a living creature, reasonable: Number is equal or unequal.

Q. *What is this called?*

A. This is called καθόλου πρῶτον, universally first.

Q. *What then are the lawes of the proper documents of the arts?*

A. These three: the first, καθαπαντὸς, the law of verity: the second, καθ' αὐτὸ, the law of justice: the third, καθόλου πρῶτον, called the law of wisdom.

And

And such is the judgment of catholick axiomas, the most true and chief knowledge.

Cap. 4.

The simple Axioma.

Q. *You have expounded the common affection of axiomas, the kindes follow: what are then the kindes of an axioma,*

A. An axioma is simple or compound.

Q. *What is simple?*

A. Simple is that which is contained in the force of one word; and therefore by an affirmative or negative word it affirmeth or denieth.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Fire burneth, fire is hot, fire is not water.

Q. *Shew the force of these examples.*

A. Here *fire* is the antecedent, *burneth* the consequent: and this is the first disposition of invented things; of the cause with the effect, as in the first example; the subject with the adjunct, as in the second; the disagreeing with the disagreeing, in the third: After a certain manner

manner any argument may be enuntiated (except those full of comparison and distribution) ; agreeings, truely, by affirming ; disagreeings by denying.

Q. *What are the kindes of a simple axioma.*

A. A simple axioma is generall, or speciall.

Q. *What is generall?*

A. Generall is when the common consequent is attributed generally to the common antecedent: And this contradiction doth not alwayes divide the true and false ; but both parts of the contingent, as also not of contingents may be false.

Q. *Give example of the first.*

A. Each place delighted is with *Baiis* pleasant Rooms.
No place delighted is with *Baiis* pleasant Rooms.

Q. *Give example of the second.*

A. Every creature is reasonable: no creature is reasonable.

Q. *What is a speciall axioma?*

A. A specall axioma is when the consequent is not attributed to every antecedent: and here the contradiction ever divideth the true from the false.

Q. *What*

Q. *What are the kinds of speciall?*

A. Speciall is particular, or proper.

Q. *What is particular?*

A. Particular is when the common consequent is attributed particularly to the antecedent: but to this axioma it is generally contradicted.

Q. *Give examples.*

A. Somewhat is to be pardoned: Nothing is to be pardoned. Some clemency is not to be praised: All clemency is to be praised.

Q. *What is a proper axioma?*

A. A proper axioma is when the consequent is attributed to a proper antecedent.

Q. *Give example.*

A. *Fabulla* is fair: whose negative and contradiction is, *Fabulla* is not fair.

Cap. 5.

The copulative axioma.

Q. *What is the compound axioma?*

A. The compound axioma is that which is contained in the force of a conjunction. Therefore from an affirmative or negative conjunction it is a affirmed

med or denyed. And a part of the contradiction is true, a part false.

Q. *What are the kindes?*

A. A compound Enunciate is for his conjunction congregative, or segregative.

Q. *What is congregative?*

A. Congregative is that which enuntiateth all agreeings by affirming, and disagreeings by denying.

Q. *What are the kinds?*

A. Copulative or connexed.

Q. *What is copulative?*

A. Copulative is that whose conjunction is copulative.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Æneid. 1.

The east and south windes on the seas do (blow
They rush through deep till on the top they (joynes.
show,
The Affrick oft with these his blasts con-

This therefore shall be the negative and contradiction.

The east and south windes not on seas do (show:
blow,
They rush not through the deep, ne on top
The Affrick doth not oft his blasts conjoyn.

Q. *But whereupon dependeth the judgment of the copulative enunciate?*

A. The

A. The judgment of the copulative Enunciate being true, dependeth of the truth of all parts: false, at the least of one part false.

Q. *What may further be comprised under this head?*

A. The enunciate of a relate quality is of this kinde, whose conjunction is the relation it self.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Eclog. 3.

Some thy song as sleep on grass doth please
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.

Q. *Shew the force of this example.*

A. Here the copulative judgment is as if he should say, sleep is gratefull to the weary, and so thy song is pleasing to me.

Q. *What is the Negative hereof?*

A. Not me thy song as sleep on grass doth please
The traveller, his weary limbs to ease.

CAP. 6.

The connexed Axioma.

Q. *What is a connexed Axioma.*

A. A connexed axioma is congregative, whose conjection is connexive.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Æne-

A. *Æneid.* 2. If fortune doth feign *Simon* miserable, it dishonestly feigneth him to be vain and a lyer. Whose negative is, If fortune doth not feign *Simon* miserable, it dishonestly feigneth him to be vain and a lyer.

Q. *Is not this conjunction also denyed more manifestly, by denying the consequent?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Pro Amer. I am not a murtherer, though in their company: *De facto*: Neither if every Enunciation be true or false, doth it follow therefore that the causes are immutable; For affirmation signifieth, if the Antecedent be, that the consequent is also. Negation therefore and Contradiction determineth, If the Antecedent be, that therefore the consequent is not. Wherefore, when thou shalt judge the connexive to be absolutely true, thou shalt judge it also necessary; and thou shalt understand this necessity to spring from the necessary connexion of parts, the which may also be even in false parts.

Q. *Give example of this.*

A If

A. If a man be a Lyon, he is also four footed; this is a necessary connexion.

Q. *But if the connexion be contingent, and only put for his probability, how shall it be judged then?*

A. Its judgment then shall be only opinion.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Ter: and *Phæmphilus*, if thou dost this, this day is the last thou shalt see me.

Q. *What may be further under this head?*

A. This relation connexive of consequence is like to the connexed axioma. As when *Tullius* is said to be an orator, he hath also skil in pleading well. And thus much of the Congregative axioma.

Cap. 7.

The discrete Axioma.

Q. *What is a segregative axioma?*

A. A segregative axioma is that whose conjunction is segregative, and therefore enunciateth disagreeing arguments,

Q. *What*

Q. *What are the kindes?*

A. A segregative enunciation is discrete or disjunct.

Q. *What is discrete?*

A. Discrete is that whose conjunction is discretive; and therefore of disagreeings it chiefly enunciateth diverses.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Tusc. 5. Although they may be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are referred to the minde: Whose negative and contradiction is, Although they may not be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are referred to the mind; or, although they may be judged by the sense of the body, yet they are not referred to the mind. For *yet* is here a chief conjunction.

Q. *How is the discrete Enunciat judged to be true?*

A. The discrete enunciation is judged to be true and lawfull, if the parts be not only true, but may be also discrete.

Q. *How is the false or ridiculous judged?*

A. Contrarily.

Cap. 8.

The disjunct Axioma.

Q. *What is a disjunct axioma?*

A. A disjunct axioma is a segregative axioma, whose conjunction is disjunct.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Goerg. 1.

There, as they say, is either silent night,
Always most dark, and void of any light;
Or else the morning from us here doth go,
And brings the day unto them there also.

Q. *Shew another example.*

A. De facto, Every enunciation is true or false.

Q. *Here it seemeth is signified from the disjunct, that one only is true.*

A. So it is.

Q. *What shall the negative and contradiction be.*

A. Not every enunciation is true or false.

Q. *And what doth the contradiction signifie?*

A. That one of them is not true by necessity: for if the disjunction be absolutely true, it is also necessary:

and

and the parts of the disjunct are opposite without any means.

Q. *But although the disjunction be absolutely true, and also necessary; may there not be a necessity, that the parts should be separately necessary?*

A. No.

Q. *Give example.*

A. A man *is good* or *not good*. Here the disjunction is necessary, and yet *A man is good*, is not a necessary enunciation; also *A man is not good*, is not a necessary enunciation.

Q. *Whereupon then dependeth the necessity of the disjunction?*

A. The necessity of the disjunction dependeth on the necessary opposition and disjunction of the parts, not as their necessary verity.

Q. *But is not the disjunction oftentimes from condition?*

A. Yes.

Q. *Give example.*

A. As if it be thought whether *Cleon* will come, or *Socrates*, because it was so agreed that one of them only should come.

Q. *It seemeth by this, that if the disjunction be contingent, it is not absolutely*

lutely true, but is only opinionable.

A. So it is, and that more frequently in the use of man.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Ovid. Epist. Lean.

Either good hap shall now unto me fall,
Or else fierce death the end of loving thral.

Cap. 9.

The Syllogisme and its parts.

Q. *You have manifested in its selfe the axiomaticall judgement by axiomas: the dianoetical followeth: What therefore is dianoia?*

A. Dianoia is when one axioma is derived from another.

Q. *What are the kinds of Dianoia?*

A. A Syllogisme or Method.

Q. *What is a Syllogisme?*

A. Syllogism is a Dianoia whereby the question is so disposed with the argument, as the antecedent put, it is necessarily concluded.

Q. *Make this plainer.*

A. When the axioma is doubtfull, the question is effected, and there is need of a third argument to be placed with the question, for its trust.

Q. *How many parts hath the antecedent?*

A. The antecedent of a Syllogisme hath two parts, a Proposition, and an Assumption.

Q. *What is a proposition?*

A. A propolition is the first part of the antecedent, whereby the consequent of the question is at least disposed with the argument.

Q. *What is the assumption?*

A. The assumption is the second part of the antecedent, which is affirmed from the proposition.

Q. *But what is the consequent part of the syllogisme?*

A. The consequent part of the syllogisme, is that which imbraceth the part of the question, and concludeth it.

Q. *What is it called?*

A. It is called from the nature of its Complexion and Conclusion.

Q. *If any part of the syllogisme want, what is said to be?*

A. It is called *Enthymema.*

Q. *But what if any part happen to be besides its parts?*

A. Then it is called a *Porsyllogisme.*

Q. *Is not the order of the parts oftentimes confounded?* *A.* Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. What then if any doubt shall arise from it?

A. Then that shal be filled up which wanteth, those cut off which abound, and every part digested into his place.

CAP. 10.

The simple contracted Syllogism.

Q. What are the kinds of a syllogisme?

A. A syllogisme is simple or compound.

Q. What is simple?

A. Simple is, where the consequent part of the question is placed in the proposition, the antecedent part in the assumption.

Q. What are the affections of it?

A. It is affirmed, denyed, generall, special, and proper.

Q. How is it affirmed?

A. From al the affirmative parts.

Q. How is it denyed?

A. From one negative of the antecedent parts, with complexion.

Q. How is it general?

A. From the general proposition and assumption.

Q. *How is it ſpeciall?*

A. From one of the generals only.

Q. *And how is it proper?*

A. From both propers.

Q. *What are the kinds of the ſimple ſyllogiſme?*

A. The ſimple ſyllogiſme is contracted by parts, or explicated.

Q. *What is contract?*

A. Contract is when the argument for the example is ſo ſubjected to a particular queſtion, that the antecedent may be underſtood to affirm each part; and in the aſſumption.

Q. *Give an example.*

A. Certain confidence is vertue, as conſtancy: certain confidence is not vertue, as boldneſſe.

Q. *Shew the force of this example.*

A. This argument is underſtood to go before each part of the queſtion, as if it were expreſſed; conſtancy is a vertue, and confidence, and therefore certain confidence is a vertue: alſo boldneſſe is not a vertue, and yet it is confidence; and therefore ſome confidence is not a vertue. So in the uſe of diſputing, the Maſter of the ſyllogiſme draweth the judgement, neither

is

is it set forth otherwise. And by this exposition the beginning of the syllogism is expounded by *Aristotle*, so that the syllogisme in its full judgement is more clear and manifest.

Cap. II.

The first kinde of the simple explicated Syllogisme.

Q. *What is the explicated Syllogisme?*

A. The explicated Syllogism is, whose parts are explicated.

Q. *What are the proprieties in this explicated Syllogisme?*

A. Two, first the proposition is generall or proper: secondly, the conclusion is like to the antecedent, or the the weaker part.

Q. *What are the kinds of it?*

A. The kinds are two-fold.

Q. *What is the first?*

A. The first is, where the argument always followeth the negative in the other part.

Q. *Shew some Syllogisme of this kind.*

A. GEN. I.

Ce- A troubled man uſeth not his reaſon well:

ſa- But a wiſe man uſeth his reaſon well:

re. A wiſe man is not therefore troubled.

Q. *Produce the example of ſome Orator for this Syllogiſme.*

A. This judgment is ſo brought forth of *Cicero, Tuſc.* 3. And when (ſaith he) the eye is troubled, it is not honeſtly affected to the fulfilling of its duty: and the reſt of the parts, as alſo the whole body, when it is moved from its ſtate, wanteth its office and function; ſo a troubled mind is not honeſtly affected to fulfill his duty. But the duty of the mind is to uſe reaſon, and a wiſe man is always ſo affected, that he uſeth reaſon moſt excellently; he is therefore never troubled.

Q. *Give example of another generall Syllogiſme.*

A. GEN. 2.

Ca- A mortall thing is compound.

me- A ſoul is not compound.

ſtres. A ſoul therefore is not mortall.

Q. *Produce the authority of ſome Ancient,*

Ancient, avouching this Syllogisme.

A. Cicero judgeth the soul to be immortall by this syllogisme. *Tusc. 1.* For we cannot doubt, saith he, in our minds, unlesse we be perchance ignorant in physicall things, but that there is nothing knit to soules, nothing connexed, nothing copulate, nothing joyned, nothing double; which when it is so, can surely never be parted, nor divided, nor severed, nor drawn asunder, therefore neither perish: for perishing is as it were a departure and separation or breach of those parts, which before the perishing were joyned together.

Q. Give an example of a speciall syllogisme.

A. SPEC. 1.

Fe- A pale man is not couragious.
sti- *Maximus* is couragious.
no. *Maximus* therefore is not pale.

Q. Produce authority for this syllogisme.

A. But this judgment *Ovid.* concludeth, *De Pont. 3. El. 3.*

Paleness and sloth are not in the high mind, (finde:
Rather with vipers them on ground we

In highest things thy minde excels, we see, (thee.
No name I finde t' expresse the wit of thee.
Some miseries do taste, hurt and outworn,
Are made to feel sharpe pricking of the thorn:
Yet thou art wont to help complaining men,
Amongst which number, pray, let me be then.

Q. *Shew another example of the speciall syllogisme.*

A. SPEC. 2.

Ba- A dancer is *Lecherous.*
ro- *Murena* is not *Lecherous.*
co. *Murena* therefore is no dancer.

Q. *Produce some Orator for this syllogisme?*

A. *Cic. pro Mur.* For no man almost, being sober, danceth, unlesse perchance he be mad; neither alone, nor at a moderate and honest banquet; for dancing is the companion of untimely banquets, pleasant places, and many delights: Thou snatchest that from me, that it is necessary that vices should be: thou leavest that whereby this removed, this vice ought not to be at all; no filthy banquet, no love, no gluttony is shewed: and when we finde

finde not all theſe things which have the name of pleaſure, and vices; there thou canſt not finde lechery: nay, thinkeſt thou to finde a ſhadow of luſt in ſuch?

Q. *Avouch ſome other authority after the like manner?*

A. After this manner of judgement *Ovid de Triſt.* 1. concludeth triply, whil'ſt he ſets forth the excuſe of his verſes.

They that make verſes ſhould not merry be,
Our time is clouded with adverſity:
They that write verſes ſhould enjoy their eaſe,
The ſeas, the windes, with winter fierce me preſſe. (death,
Good poets ſhould not fear, but I feare
I dread leſt ſwords do take away my breath: (admire,
Then what is here, a right judge will
If reading them they ſatisfie's deſire.

Q. *Give example of proper ſyllogiſms.*

A. PRO. 1.

Ageſilaus is not painted by *Apelles.*
Alexander is painted by *Apelles.*
Alexander therefore is not *Ageſilaus.*

Q. *Give another example of a proper Syllogiſm.*

A. PRO. 2.
Cesar oppressed his countrey.
Tullius opressed not his countrey.
Tullius therefore is not *Cesar*.

CAP. 12.
The second kinde of the simple explicate Sollogism.

Q. *What is the second kinde of the explicate Syllogisme ?*

A. The second kinde of the explicate Syllogisme is, when the argument goeth before in the propositon, the affirmative followeth in the assumption.

Q. *Give an example of an affirmative generall after this kinde.*

A. AFF. GEN.
Barba-ra. Every just thing is profitable.
Every honest thing is just.
Every honest thing therefore is profitable.

Q. *Produce some Orator avouching this Syllogisme.*

A. Thus *Cicero* concludeth, *Offic.* 2. The Philosophers, truly, with great authority, severely, soundly, and honestly do distinguish these three confused kindes by cogitation. For whatsoever

is

is juſt, that alſo they think to be profitable: alſo, whatſoever is honeſt, that is juſt; from whence ariſeth, That whatſoever is honeſt, that is alſo profitable.

Q. *Give an example of a Negative Generall Syllogiſme?*

A. NEG. GEN.

Celarent.
A fearfull man is not free.
A covetous man is fearfull.
A covetous man therefore is not free.

Q. *Prove this by ſome Poet.*

A. It is thus concluded and judged by *Horace*: *Epiſt.* 1.

Who freer is, he that as ſervant dwelleth,
Or he that in his monies love excelleth:
I do not ſee, he that deſires doth fear,
And he that fears, his freedom doth not bear.

Q. *Give another example of this kind of Syllogiſme.*

A. *Ter. in Eu.* concludeth and judgeth this; That which is void of counſell, cannot be governed by counſell: Love is void of counſell: It cannot therefore be governed by counſell.

Q. *Produce the words of Terrence.*

A. The former Syllogiſm followeth in theſe words: Maſter, that thing which hath

hath in it neither counſell nor means, that thou canſt not govern by counſell. In love are all theſe vices, injuries, ſuſpitions, enmities, flatteries, warre, peace again: theſe uncertain things, if thou wouldeſt guide by certain reaſon, thou doeſt no more then if thou ſhouldeſt labour to be mad with reaſon.

Q. *Give an example of the affirmative ſpeciall Syllogiſme.*

A. AFF. SPE.

Da- Conſuls made by vertue, ought ſtudiouſly to defend the common-wealth.

ri- *Cicero* is made Conſul by vertue.

i. *Cicero* therefore ought ſtudiouſly to defend the common-wealth.

Q. *Produce* Tullies *words avouching this Syllogiſme.*

A. The Orator doth both conclude and judge his own diligence. *Agr.* 2. For the great care and diligence as wel of all the Conſuls, ought to be placed in defending the common-wealth, as of thoſe, who not in the cradle, but in the camp were made Conſuls: none of our ancients promiſed to the people of *Rome* for me, that I ought to be truſted: to ask of me that I ought, even when

I did ask, none of our ancestors commended me to you; therefore if I neglect any thing, there is none who shal intreat me for you. Yet while my life lasts (I being he who am able to defend it from their wickedness) I promise to you, O *Quirites*, that you have committed the common-wealth to the providence of a good trust: to a watchfull man, not a coward; to a diligent man, not a sluggard.

Q. *Shew another Syllogisme of this kind.*

A. That which comes wished for, is gratefull.

Lesbia comes wished for to *Catullus.*

She is therefore gratefull.

Q. *Set forth* Catullus *his words, wherein he thus concludeth.*

A. That which we long for with desires great,
Is acceptable to us when we have 't:
Wherefore this gratefull is, more dear then gold,
That Lesbia *is come, our friend of old.*
Thou dost our wishes grant, our hope restore:
O light most clear! who is there that is more

Happy

Happy then I, who have what I desire;
Even what I wish, they's nought I can
require.

Q. *Give an example of an Negative Speciall.*

A. NEG. SPE.

Fe- The deceiver of a loving maid is
not to be praised.

ri- *Demophoon* is the deceiver of a lo-
ving maid, to wit *Phillis.*

e. *Demophoon* therefore is not to be
praised.

Q. *Set forth the words of* Phillis *in* Ovid, *so judging.*

A. It is no glory virgins to deceive,
Who love a man, and wish him for to have;
Simplicity should rather favour gain.
But I that love, and als' a woman am,
Deceived am by thee with flattering stile;
The gods thy praises make it all the while.

Q. *Give an example of an Affirmative Proper.*

A. AFF. PRO.

Octavius is *Cesars* heir.

I am *Octavius.*

I am therefore *Cesars* heir.

Q. *Give an example of a Negative Proper.*

A. NEG.

A. NEG. PRO.
Anthony is not *Ceſars* ſon.
Thou art *Anthony*,
Thou art not therefore *Ceſars* ſon.

CAP. 13.

The firſt connexed Syllogiſme.

Q. *You have expounded hitherto the ſimple Syllogiſm: What now is the compound Syllogiſme?*

A. The compound Syllogiſme is a Syllogiſme where the whole queſtion is another part of the affirmed and compound propoſition, the argument is another part.

Q. *But what if any thing were taken away in the compound Syllogiſme?*

A. That were to put a ſpeciall contradiction.

Q. *What are the kindes of a compound Syllogiſme?*

A. A compound Syllogiſme is connexed or disjunct.

Q. *What is a connexed ſyllogiſme?*

A. A connexed ſyllogiſme, is a compound ſyllogiſme of a connexed propoſition.

Q. *How*

Q. *How many are the manners o distinction ?*

A. It is of two manners.

Q. *What is the first?*

A. The first manner of the connexed syllogisme is that which assumeth the antecedent, and the consequent concludeth.

Q. *Give an example of this.*

A. After this manner *Cicero* concludeth. *lib.* 2. *De Divinatione.*

If they be gods, it is divination.
But they are gods.
It is divination therefore.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. Offic. 3. And if also nature prescribeth this, that a man to a man, whatsoever he be, for that same cause that he is a man, will use consultation, it is necessary according to the same nature, that the profit of all should be common. Which if it be so, all of us are contained in one and the same law of nature; and this, if it be so indeed, we are certainly forbidden by the law of nature to violate one another: but the first is true: the last therefore is also true.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. Æne-

A. Æneid. 4. *Dido* adjureth Æneas to remain with her.

Dost thou me fly? by these tears I thee pray,
By thy right hand thee I beseech to stay:
Else thou wilt leave me wretched here alone.
By our dear marriage, our dear love, like none.
If I do ought deserve, if thou hast been
Sweet unto me, have pity on me then.
Look on my slippery house, and now I pray,
If any place for prayers be, I say, (kings,
For Lybians *sake, for* Nomades *his*
Who hated me, and for all other things
Which I for thee did bear. My credit's lost:
I am alone, for thee thus am I crost: (all,
Besides all this, my fame is quite decay'd,
Rather I had my flesh in dust were laid.

Q. *Doth it always assume the same?*

A. Oftentimes not the same, but a greater.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Cat. 1. If thy parents feared and hated thee, neither couldest thou please them by any reason, in my opinion, though thou wert to abstain a little from their sight: now the countrey (which is our common parent) hateth and feareth thee, and of a long time judgeth nothing of thee, except it be touching thy death.

death. Canſt thou neither avoyd its authority, neither follow its judgment, neither feareſt thou its force?

Q. *What may further be under this head?*

A. This manner of concluding is the very ſame when the propoſition is a relate of time.

Q. *Give example.*

A. After this kinde the nymph *Oenon* in *Ovid*, concludeth the error of her fooliſhneſs.

When Paris Oenon *hoped to forſake,*
It would to Xanthus *with all ſpeed betake:* (*again,*
Xanthus, *make haſte, return thou back*
That ſo this Paris Oenon *may ſuſtain.*

CAP. 14.

The ſecond connexed Syllogiſme.

Q. *What is the ſecond manner of the connexed ſyllogiſme?*

A. The ſecond manner of the connexed ſyllogiſme taketh away the conſequent, that it may take away the antecedent.

Q. *Give*

Q. *Give example.*

A. If a wiſe man aſſent to any thing, ſometimes alſo he ſhall be opinated.

But he ſhall never be opinated.

Therefore he ſhall aſſent to nothing.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. By the like ſyllogiſme *Ovid. Triſt.* 12. judgeth his fooliſhneſs.

If I were wiſe, thoſe ſiſters I ſhould hate,
Deities hurtfull to whom on them wait.
But now ſo great my fooliſhneſs is ſeen,
I build them altars who my hurt have been.

Theſe two kindes of the ſyllogiſme are moſt uſuall of all.

CAP. 15.

The firſt disjunct Syllogiſme.

What is the disjunct ſyllogiſme?

A. The disjunct ſyllogiſme is the ſyllogiſme compoſed of a disjunct propoſition.

Q. *What are the manners of diſtinction?*

A. Two.

Q. *What is the firſt?*

A. The

A. The first taketh away one, and concludeth the rest,

Give example.

A. Either it is day, or it is night.
But it is not day.
It is therefore night.

Q. *Give another example.*

A. The judgment of *Cicero* in defence of *Cluventius* is such: But when as this condition was proposed to him, that either he should accuse justly and piously, or die sharpely or unworthily: he would rather accuse after that manner, then die after this.

Q. *Make the disjunction appear clearer.*

A. Either he must accuse or die:
He must not die,
He must accuse therefore.

Q. *Give another example like to this.*

A. There is the like reasoning, *Phil.* 2. Dost thou not understand it is determined, that either those who have done this thing are homicides, or revengers of liberty? But attend a little, and take the thoughts of a sober man for a little time; and I who am of them, as my self doth confesse, will familiarly argue with thee as a fellow: I deny that there is any

any mean: I grant, that they are, except they be deliverers and conſervers of the Roman Common-wealth, more then villans, more then homicides, more then parricides: if truely it be cruelty, rather to be a father to the country, then a murtherer of ones ſelf: Thou art a wiſe and conſiderate man, what ſayeſt thou? if they be parricides, why were they honoured of thee, and called to this order by the Roman People? why was *Marcus Brutus* by thy means freed from the law, if he were abſent more then ten days from the city? why did *Apolinares* receive *Marcus Brutus* with incredible honour? why was the provinces given to *Caſſius* and *Brutus*? why were there Queſtors added? why were the numbers of Legates increaſed, and this done by thee? they are not therefore homicides. It followeth then, that by thine own judgement, they are deliverers, when as truly there can be no third admitted.

Q. *If the parts of the diſjunct propoſition ſhall be more then two, how ſhall they be judged then?*

A. The art of judging them, and concluding them ſhall be the ſame.

Q. *Give*

Q. Give example.

A. So *Cicero* judgeth *Rabirius* to be among the Consuls: And we see (saith he) these three to be in the nature of things, to wit, that either he should be with *Saturninus*, or with the good, or that he should lie hid. But to lie hid is proper to the dead and rotten: to be with *Saturnius*, of fury and wickednesse: Vertue, and honesty, and shamefastnesse constrained him to be with the Consuls.

Cap. 16.

The second disjunct Syllogisme.

Q. What is the second disjunct?

A. The second disjunct, from the proposition the affirmative assumeth one, and taketh away the rest.

Q. Give example.

A. It is day, or it is night:
But it is day:
It is not therefore night.

Q. Give another example after this manner.

A. Thus *Juno* concludeth with *Jove* touching *Turnus*, *Æneid.* 10.

What if thou sayest the thing thou dost not mean,

And

And should to Turnus *give his life again?*
Now I remain in misery and woe, (so:
And hope for that which will not happen
But rather then this ill should come to pass,
I'le mock my self, and hope past hope, alas.

Q. *Shew another Syllogisme of this kind.*

A. There is the like Syllogism effected from a proposition copulative negative, which is called negative complexion, and which obtaineth the force of an affirmative disjunction.

Q. *Give example.*

A. It is not both day and night:
But it is day:
It is not therefore night.

Cap. 17.

The only Method according to Aristotle.

Q. *What is Method?*

A. Method is a dianoia of divers homogene axioma, preposed for the clearnesse of their nature, from whence the agreeing amongst themselves of them are judged and comprehended in memory.

Q. *What*

Q. *What is to be considered in Method?*

A. As verity and falsity is beheld in the Axioma, consequence and inconsequence in the Syllogisme; so in Method it is to be considered, that by it the more clear may precede, the more obscure may follow; and that altogether order and confusion be judged.

Q. *Make this plainer.*

A. After this manner is disposed from homogene axiomas in the first place by an absolute notion, the first; in the second place the second, in the the third place the third, and so forward.

Q. *It seemeth by this, that Method doth continually pass from universals to singulars?*

A. So it is: for by this sole and only way it proceedeth from antecedents altogether, & absolute notions, to the declaring of unknown consequences. And this is the only Method that *Aristotle* taught.

Cap. 18.

The first illustration of Methods by illustration of Arts.

Q. *But do not Examples set forth this head more clearly?*

A. Yes, the examples of doctrines and artes do chiefly demonstrate and set forth the unity of Method; in the which, although all the rules are generall and universall, yet the degrees of them are distinguished: and by how much every thing shall be more generall, by so much it shall more precede.

Q. *Why shall the first be in the most generall place and order?*

A. because in light and knowledge it is first.

Q. *Why shall the subalternates follow?*

A. Because in their clearness they are next.

Q. *It seemeth by this, that those things which by nature are more known shall precede, those which are less known are*

ſubſtitute, and at length the moſt ſpeciall follow.

A. So it is.

Q. *What then ſhall precede and be firſt?*

A. The moſt general definition ſhall be firſt.

Q. *What ſhall follow?*

A. The diſtribution.

Q. *But how if there be many?*

A. Then the partition in perfect parts ſhal precede.

Q. *What ſhall follow?*

A. The diviſion into kindes.

Q. *What then?*

A. The parts themſelves and the kindes, are in the ſame order to be handled and defined again, in which they were diſtributed.

Q. *What further is required?*

A. If there ſhall be a long explication of them, they are to be chained together by the chains of tranſition.

Q. *What benefit redoundeth from hence?*

A. It refreſheth and recreateth the Auditor.

Q. *But may not Example be under this head?*

A. Yes;

A. Yes, as a more familiar thing is taken, ſo a more familiar example muſt be uſed.

Q. *Give example of what you have here ſhewed out of the art of Grammer?*

A. All definitions, diſtributions, are found in the rules of grammer, and every one of them ſeverally judged; and all theſe documents, inſcribed in diverſe tables, are confounded and mingled together as it were in a certain pot.

Q. *What part of Dialectica teacheth us to compoſe theſe confuſed rules, and digeſt them into orders? firſt there is no need of the places of Invention, when as they are all found: neither of the firſt judgment of Axiomas, when as every axioma is proved and valued: neither of the ſecond judgment of the Syllogiſme, when as all of them are diſputed and concluded controverſies of ſeverall things by theſe onely ſyllogiſmes: it ſeemeth therefore to be onely Method, is it not?*

A. Yes, it is onely Method.

Q. *How is it done?*

A. The Logician by this light of artificiall Method ſelecteth out of this

pot the definition of Grammer (for that is moſt generall) and placeth it in the firſt place: Grammer is the doctrine of ſpeaking well. Then he taketh out of the ſame Oven the partition of Grammer, and placeth it in the ſecond place: the parts of Grammer are two: Etymology and Syntaxis. Then out of the ſame veſſel he ſeparateth the definition of Etymology of words, and joyneth it in the third place to thoſe that go before: then he ſeeketh out the parts of words in letters and ſyllables, and the kinds in words of number, and without number, and placeth them with their tranſitions in their ſeverall places. And ſo the definitions of all the parts of Etymology, together with their diſtributions, colligations, and moſt ſpeciall examples he placeth in their ſeverall places, and ſo likewiſe in the Syntax. This way all the Arts have propoſed to themſelves.

Cap. 19.

The ſecond example of Method by example of Poets, Orators, Hiſtoriographers.

Q. *But is Method only ſet forth in matter of the arts and doctrines?*

A. No, it is alſo declared in all things which we would teach eaſily and plainly: therefore Poets, Orators, and all manner of writers, as often as they propoſe any thing to teach to their auditors, do follow this way, although they do not enter and inſiſt upon it all alike.

Q. *Give an example out of ſome Poet.*

A. Virgil in his Georgicks diſtributeth, as I ſaid before, the propoſed matter into four parts; and in the firſt book followeth common things, as Aſtrology, Meteorology, and of corn and tillage; this was the firſt part of his work; then the tranſition is adhibited in the beginning of the ſecond book.

Thus far of tillage and of ſtars were we;
Now of thee, Bacchus, *we'l ſing preſently.*

Then he writeth generally of trees,

as alſo ſpecially of plants; the ſecond tranſition is adhibited to the third part, but more imperfect and without an Epilogue. In the beginning of the third book of Oxen, Horſes, Sheep, Goats, Dogs.

Wee'l ſing of goddeſſe Pales, *als' of him,*
Who by Amphryſo *kept his ſheep moſt trim.*

At length in the beginning of the fourth book, there is the third tranſition of the fourth part, but alſo imperfect from the only prepoſition of their Bees.

Now of the eyre hony Bee I'le ſpeak.

So therfore the Poet ſtudieth to place the moſt generall firſt, the ſubalternate middle, the moſt ſpecial in the laſt place.

Q. *Give another poeticall example.*

A. Ovid in Faſt. uſeth this kind of diſpoſition, propoſing in the beginning the ſum of his work.

I'le ſing of times that paſſe throughout the year,
Fall of the ſtars, and riſing I'le declare.

By and by, having made imploration, he determineth the partition of the year, made firſt by *Romulus*, into ten months, which he reprehendeth.

When at Rooms *builder did the year*
divide,
In it he made five months, and five beſide.

And a little further he adjoyneth *Numa* his more full Diviſor.

But Numa *neither* Janus *did omit,*
Nor yet the ancient ſhadows out did put;
But to th' old months two more appointed
(he.

Here the Poet having interpreted the common differences of holy-dayes, working-dayes, banquet-dayes, kalends, nones, ides, at the laſt he followeth every month in his place, and with a preface after this order, he paſſeth from generals to the ſtudy of ſpecials.

Ith' whole I have you ſhew'd what theſe
things be,
It now remains we part them preſently.

At length after the expoſition of every part, the tranſition is joyned, as in the end of the firſt, and beginning of the ſecond book.

The firſt part of my task is ended now,
The month is done, my little book alſo:
Janus *is done, another month beginneth,*
Another book now with that month renew-
(eth.

And in every one of his books after-

ward the transitions are adhibited, but leſſe accurately.

Q. *How do the Orators follow this Method?*

A. The Orators in poems, narrations, confirmations, perorations do follow this order, as the nature both of the art, and the order of the thing do require, & ſomtimes more ſtudiouſly too.

Q. *Give example.*

A. Cicero in an accuſation firſt by propounding, then by parting, followeth this order. *Queſtor Cu. Paxeris*, ſaith he, thou haſt been Conſul unto this time fourteen years, and from that day unto this day, in which thou haſt made me, I call thee into judgement; there was no void hour found in robbery, wickedneſſe, cruelty, iniquity. This is the propoſition and definition of the chief matter, as in this judgment moſt generall. The partition followeth; theſe are the years conſumed in the Queſtorſhip, and a Sciatican Embaſſage, and the Urban Pretorſhip, and in the Sicilian Pretorſhip: wherefore this ſhall be the fourfold diſpoſition of my accuſation, which four parts with their particular partitions he hath alſo

also handled in their severall order and place, and coupled them with transitions; the three first in the third book. Wherefore (saith he) his Questorship being shewed, and his first magistracy, together with his theft and wickednesse looked unto, let us attend to the rest. Then having expounded the faults of his embassadorship, the transition to his Pretorship followeth. But let us now come to that famous Pretorship, & those faults which were more known to those which were present, then to us who come meditated and prepared to pleading. This transition is more imperfect without an epilogue; at length in the beginning of the fourth oration there is the like transition to the fourth part of the Sicilian Pretorship. Many necessary things, O Judges, I must pretermit, that I may in some manner speak of those things which are committed to my trust: for I have received the cause of *Sicilia*; that Province hath drawn me unto this businesse.

Q. *Give an example out of the same Historiographer.*

A. *Livy* doth so imbrace the sum of 70. years in the beginning, then divideth them by tens.

Cap. 20.

The secrets of Method.

Q. *It seemeth that in the diverse axiomaticall homogenes, as also in the judgment of the syllogisme, the notes of Method shall be as often as any thing is taught clearly: but is there no other kinde of Method?*

A. Yes, when as the auditor shall be deceived in a certain part with delectation and a greater motion; then certain homogenes are rejected, as the lights of definition, partition and transition: and certain heterogenes are assumed, as digressions from the matter, and commotations upon the thing; but chiefly the order of things in the beginning is turned over, and certain antecedents are put after consequents. Therefore to that rule of perfect Method this may seem somwhat more imperfect; the form is not only lame, things being detracted; or abounding, things being added; but also the order of it being inverted by certain degrees, is preposterours.

Q. *Give*

Q. *Give an example of it.*

A. The like the Poet maketh with a certain greater kinde of artificialnes, while he propoundeth to himself to leade the people, viz. the beast-like heads of the multitude, and therefore he deceiveth divers wayes; he beginneth in the middle, & there oftentimes he comprehendeth the first; to conclude the last, he placeth an uncertain and an unthought of chance. So (as *Horace* saith) *Homer* disposeth his Iliads.

Ne doth this man Troyes *wars divide so well,*
He always maketh haste th'event to tell:
Even in the midst his reader he doth catch, (doth snatch;
Leaves off his tract, with haste from it
And thus he lies, thus mingles false with true,
So that ne first nor midst in it I view.

Q. *Proceede to further example.*

A. So *Virgil* taketh *Æneas* from *Sicilia*, and makes a narration of him in the banquet of *Carthage*; and at last bringeth in his diverse troubles. So the Commedian Poets, although with great judgment they have distinguished

guiſhed their Comedies by acts and ſcenes, yet do ſo effect, that all things ſeem to be done by chance. The Orators attribute all to victory. Therfore this ſeemeth to be placed chiefly by them, not ſo much to teach, as to perſwade; when as alſo thoſe things which do equally excell, are kept even unto the laſt, and the means are conferred into the middle, according to *Homers* diſpoſition.

FINIS.

A BRIEF OF THE ART OF RHETORICK.

Containing in ſubſtance
All that ARISTOTLE
hath written in his Three
Books of that Subject,

Except onely what is not ap-
plicable to the Engliſh
TONGUE.

BIBLIOTHECA BODLEIANA

A BRIEF Of the ART of RHETORICK.

The first Book.

CHAP. 1.

That Rhetorick *is an* Art *consisting not only in moving the passions of the Judge; but chiefly in* Proofes. *And that this* Art *is profitable.*

WE see that all men naturally are able in some sort to *accuse* and *excuse*: some by *chance*; but some by *method*. This *method* may be

be diſcovered: and to diſcover *Method* is al one with teaching an *Art*. If this *Art* conſiſted in Criminations only, and the skill to ſtirre up the Judges to *Anger*, *Envy*, *Feare*, *Pity*, or other *affections*; a *Rhetorician* in well ordered Common wealths and States, where it is forbidden to digreſs from the cauſe in hearings, could have nothing at all to ſay. For all theſe perverſions of the Judge are beſide the queſtion. And that which the pleader is to ſhew, and the Judge to give ſentence on, is this only: *'Tis ſo*; or *not ſo*. The reſt hath been decided already by the Law-maker; who judging of univerſals, and future things, could not be corrupted. Beſides, 'tis an abſurd thing, for a man to make crooked the ruler he means to uſe.

It conſiſteth therfore chiefly in *Proofes*; which are *Inferences*: and all *Inferences* being *Sllyogiſmes*, a *Logician*, if he would obſerve the difference between a plain *Syllogiſme* and an *Enthymeme*, (which is a *Rhetoricall Syllogiſme*,) would make the beſt *Rhetorician*. For all *Syllogiſmes* and *Inferences* belong properly to *Logick*;

Whether

Whether they inferre truth or probability: and becauſe without this *Art* it would often come to paſs, that evill men by the advantage of naturall abilities, would carry an evil cauſe againſt a good; it brings with it at leaſt this profit, that making the pleaders even in skill, it leaves the oddes only in the merit of the cauſe. Beſides, ordinarily thoſe that are Judges, are neither patient, nor capable of long *Scientificall proofes*, drawne from the *principles* through many *Syllogiſmes*; and therefore had need to be inſtructed by the *Rhetoricall*, and ſhorter way. Laſtly, it were ridiculous, to be aſhamed of being vanquiſhed in exerciſes of the body; and not to be aſhamed of being inferiour in the vertue of wel expreſſing the mind.

CHAP. 2.

The Definition of Rhetorick.

Rhetorick, is that Faculty, by which wee underſtand what wil ſerve our turne, concerning any ſubject to win beliefe in the hearer.

Of

Of those things that beget beleefe; some require not the help of Art; as *Witnesses*, *Evidences*, and the like, which we invent not, but make use of; and some require Art, and are invented by us.

The beleefe that proceedes from our invention, comes partly from the *behaviour* of the *speaker*; partly from the *passions* of the *hearer*: but especially from the *proofes* of what we alledge.

Proofes are, in *Rhetorick*, either *Examples*, or *Enthymemes*; as in *Logick*, *Inductions*, or *Syllogismes*. For an *Example* is a short *Induction*, and an *Enthymeme* a short *Syllogisme*; out of which are left as superfluous, that which is supposed to be necessarily understood by the hearer; to avoid prolixity, and not to consume the time of publick business needlessly.

Chap. 3.

Of the severall kinds of Orations: *and of the* Principles *of* Rhetorick.

IN all *Orations*, the Hearer does either hear only; or judge also.

If

If he heare onely, that's one kind of *Oration*, and is called *Demonſtrative*.

If he judg, he muſt judg either of that which is to come; or of that which is paſt.

If of that which is to come, ther's a nother kind of *Oration*, and is called *Deliberative*.

If of that which is paſt; then 'tis a third kind of *Oration*, called *Judiciall*.

So there are three kinds of *Orations*; *Demonſtrative*, *Judiciall Deliberative*.

To which belong their proper times. To the *Demonſtrative*, the *Preſent*; To the *Judiciall*, the *Paſt*; and to the *Deliberative*, the *time to come*.

And their proper Offices. To the *Deliberative*, *Exhortation* and *Dehortation*. To the *Judiciall*, *Accuſation* and *Defence*. And to the *Demonſtrative*, *Prayſing* and *Diſprayſing*.

And their proper ends. To the *Deliberative*, to Prove a thing *Profitable*, or *Unprofitable*. To the *Judiciall*, *Juſt*, or *Unjuſt*. To the *Demonſtrative*, *Honourable*, or *Diſhonourable*.

The

The *Principles* of *Rhetorick* out of which *Enthymemes* are to be drawn; are the *common opinions* that men have concerning *Profitable* and *Unprofitable*; *Juſt* and *Unjuſt*, *Honourable* and *Diſhonourable*; which are the points in the ſeverall kinds of *Orations* queſtionable. For as in *Logick*, where certain and infallible knowledg is the ſcope of our proofe, the *Principles* muſt be all *infallible truths*: ſo in *Rhetorick* the *Principles* muſt be *common opinions*, ſuch as the Judg is already poſſeſſed with: becauſe the end of *Rhetorick* is victory; which conſiſts in having gotten *beleefe*.

And becauſe nothing is *Profitable*, *Unprofitable*, *Juſt*, *Unjuſt*, *Honourable* or *Diſhonourable*, but what has been *done*, or is *to be done*; and nothing is *to be done*, that is not *poſſible*: and becauſe there be degrees of *Profitable*, *Unprofitable*, *Juſt*, *Unjuſt*, *Honourable*, and *Diſhonourable*; an Orator muſt be ready in other *Principles*; namely, of what is *done* and *not done*; *poſſible* and *not poſſible*, *to come* and *not to come*, and what is *Greater*, and what is *Leſſer*, both in general, and particularly

apply-

applyed to the thing in queſtion; as what is *more* and *leſs*, generally; and what is *more profitable*, and *leſs profitable*, &c. particularly.

Chap. 4.

Of the ſubject of Deliberatives; *and the abilities that are required of him that will deliberate of buſineſſe of State.*

IN *Deliberatives* there are to be conſidered the *ſubject*, wherin; and the *ends* whereto the Oratour exhorteth, or from which he dehorteth.

The *Subject* is alwayes ſomthing in our own power, the knowledg whereof belongs not to *Rhetorick*, but for the moſt part to the *Politicks*; and may be referred in a maner to theſe five heads.

1. *Of levying of mony.* To which point he that will ſpeak as he ought to do, ought to know before hand the revenue of the State, now much it is, and wherin it conſiſteth: and alſo how great are the neceſſary charges and expences of the ſame. This knowledge is gotten partly by a mans owne experience, partly by Relations, and accounts in writing.

2. *Of Peace and Warre.* Concer-

ning

ning which the Counſellor or Deliberator, ought to know the ſtrength of the Commonwealth; how much it both now is, and hereafter may be; and wherein that power conſiſteth. Which knowledge is gotten, partly by experience, and Relations at home; and partly by the ſight of Wars, and of their events abroad.

3. *Of the ſafeguard of the Country.* Wherein he onely is able to give counſell, that knows the forms, and number, and places of the Garriſons.

4. *Of Proviſion.* Wherein to ſpeak well, it is neceſſary for a man to know what is ſufficient to maintain the State; what Commodities they have at home growing; what they muſt fetch in through need; and what they may carry out through abundance.

5. *Of making Laws.* To which is neceſſary ſo much *Politicall*, or *Civill Philoſophy*, as to know what are the ſeverall kinds of Governments; and by what means, either from without or from within, each of thoſe kinds is preſerved, or deſtroyed. And this knowledge is gotten, partly by obſerving the ſeveral Governments in times paſt,

past, by *History*; and partly by observing the Government of the times present in severall Nations, by *Travell*.

So that to him that will speak in a Councell of State, there is necessary this; *History, Sight of Wars, Travel, Knowledge of the Revenue, Expences, Forces, Havens, Garrisons, Wares, and Provisions* in the State he lives in; and what is needfull for that State, either to *export*, or *import*.

Chap. 5.

Of the ends which the Orator in Deliberatives, *propoundeth, whereby to* exhort, *or* dehort.

AN Orator in *exhorting* always propoundeth *Felicity*, or some part of *Felicity* to be attained by the actions he exhorteth unto: and in *Dehortation* the contrary.

By *Felicity*, is meant commonly, *Prosperity with vertue*, or *a continuall content of the life with surety*. And the parts of it are such things as we call *good*, in body, mind, or fortune; such as these that follow.

1. *Nobility*,

1. *Nobility*, which to a State or Nation is, *to have been antient inhabitants; and to have had most antiently, and in most number, famous Generals in the Wars, or men famous for such things as fall under emulation.* And to a private man, *to have been descended lawfully of a family, which hath yeilded most antiently, and in most number, men known to the world for vertue, riches, or any thing in generall estimation.*

2. *Many and good Children.* Which is also publick and private. *Publick*, when there *is much youth in the State enduced with vertue*, (namely, of the *body*, stature, beauty, strength, and dexterity: Of the *mind*, valour, and temperance) *Private*, when a man *hath many such Children, both Male and Female.* The vertues commonly respected in women, are of the *body*, Beauty, and Stature; Of the *mind*, Temperance, and Housewifery, without sordidnesse.

3. *Riches.* Which is, *Money, Cattel, Lands, Houshold-stuffe; with the power to dispose of them.*

4. *Glory.* Which is *the reputation of Vertue, or of the possession of such things as all, or most men, or wise men desire.*

5. *Honour.*

5. *Honour.* Which is *the glory of benefitting, or being able to benefit others. To benefit others,* is *to contribute somewhat, not easily had, to another mans safety, or riches.* The parts of *Honour* are, *Sacrifices, Monuments, Rewards, Dedication of places, Precedence, Sepulchres, Statues, publick Pensions, Adorations, Presents.*

6. *Health.* Which is *the being free from Diseases, with strength to use the body.*

7. *Beauty.* Which is to different Ages different. To *Youth, strength of body, and sweetnesse of aspect.* To *full men, strength of body fit for the Wars, and Countenance sweet, with a mixture of Terrour.* To *old men, strength enough for necessary labours, with a Countenance not displeasing.*

8. *Strength.* Which is *the ability to move any thing at pleasure of the Mover.* To *move,* is *to pull, to put off, to lift, to thrust down, to presse together.*

9. *Stature.* Which is then *just,* when a man *in heighth, breadth, and thicknesse of body doth so exceed the most, as nevertheless it be no hinderance to the quicknesse of his motion.*

10. *Good old Age.* Which is, *that which comes late, and with the least trouble.*

11. *Many and good Friends.* Which is, *to have many that will do for his sake that which they thinke will be for his good.*

12. *Prosperity.* Which is, *to have all, or the most, or the greatest of those goods which we attribute to Fortune.*

13. *Vertue.* Which is then to be defined, when we speak of *Praise.*

These are the grounds from whence we *exhort.*

Dehortation is from the contraries of these.

CHAP. 6.

Of the Colours *or* common opinions *concerning* Good *and* Evill.

IN *Deliberatives*, the *Principles*, or *Elements* from whence we draw our *Proofes*, are *common Opinions* concerning *Good* and *Evill.* And these *Principles* are either *Absolute*, or *Comparative.* And those that are *Absolute*, are either *Disputable*, or *Indisputable.* The

The *Indisputable Principles* are such as these;

Good, is that which we love for it self.

And that, for which we love some what else.

And that which all things desire.

And that to every man which his reason dictates.

And that, which when we have, we are well, or satisfied.

And that which satisfies.

And the Cause or Effect of any of these.

And that which preserves any of these.

And that which keepes off, or destroyes the contrary of any of these.

Also to take the *Good*, and reject the *Evill*, is *Good*.

And to take the greater *Good*, rather then the lesse; and the lesser *Evill*, rather then the greater.

Further, all Vertues are *Good*.

And Pleasure.

And all things Beautifull.

And Justice, Valour, Temperance, Magnanimity, Magnificence; and other like habits.

And Health, Beauty, Strength, &c.

And Riches.

And Friends.

And Honour, and Glory.

And Ability to say or do: also Towardliness, Will, and the like.

And Whatsoever Art, or Science.

And Life.

And Whatsoever is Just.

The *Disputable Principles* are such as follow.

That is, *Good*, whose contrary is *Evill.*

And whose contrary is *good* for our Enemies.

And whose contrary our Enemies are glad of.

And of which there cannot be too much.

And upon which much labour and cost hath been bestowed.

And that which many desire.

And that which is praised.

And that which even our Enemies and evill men praise.

And What good me prefer.

And What we do advise.

And that which is Possible, is *Good* (to undertake.)

And

And that which is Eaſie.

And that which depends on our own Will.

And that which is proper for us to do.

And what no man elſe can do.

And whatſoever is Extraordinary.

And what is ſutable.

And that which wants a little of being at an end.

And what we hope to maſter.

And what we are fit for.

And what evill men do not.

And what we love to do.

CHAP. 7.

Of the Colours, *or* common Opinions *concerning* Good *and* Evill comparatively.

THE *Colours* of *Good comparatively* depend partly upon the following Definitions of *Comparatives*.

1. *More*, is *ſo much, and ſomewhat beſides.*

2. *Leſs*, is *that, which and ſomwhat elſe is ſo much.*

3. *Greater* and *more in number* are

ſaid only *Comparatively* to *Leſs*, and *Fewer in number*.

4. *Great* and *Little*, *Many* and *Few*, are taken *Comparatively* to the *Moſt of the ſame kind*. So that *Great* and *Many*, is that which *exceeds*; *Little* and *Few*, is that which is *exceeded by the Moſt of the ſame kind*.

Partly from the precedent Definitions of *Good abſolutely*.

Common Opinions concerning Good Comparatively then are theſe.

Greater Good is Many, then Fewer, or one of thoſe many.

And *Greater* is the kind, in which the greateſt is greater then the greateſt of another kind. And *greater* is that *Good* then another good, whoſe kind is *greater* then another's kind.

And *Greater* is that from which another *Good followes*; then the *Good* which followes.

And of two which exceed a third, *Greater* is that which exceeds it moſt.

And that which cauſes the *greater Good*.

And that which proceeds from a *greater Good*.

And *Greater* is that which is choſen

ſen for it ſelfe, then that which is choſen from ſomewhat elſe.

And the end *greater* then that which is not the end.

And that which leſs needs other things, then that which more.

And that which is independent, then that which is dependent of another.

And the Beginning, then not the Beginning.

[Seeing the Beginning is a *greater Good*, or *Evill*, then that which is not the Beginning; and the End, then that which is not the End; One may argue from this *Colour* both wayes: as *Leodamas* againſt *Chabrias*, would have the Actor more to blame then the Adviſor; and againſt *Calliſtratus*, the Adviſor more then the Actor.]

And the Cauſe, then not the Cauſe.

And that which hath a *greater* Beginning or Cauſe.

And the Beginning, or Cauſe of a *greater Good*, or *Evill*.

And that which is ſcarce, *greater* then that which is Plentifull; becauſe harder to get.

And that which is Plentifull, then that which is Scarce; becauſe oftner in Uſe.

And that which is Eaſy, then that which is Hard.

And that whoſe Contrary is *greater.*

And that whoſe Want is *greater.*

And Vertue then not Vertue, a *greater Good.* Vice, then not Vice, a *greater Evill.*

And *greater Good*, or *Evill* is that, the effects whereof are more Honorable or more Shamefull.

And the effects of *greater* Vertues, or Vices.

And the Exceſſe whereof is more tolerable, a *greater Good.*

And thoſe things which may with more honour be deſir'd.

And the deſire of better things.

And thoſe things wherof the Knowledge is better.

And the Knowledge of better things.

And that which wiſe men preferre.

And that which is in better men.

And that which better men chuſe.

And that which is more, then that which

which is leſſe delightfull.

And that which is more, then that which is leſs Honourable.

And that which we would have for our ſelves and Friends, a *greater Good*; and the contrary a *greater Evill*.

And that which is Laſting, then that which is not Laſting.

And that which is Firme, then that which is not Firme.

And what many deſire, then what few.

And what the Adverſary, or Judge confeſſeth to be *greater*, is *greater*.

And Common then not Common.

And not Common then Common.

And what is more Laudable.

And that which is more Honour'd, a *greater Good*.

And that which is more Puniſh'd, a *greater Evill*.

And both *Good* and *Evill* divided then undivided, appeare *greater*.

And Compounded then Simple, appeare *greater*.

And that which is done with Opportunity, Age, Place, Time, Means diſadvantageous, *greater* then otherwiſe.

And that which is naturall, then that which is attained unto.

And the ſame part of that which is great, then of that which is leſſe.

And that which is neareſt to the end deſigned.

And that which is *Good* or *Evill* to ones ſelf, then that which is ſimply ſo.

And Poſſible, then not poſſible.

And that which comes toward the end of our Life.

And that which we do really, then that which we do for ſhew.

And that which we would be, rather then what we would ſeem to be.

And that which is good for more purpoſes, is the *greater Good*.

And that which ſerves us in great neceſſity.

And that which is joyned with leſs trouble.

And that which is joyned with more delight.

And of the two, that which added to a third makes the whole the greater.

And that which having, we are more ſenſible of.

And in every thing, that which we moſt eſteem.

CHAP.

CHAP. 8.

Of the ſeverall kinds of Governments.

BEcauſe *Hortation* and *Dehortation* concern the Common-wealth, and are drawn from the *Elements* of *Good* and *Evill*; as we have ſpoken of them already in the *Abſtract*, ſo we muſt ſpeak of them alſo in the *Concrete*; that is, of what is *Good* or *Evill* to each ſort of Common-wealth in ſpeciall.

The *Government* of a Common-wealth, is either *Democracy*, or *Ariſtocracy*, or *Oligarchy*, or *Monarchy*.

Democracy is that, wherein all men with equall right, are preferred to the higheſt Magiſtracy by Lot.

Ariſtocracy is that wherein the higheſt Magiſtrate is choſen out of thoſe, that had the beſt education, according to what the Lawes preſcribe for beſt.

Oligarchy is that, where the higheſt Magiſtrate is choſen for wealth.

Monarchy is that, wherein one man hath the Government of all; which *Government*, if he limit it by Law, is called *Kingdom*; if by his own will, *Tyranny*.

The

The end of *Democracy*, or the Peoples Government, is *Liberty*.

The end of *Oligarchy*, is *the riches of those that govern*.

The end of *Aristocracy*, is *good Laws*, and *good ordering of the City*.

The end of *Monarchy*, or *Kings*, is *the safety of the People*, *and conservation of his own authority*.

Good therefore, in each sort of *Government* is that which conduceth to these their ends.

And because *belicfe* is not gotten only by *proofes*, but also from *manners*; the *manners* of each sort of Commonwealth ought to be well understood by him that undertaketh to perswade, or dissuade in matter of State. Their *manners* may be known by their *designs*; & their *designs* by their *ends*; and their *ends* by what we see them take *pleasure* in. But of this more accurately in the *Politicks*.

Cap. 9.

Of the Colours *of* Honourable *and* Dishonourable.

IN a *Demonstrative Oration*, the subject whereof is *Praise*, or *Dispraise*; the

the *proofs* are to be drawn from the *Elements* of *Honourable*, and *Dishonourable*.

In this place we anticipate the second way of getting *beliefe*; which is from the *manners* of the Speaker. For *Praise*, whether it come in as the prinpall businesse, or upon the by, depends still upon the same *Principles*. Which are these.

Honourable, is that, which we love for it selfe, and is withall laudable.

And that Good, which pleaseth us only because 'tis Good.

And Vertue.

Vertue is the faculty of getting and preserving that which is Good; and the faculty of doing many, and great things well.

The kinds of it are these;

1. *Justice*; which is a *Vertue* wherby every man obtains what by law is his.

2. *Fortitude*; which is a *Vertue* by which a man carries himself *honourably*, and according to the Lawes, in time of danger.

3. *Temperance*; which is a *Vertue* whereby a man governs himself in matter.

ter of pleasure according to the Law.

4. *Liberality*; which is a *Vertue*, by which we benefit others in matter of money.

5. *Magnanimity*; which is a *Vertue*, by which a man is apt to do great benefits.

6. *Magnificence*; which is a *Vertue*, by which a man is apt to be at great cost.

7. *Prudence*; which is an *Intellectuall Vertue*, by which a man is able to deliberate well concerning any *Good* leading to *Felicity*.

And *Honourable*, are the Causes, and Effects of things *Honourable*.

And the Works of Vertue.

And the signes of Vertue.

And those actions, the reward whereof is *Honor*.

And the reward whereof is rather *Honor*, then Money.

And that which we do not for our own sakes.

And what we do for our Contries good, neglecting our own.

And those things are *Honorable*, which good of themselves, are not so to the Owner.

And

And those things which happen to the dead, rather then to the living.

And what we do for other men, especially for Benefactors.

And bestowing of Benefits.

And the contrary of those things we are ashamed of.

And those things which men strive for earnestly, but without fear of Adversary.

And of the more *Honorable*, and better men, the Vertues are more *Honorable*.

And more *Honorable* are the vertues that tend to other mens benefit, then those which tend to ones own.

And *Honorable* are those things which are Just.

And Revenge is *Honorable*.

And Victory.

And *Honor*.

And Monuments.

And those things which happen not to the living.

And things that excell.

And what none can do but we.

And Possessions we reape no profit by.

And those things which are had in honor

honor particularly in ſeverall places.

And the ſignes of praiſe.

And to have nothing of the ſervile, mercenary, or Mechanick.

And that which ſeemes *Honorable*; Namely ſuch as follow;

Vices confining upon Vertue.

And the extreams of Vertues.

And what the Auditors think *Honorable*.

And that which is in eſtimation.

And that which is done according to cuſtome.

Beſides, in a *Demonſtrative Oration*, the Orator muſt ſhew, that he whom he prayſeth, did what he prayſeth unconſtrainedly, and willingly.

And he does ſo, who does the ſame often.

Prayſe, is ſpeech, declaring the magnitude of a *Vertue*, *Action*, or *Work*.

But to praiſe the Work from the Vertue of the Worker, is a circular Proofe.

To Magnifie, and *to Praiſe*, differ in themſelves, as *Felicity* and *Vertue*. For *Praiſe* declares a mans *Vertue*; and *Magnifying* declares his *Felicity*.

Praiſe

Praise is a kind of inverted *Precept*. For to say, *Do it because 'tis good*, is a *Precept*. But to say, *He is good because he did it, is Praise*.

An Orator in *Praising* must also use the formes of *Amplification*; such as these:

He was the first that did it.

The onely man that did it.

The speciall man that did it.

He did it with disadvantage of Time.

He did it with little help.

He was the cause, that the Law ordained Rewards and Honors for such Actions.

Further, he that will *praise* a Man, must compare him with others; and his actions with the actions of others; especially with such as are renowned.

And *Amplification* is more proper to a *Demonstrative Oration* then to any other. For here the Actions are confess'd; and the Orators part is only this, to contribute unto them Magnitude and Luster.

CHAP.

Chap. 10.

Of Accusation *and* Defence, *with the Definition of* Injury.

IN a *Judiciall Oration*, which consists in *Accusation* and *Defence*, the thing to be proved is, that *Injury* has been done: and the heads from whence the proofes are to be drawne, are these three:

1. The causes that move to *Injury*.
2. The Persons apt to do *Injury*.
3. The Persons obnoxious, or apt to suffer *Injury*.

An *Injury* is a voluntary offending of another man contrary to the Law.

Voluntary is that which a man does with knowledge, and without compulsion.

The causes of *Voluntary* Actions are Intemperance, and a Vicious disposition concerning things Desirable. As the Covetous man does against the Law, out of an intemperate desire of Money.

All Actions proceed either from the

the doers disposition, or not.

Those that proceed not from the Doers disposition are such as he does by *Chance*, by *Compulsion*, or by *Naturall necessity*.

Those that proceed from the Doers disposition, are such as he does by *Custome*, or *upon Premeditation*, or in *Anger*, or out of *Intemperance*.

By Chance are said to be done those things, whereof neither the Cause, nor the Scope is evident; and which are done neither orderly, nor alwaies, nor most commonly after the same manner.

By Nature are said to be done those things, the Causes whereof are in the Doer; and are done orderly, and alwaies, or for the most part after the same manner.

By Compulsion are done those things, which are against the Apperite, and Ordination of the Doer.

By Custome those Actions are said to be done, the Cause whereof is this, that the Doer has done them often.

Upon Premeditation are said to be done those things which are done for profit, as the End, or the way to the End.

In

In Anger are said to be done those things which are done with a purpose of Revenge.

Out of Intemperance are said to be done those things which are delightful.

In sum, every *Voluntary* Action tends either to *Profit* or *Pleasure*.

The *Colours* of *Profitable* are already set down.

The *Colours* of that which is *Pleasing* follow next.

Chap. II.

Of the Colours, *or* Common Opinions *concerning* Pleasure.

Pleasure is a suddain and sensible motion of the Soule, towards that which is Naturall.

Grief is the Contrary.

Pleasant therfore is that, which is the cause of such motion.

And to return to ones own Nature.

And Customes.

And those things that are not violent.

Unpleasant are those things, which proceed from Necessity, as Cares, Study,

Study, Contentions. The contrary whereof, Eaſe, Remiſſion from Labour and Care: alſo Play, Reſt, Sleep, are *Pleaſant*.

Pleaſant alſo is that, to which we have an appetite.

Alſo the appetites themſelves, if they be ſenſuall; as Thriſt, Hunger, and Luſt.

Alſo thoſe things to which we have an appetite upon perſwaſion and Reaſon.

And thoſe things we remember, whether they pleaſed, or diſpleaſed, then when they were preſent.

And the things we hope for.

And Anger.

And to be in Love.

And Revenge.

And Victory. Therefore

Alſo contentious Games; as Tables, Cheſs, Dice, Tennis, &c.

And Hunting.

And Suites in Law.

And Honor and Reputation amongſt men in Honor and Reputation.

And to Love.

And to be Belov'd and Reſpected.

And

And to be admir'd.
And to be Flatter'd.
And a Flatterer: (for he seems both to love and admire.)
And the same thing Often.
And Change, or Variety.
And What we return to afresh.
And to Learn.
And to admire.
And to do Good.
And to receive Good.
And to help up again one that's fallen.
And to finish that which is unperfect.
And Imitation.
And therefore the Art of Painting.
And the Art of Carving Images.
And the Art of Poetry.
And Pictures and Statues.
And other mens Dangers, so they be neer.
And to have escaped hardly.
And things of a kind *please* one another.
And every one himself.
And ones own *pleases* him.
And to bear Sway.
And to be thought Wise.

And to dwell upon that which he is good at.

And ridiculous actions, Sayings and Persons.

CHAP. 12.

Presumptions of Injury *drawn from the persons that do it: or* Common Opinions *concerning the aptitude of Persons to do* Injury.

OF the Causes which move to *Injury*, namely, *Profit* and *Pleasure*, has been already spoken, *Chap. 6. 7. 11.*

It follows next to speak of the *Persons*, that are apt to *do Injury*.

The *Doers of Injury* are.

Such as think they can do it.

And such as think to be undiscover'd when they have done it.

And such as think, though they be discover'd, they shall not be called in question for it.

And such as think, though they be called in question for it, that their Mulct will be lesse then their Gain, which either themselves or their friends receive by the *Injury*.

Able

Able to do Injury are.

Such as are Eloquent.

And such as are practis'd in busineſſe.

And such as have skill in Proceſſe.

And such as have many Friends.

And Rich Men.

And such as have Rich Friends; or Rich Servants; or Rich Partners.

Undiſcover'd when they have done it, are

Such are not apt to commit the crimes whereof they are accuſed: as Feeble Men, Slaughter: Poor, and not Beautifull Men, Adultery.

And such as one would think could not chuſe but be diſcovered.

And such as do *Injuries*, whereof there hath been no Example.

And such as have none, or many enemies.

And such as can eaſily conceale what they do.

And such as have ſome body to transferre the fault upon.

They that do *Injury openly*, are

Such, whoſe friends have been *injured*.

And such as have the Judges for friends.

An

And ſuch as can eſcape their triall at Law.

And ſuch as can put off their triall.

And ſuch as can corrupt the Judges.

And ſuch as can avoid the paiment of their fine.

And ſuch as can deferre the paiment.

And ſuch as cannot pay at all.

And ſuch as by the *Injury* get manifeſtly, much, and preſently; when the fine is uncertain, little, and to come.

And ſuch as get by the *Injury*, money; by the penalty, ſhame only.

And ſuch on the contrary, as get honour by the *Injury*, and ſuffer the mulct of money only, or baniſhment, or the like.

And ſuch as have often eſcaped, or been undiſcovered.

And ſuch as have often attempted in vain.

And ſuch as conſider preſent pleaſure, more then pain to come; and ſo intemperate men are apt to do *Injury*.

And ſuch as conſider pleaſure to come, more then preſent pain; and ſo temperate men are apt to do *Injury*.

And ſuch as may ſeem to have done it by Fortune, Nature, Neceſſity, or

Customes; and by Errour rather then by Injustice.

And such as have means to get pardon.

And such as want Necessaries, as poor men: or Unnecessaries, as rich men.

And such as are of very good, or very bad Reputation.

Chap. 13.

Presumptions of Injury *drawne from the* Persons *that suffer, and from the* matter *of the* Injury.

Of those that doe *Injury*, and why they do it, it hath been already spoken.

Now of the persons that suffer, and of the *Matter* wherein they suffer, the *common Opinions* are these:

Persons obnoxious to *Injury* are,

Such as have the things that we want either as necessary, or as delightfull.

And such as are far from us.

And such as are at hand.

And such as are unwary, and Credulous.

An

And ſuch as are Lazy.

And ſuch as are Modeſt.

And ſuch as have ſwallowed many *Injuries*.

And ſuch as we have *injured* often before.

And ſuch as never before.

And ſuch as are in our danger.

And ſuch as are ill belov'd generally.

And ſuch as are envied.

And our Friends.

And our Enemies.

And ſuch as, wanting friends, have no great ability either in ſpeech or action.

And ſuch as ſhall be looſers by going to Law; as Strangers, and Workmen.

And ſuch as have done the *Injuries* they ſuffer.

And ſuch as have committed a crime, or would have done, or are about to do.

And ſuch as, by doing them an *Injury*, we ſhall gratifie our friends or ſuperiours.

And ſuch, whoſe friendſhip we have newly left, and accuſe.

And ſuch as another would do

the *Injury* to, if we ſhould not.

And ſuch as by *injuring*, we get greater means of doing good.

The *Matters* wherein men are obnoxious to *Injury* are,

Thoſe things wherein all, or moſt men uſe to deal unjuſtly.

And thoſe things which are eaſily hid, and put off into other hands, or altered.

And thoſe things which a man is aſhamed to have ſuffered.

And thoſe things wherein proſecution of *Injury*, may be thought a love of contention.

Cap. 14.

Of thoſe things which are neceſſary to be known for the Definition of Juſt *and* Unjuſt.

When the fact is evident, the next inquiry is, whether it be *juſt*, or *unjuſt*.

For the Definition of *Juſt* and *Unjuſt*, we muſt know what *Law* is; that is, what the *Law of Nature*, what the *Law of Nations*; what the *Law Civil*,

what

what *written Law*, and what *unwritten Law* is: and what *Persons*; that is, what a *publick Person*, or the *City* is; and what a *private Person*, or *Citizen* is.

Unjust in the opinion of all men, is that which is contrary to the *Law of Nature*.

Unjust in the opinion of all men of those Nations which traffick and come together, is that which is contrary to the *Law common to those Nations*.

Unjust onely in one Commonwealth, is that which is contrary to the *Law Civill*, or Law of that Commonwealth.

He that is accused to have done any thing against the *Publick*, or a *private Person*, is accused to do it either *ignorantly*, or *unwillingly*, or *in anger*, or *upon premeditation*.

And because the defendant does many times confesse the *fact*, but deny the *unjustice*; as that he *took*, but did not *steal*; and *did*, but not *adultery*; it is necessary to know the Definitions of *Theft*, *Adultery*, and all other crimes.

What facts are contrary to the

written Lawes, may be known by the *Lawes* themselves.

Besides *written Lawes*, whatsoever is *Just*, proceeds from *Equity*, or *Goodnesse*.

From *Goodnesse* proceeds that which we are prayſed, or honored for.

From *Equity* proceed thoſe actions, which though the *written Law* command not, yet being interpreted reaſonably, and ſupplyed, ſeems to require at our hands.

Actions of *Equity* are ſuch as theſe.

Not too rigorouſly to puniſh Errors, Miſchances, or Injuries.

To pardon the faults that adhere to Mankind.

And not to conſider the *Law* ſo much, as the *Law-makers mind*; and not the *Words* ſo much, as the *meaning* of the *Law*.

And not to regard ſo much the Fact, as the intention of the Doer; nor part of the Fact, but the Whole; nor what the Doer *is*, but what he *has been* alwaies, or for the moſt part.

And to remember better the Good received, then the Ill.

And to endure injuries patiently.

And

And to ſubmit rather to the ſentence of a Judge, then of the ſword.

And to the ſentence of an Arbitrator, rather then of a Judge.

CHAP. 15.

Of the Colours *or* Common Opinions *concerning* Injuries, comparatively.

Common Opinions concerning *Injuries comparatively*, are ſuch as theſe:

Greater is the *Injury* which proceed from greater Iniquity.

And from which proceedeth greaters dammage.

And of which there is no revenge.

And for which there is no remedy.

And by occaſion of which, he that hath received the *Injury*, hath done ſome miſchief to himſelf.

He does the greater *Injury*, that does it firſt, or alone, or with few.

And he that does it often.

Greater *Injury* is that, againſt which Lawes and Penalties were firſt made.

And that which is more brutall, or

more approaching to the actions of beasts.

And that which is done upon more premeditation.

And by which more Lawes are broken.

And which is done in the place of execution.

And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the *Injury*.

And which is committed against well deservers.

And which is committed against the *unwritten Law*; because good men should observe the Law for Justice, and not for fear of punishment.

And which is committed against the *written Law*; because he that will do *Injury* neglecting the penalty set down in the *written Law*, is much more likely to transgress the *unwritten Law*, where there is no penalty at all.

Chap. 16.

Of Proofes Inartificiall.

Of *Artificiall Proofes* we have already spoken.

In-

Inartificiall Proofes, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five sorts.

1. *Lawes*. And those are *Civill*, or *written Law*: the *Law or Custome of Nations*: and the *universall Law of Nature*.

2. *Witnesse*. And those are such as concern *Matter*; and such as concern *Manners*. Also, they be *ancient*, or *present*.

3. *Evidences*, or Writings.

4. *Question*, or Torture.

5. *Oathes*. And those be either *given*, or *taken*, or both, or neither.

For *Lawes*, we use them thus.

When the *written Law* makes against us, we appeal to the *Law of Nature*, alledging,

That to be greatest Justice, which is greatest Equity.

That the *Law of Nature* is immutable; the *written Law* mutable.

That the *written Law* is but seeming Justice; the *Law of Nature* very Justice. And Justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be.

That the Judge ought to discern

ſcern between true and adulterate Juſtice.

That they are better men that obey *unwritten*, then *written Laws*.

That the *Law* againſt us does contradict ſome other *Law*. And when the *Law* has a double interpretation, that is the true one, which makes for us.

And that the cauſe of the *Law* being aboliſhed, the *Law* is no more of Validity.

But when the *written Law* makes for us, and *Equity* for the Adverſary, we muſt alledg,

That a Man may uſe *Equity*, not as a liberty to judg againſt the *Law*; but only as a ſecurity againſt being forſworn, when he knowes not the *Law*.

That men ſeek not *Equity* becauſe 'tis good ſimply, but becauſe good for them.

That it is the ſame thing not to make, and not to uſe the *Law*.

That as in other Arts, and namely in *Phyſick*, Fallacies are pernicious; ſo in a Common-wealth 'tis pernitious to uſe pretexts againſt the *Law*.

And that in Common-wealths well inſtitu-

inſtituted, to ſeem wiſer then the *Lawes*, is prohibited.

For *Witneſſes*, we muſt uſe them thus:

VVhen we have them not, we muſt ſtand for *Preſumptious*, and ſay,

That in *Equity* ſentence ought to be given according to the moſt probability.

That *Preſumptions* are the teſtimony of the things themſelves, and cannot be bribed.

That they cannot lie.

VVhen we have *witneſſes*, againſt him that has them not, we muſt ſay,

That *Preſumptious*, if they be falſe, connot be puniſhed.

That if *Preſumptious* were enough, *witneſſes* were ſuperflurous.

For writings, when they favour us; we muſt ſay,

That *writings* are private and particular *Laws*; and he that takes away the uſe of *Evidences*, aboliſheth the Law.

That ſince Contracts and Negotiations paſſe by *writings*, he that bars their uſe, diſſolves humane Society.

Againſt them, if they favour the Adverſary, we may ſay, That

That since *Laws* do not bind, that are fraudulently made to passe, much lesse *writings*.

And that the Judge being to dispense Justice, ought rather to consider what is *just*, then what is in the *Writing*.

That *Writings* may be gotten by fraud or force; but Justice by neither.

That the *Writing* is repugnant to some *Law*, *Civill*, or *Naturall*; or to *Justice*; or to *Honesty*.

That 'tis repugnant to some other *writing* before, or after.

That it crosses some commodity of the Judge (which must not be said directly, but implied cunningly.)

For the *Torture*, if the giving of it make for us, we must say,

That 'tis the only testimony that is certain.

But if it make for the Adversary, we may say.

That men inforced by *Torture*, speak as well that which is false, as that which is true.

That they who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false to be delivered from pain.

For

For *Oaths*; he that will not put his Adverſary to his *Oath*, may alleadge,

That he makes no ſcruple to be *forſworn*.

That by *ſwearing*, he will carry the cauſe; which *not ſwearing*, he muſt loſe.

That he had rather truſt his cauſe in the hand of the Judge, then of the Adverſary.

He that refuſeth to *take the Oath*, may ſay,

That the matter is not worth ſo much.

That if he had been an evill man, he had *ſworn*, and carried his cauſe.

That to trie it by *ſwearing* for a religious man againſt an irreligious, is as hard a match, as to ſet a weak man againſt a ſtrong in Combate.

He that is willing to *take the Oath*, may pretend.

That he had rather truſt himſelfe, than his Adverſary; and that 'tis equall dealing for an irreligious man to *give*, and for a religious man to *take the Oath*.

That 'tis his duty to *take the Oath*, ſince he has required to have *ſworn Judges*.

He

He that *Offers the Oath* may pretend,

That he does piously commit his cause to the Gods.

That he makes his Adversary himself Judge.

That 'twere absurd for him *not to swear*, that has required the Judges *to be sworn*.

And of these are to be compounded the Formes we are to use, when we would *give*, and *not take the Oath*; or *take*, and *not give*; or *both give* and *take*; or *neither give nor take*.

But if one have *sworn* contrary to a former *Oath*, he may pretend;

That he was forced.

That he was deceived, and that neither of these is *Perjury*, since *Perjury* is voluntary.

But if the Adversary do so, he may say;

That he that stands not to what he hath *sworn*, subverteth humane society.

And (turning to the Judge) What reason have we to require, that you should be *sworn*, that judg our cause; when

when we will not ſtand to that we *ſwear* our ſelves.

And ſo much for *Proofes inartificiall.*

The ſecond Book.

CHAP. I.

The Introduction.

OF *Beleefe* proceeding from our *Invention*, that part which conſiſteth in *proofe*, is already ſpoken of.

The other two parts follow; whereof one ariſeth from the *manners* of the *ſpeaker*; the other from the *paſſions* of the *Hearer*.

The *Principles*, *Colours*, or *Common Opinions* upon which a mans *beleefe* is grounded concerning the *manners* of him that *ſpeaks*, are to be had partly

our

out of that which hath been ſaid before concerning *Vertue*, Book. 1. Chap. 9. partly out of thoſe things which ſhall be ſaid by and by, concerning the *Paſſions*. For a man is *beleev'd* either for his *Prudence*, or for his *Probity*, which are Vertues; or for *good will*: of which among the *Paſſions*.

The *Principles concerning beleefe*, ariſing from the *paſſion* of the *Hearer*, are to be gather'd from that which ſhal now be ſaid of the ſeverall *Paſſions* in order.

In every one of which three things are to be conſidered.

1. Firſt, *how* men are affected.
2. Secondly, *Towards whom*.
3. Thirdly, *For what*.

CHAP. 2.

Of Anger.

ANger is deſire of revenge, joyned with grief for that He, or ſome of his, is, or ſeems to be *neglected*.

The object of *Anger* is alwayes ſome particular, or indiuall thing.

In *Anger* there is alſo pleaſure proceeding

ceeding from the imagination of revenge to come.

To *Neglect*, is to esteem little or nothing: and of three kinds.

1. *Contempt.*
2. *Crossing.*
3. *Contumely.*

Contempt, is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself.

Crossing is the hinderance of another mans will without design to profit himself.

Contumely, is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.

The *common Opinions* concerning *Anger* are therefore such as follow.

They are easily *Angry* that think they are neglected.

That thinke they excell others; as the Rich with the Poore; the Noble with the Obscure, &c.

And such as thinke they deserve wel.

And such as grieve tobe hindered, opposed, or not assisted. And therfore sick men, poor men, Lovers, and generally all that desire, and attain not, are *Angry* with those that stand-

ſtanding by, are not moved with their wants.

And ſuch as having expected good, find evill.

Thoſe that men are *Angry* with, are,

Such as mock, deride, or jeſt at them.

And ſuch as ſhew any kinde of *Contumely* towards them.

And ſuch as deſpiſe thoſe things which we ſpend moſt labour and ſtudy upon: and the more, by how much we ſeem the leſſe advanced therein.

And our friends, rather then thoſe that are not our friends.

And ſuch as have honored us, if they continue not.

And ſuch as requite not our courteſie.

And ſuch as follow contrary courſes, if they be our inferiours.

And our friends, if they have ſaid, or done us evill, or not good.

And ſuch as give not eare to our intreaty.

And ſuch as are joyfull, or calm in our diſtreſs.

And

And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled.

And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces.

And such as neglect us in the presence of our Competitors; of those we admire, of those we would have admire us; of those we reverence, and of those that reverence us.

And such as should help us, and neglect it

And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest.

And such as forget us, or our Names.

An *Orator* therefore must so frame his *Judg* or *Auditor* by his *Oration*; as to make him apt to *Anger*: and then make his *Adversary* appear such as men use to be *angry withall*

CHAP. 3.

Of Reconciling, *or* Pacifying *Anger.*

Reconciliation is the Appeasing of Anger.

Those, to whom men are easily *reconciled*, are,

Such,

Such as have not offended out of Neglect.

And such as have done it against their will.

And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done.

And such as have done as much to themselves.

And such as confesse and repent.

And such as are humbled.

And such as do seriously the same things, that they do seriously.

And such as have done them more good heretofore, then now hurt.

And such as sue to them for any thing.

And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor slighters of others in their own disposition.

And generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those, whom men are usually angry withall.

And such as they fear or reverence.

And such as reverence them.

And such as have offended their Anger

Reconcilable are,

Such as are contrarily affected to those

those whom we have said before to be easily angry.

And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live in plenty; and in sum, all that have no cause of grief.

And such as have given their anger time.

Men lay down their Anger for these causes.

Because they have gotten the Victory.

Because the Offender has suffered more then they meant to inflict.

Because they have been revenged of another.

Because they think they suffer justly.

And because they think the revenge will not be felt, or not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury.

And because the Offender is dead.

Whosoever therefore would *asswage* the anger of his *Auditor*, must make himself appear such, as men use to be *reconciled* unto: and beget in his *Auditor* such opinions, as make him *reconcileable*.

CHAP.

Chap. 4.

Of Love and Friends.

TO *Love*, is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake.

A *Friend* is he that *loves*, and he that is *beloved*.

Friends one to another, are they that mutually *love* one another.

A *Friend* therefore is he,

That rejoyceth at anothers Good.

And that grieves at his hurt.

And that wishes the same with us to a third, whether good, or hurt.

And that is *enemy* or *friend* to the same man.

We *love them*,

That have done good to us, or ours especially if much, readily, or in season.

That are our Friends *Friends*.

That are our Enemies *Enemies*.

That are Liberall.

That are Valiant.

That are Just.

And that we would have *love* us.

And good Companions.

An

And ſuch as can abide Jeſts.

And ſuch as break Jeſts.

And ſuch as praiſe us, eſpecially for ſomewhat that we doubt of in our ſelves.

And ſuch as are neat.

And ſuch as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits.

And ſuch as quickly forget injuries.

And ſuch as leaſt obſerve our Errours.

And ſuch as are not of ill tongue.

And thoſe that are ignorant of our Vices.

And ſuch as croſſe us not when we are buſie, or angry.

And ſuch as are officious towards us.

And thoſe that are like us.

And ſuch as follow the ſame courſe or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.

And ſuch as labour for the ſame thing, when both may be ſatisfied.

And ſuch as are not aſhamed to tell us freely their faults, ſo it be not in contempt of us, and the faults ſuch, as the world, rather then their own conſciences condemnes.

And ſuch as are aſhamed to tell us of their very faults. And

And such as we would have honour us; and not envie, but imitate us.

And such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to our selves.

And such as continue their *friendship* to the dead.

And such as speak their mind.

And such as are not terrible.

And such as we may rely on.

The severall kinds of *friendship*, are *Society*, *Familiarity*, *Consanguinity*, *Affinity*, &c.

The things that beget *love*, are,

The bestowing of *Benefits*. { *Gratis*. *Unasked*. *Privately*.

CHAP. 5.

Of Enmity *and* Hatred.

THE *Colours*, or *Common Opinion* concerning *Hatred* are to be taken from the *contrary* of those, which concern Love and Friendship.

Hatred differs from Anger in this, That Anger regards only what

what is done to ones ſelfe; but *Hatred* not.

And in this, that Anger regards particulars only; the other univerſals alſo.

And in this, that Anger is curable, *Hatred* not.

And in this, that Anger ſeeks the vexation, *Hatred* the damage of ones Adverſary.

That with Anger there is always joyned Griefe; with *Hatred* not always.

That Anger may at length be ſatiated, but *Hatred* never.

Hence it *appears* how the Judge, or Auditor may be made *Friend*, or *Enemy* to us; and how our Adverſary may be made appear *Friend* or *Enemy* to the Judge; and how we may anſwer to our Adverſary, that would make us appear *Enemies* to him.

CAP. 6.

Of Fear.

FEar is a trouble, or vexation of the mind, ariſing from the apprehenſi-

on of an evill at hand, which may hurt or destroy.

Danger is the nearnesse of the evill feared.

The things to be *Feared*, are,

Such as have power to hurt.

And the signes of will to do us hurt, as Anger and Hatred of powerfull men.

And Injustice joyned with power.

And Valour provoked, joyned with power.

And the fear of powerfull men.

The men that are to be *feared*, are,

Such as know our faults.

And such as can do us injury.

And such as think they are injured by us.

And such as have done us injury.

And our Competitors in such things as cannot satisfie both.

And such as are feared by more powerfull men then we are.

And such as have destroyed greater men then we are.

And such as use to invade their inferiours.

And men not passionate, but dissemblers, and crafty, are more to be

feared

feared then those that are hasty and free.

The things especially to be *feared* are,

Such, wherein if we erre, the errour cannot be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our Adversaries pleasure.

And such as admit either none, or not easie help.

And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity them.

They that *fear not*, are

Such as expect not evill; or not now; or not this; or not from these.

And therefore men *fear* little in prosperity.

And men *fear* little that think they have suffered already.

An Orator therefore that would put *Fear* into the Auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious; and that greater then he do suffer, and have suffer'd from those, and at those times they least thought.

Chap. 7.

Of Assurance.

Assurance is hope, arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evill afar off.

The things therefore that beget *Assurance* are,

The remoteness of those things that are to be feared, and the nearness of their contraries.

And the facility of great, or many helps or remedies.

And neither to have done; nor received Injury.

And to have no Competitors, or not great ones, or if great ones, at least friends; such as we have obliged, or are obliged to.

And that the danger is extended to more, or greater than us.

Assured, or *Confident*, are, They that have oft escaped danger.

And they to whom most things have succeeded well.

And they that see their Equals, or inferiours not afraid.

And they that have wherewith to make themselves feared, as wealth, strength, &c.

And

And ſuch as have done others no wrong.

And ſuch as think themſelves in good terms with God-Almighty.

And ſuch as think they will ſpeed well, that are gone before.

CHAP. 8.
Of Shame.

SHame is a perturbation of the Mind ariſing from the apprehenſion of Evill, paſt, preſent, or to come, to the prejudice of a Mans own, or his friends reputation.

The things therefore which men are *aſhamed* of are thoſe Actions which proceed from Vice, as,

To throw away ones armes; to run away, ſignes of Cowardlineſs.

To deny that which is committed to ones truſt, a ſign of Injuſtice.

To have lyen with whom, where, and when we ought not, ſignes of Intemperance.

To make gain of ſmall and baſe things; not to help with money whom and how much we ought; to receive help from meaner men; to ask mony at

nſe from ſuch as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expect payment of ſomwhat before lent; and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and ſo to praiſe, as one may be thought to ask; ſignes of Wretchedneſs.

To praiſe one to his face; to praiſe his vertues too much, and colour his vices; Signes of Flattery.

To be unable to indure ſuch labours as men indure that are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of leſs ſtrength then he, ſignes of Effeminacy.

To be beholding often to another; and to upbraid thoſe that are beholding to him, ſignes of Puſillanimity.

To ſpeak and promiſe much of ones ſelf more then his due, ſignes of Arrogance.

To want thoſe things which ones Equals, all, or moſt of them have attained to, is alſo a thing to be *aſhamed of*.

And to ſuffer things ignominious, as to ſerve about anothers perſon; or to be imployed in his baſe actions.

In Actions of Intemperance, whether willingly, or unwillingly commit-

mitted; there is *ſhame* in Actions of Force, only when they are done unwillingly.

The men before whom we are *aſhamed*, are ſuch as we reſpect; namely,

Thoſe that admire us.

And thoſe whom we deſire ſhould admire us.

And thoſe whom we admire.

Thoſe that contend with us for honour.

Thoſe whoſe opinion we contemne not.

And therefore men are moſt *aſhamed* in the preſence

Of old and well bred men.

Of thoſe we are alwayes to live with.

Of thoſe that are not guilty of the ſame fault.

Of thoſe that do not eaſily pardon.

And of thoſe that are apt to reveal our faults; ſuch as are men injured, Backbiters, Scoffers, Comick Poets.

And of thoſe before whom we have had alwayes good ſucceſs.

And of thoſe who never asked any thing of us before.

And of ſuch as deſire our Friendſhip.

And of our familiars, that know none of our Crimes.

And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named before.

But in the presence of such whose judgment most men despise, men are *not ashamed.*

Therefore we are *ashamed* also in the presence

Of those whom we reverence.

And of those who are concerned in our own, or Ancestors, or Kinsfolkes actions or misfortunes, if they be shamefull.

And of their Rivals.

And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace.

The *Common Opinions* concerning *Impudence* are taken from the contrary of these.

Chap. 9.

Of Grace, or Favour.

Grace is that Vertue, by which a man is said to do a good turn, or do service to a man in need; not for his own

own, but for his cause to whom he does it.

Great *Grace* is when the need is great; or when they are hard, or difficult things that are conferr'd, or when the time is seasonable, or when he that conferr's the *favour* is the only, or first man that did it.

Need, is a desire joyned with grief for the absence of the thing desired.

Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.

Whosoever therfore would prove that he has done a *Grace*, or *Favour*, must shew that he needed it to whom it was done.

Grace it is not,

Which is done by Chance.

Nor which is done by Necessity.

Nor which has been requited.

Nor that which is done to ones Enemy.

Nor that which is a trifle.

Nor that which is naught, if the Giver know the fault.

And in this manner a man may go over the Prædicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a *Grace* for being *This*, or for being

so Much, or for being *Such*, or for being *Now*, *&c.*

CHAP. 10.

Of Pity, *or* Compassion.

PITY is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to himselfe, or his.

And because it appertains to *Pity*, to think that he, or his may fall into the misery he pities in others, it follows that they be most *compassionate*,

Who have passed through Misery.

And old men.

And weak men.

And timorous men.

And learned men.

And such as have Parents, Wife, and Children.

And such as think there be honest men.

And that they are lesse *Compassionate*,

Who are in great despair.

Who are in great prosperity.

And

And they that are Angry; for they consider not.

And they that are very Confident; for they also consider not.

And they that are in the Act of contumely; for neither do these consider.

And they that are astonished with fear.

And they that think no man honest.

The things to be *pitied* are,

Such as grieve, and withall hurt.

Such as destroy.

And Calamities of fortune, if they be great: as none or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, &c.

And evill that arrives where good is expected.

And after extream Evill, a little Good.

And through a mans life to have no good offer it self; or being offer'd, not to have been able to enjoy it.

Men to be *pitied* are,

Such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own.

And such as be of our own years.

Such as are like us in manners.

Such

Such as are of the ſame, or like ſtock.
And our Equals in dignity.

Thoſe that have lately ſuffer'd, or are ſhortly to ſuffer injury: and thoſe that have the markes of injury paſt.

And thoſe that have the words or actions of them that be in preſēt miſery.

Chap. II.

Of Indignation.

Oppoſite in a manner to *Pity* in good men, is *Indignation*, which is grief for the proſperity of a man unworthy.

With *Indignation* there is alwayes joyned a joy for the proſperity of a man worthy, as *Pity* is always with contentment in the adverſity of them that deſerve it.

In wicked men the oppoſite of *pity* is, *Envy*; as alſo the companion thereof, *delight in the harm of others*, which the Greeks in one word have called ἐπιχαιρεκακία. But of theſe in the next Chapter.

Men conceive *Indignation* againſt others, not for their vertues, as Juſtice, &c. For theſe make Men worthy; and in *Indignation* we think men unworthy.

But

But for those goods which men indued with vertue, and noble men, and handsome men are worthy of.

And for newly gotten power and riches, rather than for ancient, and especially if by these he has gotton other goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater *Indignation* against new then ancient Riches, is, that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs. but the antient seem to have but their own. For with common people, to have been so long, is to be so by Right.

And for the bestowing of goods incongruously: as when the arms of the most valiant *Achilles* were bestowed on the most eloquent *Ulysses*.

And for the comparison of the Inferiour in the same thing, as when one Valiant is compared with a more Valiant; or whether absolutely Superiour, as when a good Scholer is compared with a good Man.

Apt to *Indignation* are,

They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them.

And they that are good.

And they that are ambitious.

And

And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth, then he that hath it.

Least apt to *Indignation* are,

Such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious Nature.

Who they are, that Rejoyce, or Grieve not at the Adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions, may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said.

Whosoever therefore would turn away the *compassion* of the Judge, he must make him apt to *Indignation*; and shew that his Adversary is unworthy of the Good, and worthy of the Evill which happens to him.

CHAP. 12.

Of Envy.

ENvy is griefe, for the prosperity of such as our selves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they receive.

Such as our selves, I call those that are equall to us in bloud, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means.

They

They are apt to *Envy*,

That are within a little of the highest.

And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is singular in them, especially Wisdom or good Fortune.

And such as would be thought wise.

And such as catch at glory in every action.

And men of poor spirits: for every thing appears great to them.

The things which men *envy* in others are,

Such as bring glory.

And goods of Fortune.

And such things as we desire for our selves.

And things in the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us a little.

Obnoxious to *envy* are,

Men of our own time, of our own Countrey, of our own age, and Competitors of our glory.

And therefore,

Those whom we strive with for honour.

And those that covet the same things that we do.

And those that get quickly, what we

we hardly obtaine, or not at all.

And those that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us.

And those that possesse what we have possessed heretofore. So old and decayed men *envy* the young and lusty.

And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be *envied* by such as have bestowed much upon the same thing.

From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Joy for other mens hurt.

He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevail, when he craves *pity*, or other favour; must dispose the Judge to *Envy*; and make his Adversary appear such, as are above described, to be subject to the *Envy* of others.

BIBLIOTHECA BODLEIANA

CHAP. 13.

Of Emulation.

Emulation is griefe arising from that our Equals possesse such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not we also. No

No man therefore *Emulates* another in things whereof himſelfe is not capable.

Apt to *Emulate* are,

Such as eſteem themſelves worthy of more then they have.

And Young and Magnanimous Men.

And ſuch as already poſſeſſe the goods for which men are honoured: for they meaſure their worth by their having.

And thoſe that are eſteemed worthy by others.

And thoſe whoſe Anceſtours, Kindred, Familiars, Nation, City, have been eminent for ſome good, do *Emulate* others for that good.

Objects of *Emulation* are, for things;

Vertues.

And things whereby we may profit others.

And things whereby we may pleaſe others.

For Perſons,

They that poſſeſſe ſuch things.

And ſuch as many deſire to be friends or acquainted with, or like unto.

And

And they whose praises flie abroad,

The contrary of *Emulation* is *Contempt*.

And they that *Emulate* such as have the goods aforementioned, *Contemne* such as have them not: and thence it is, that men who live happily enough, unlesse they have the goods which men honour, are nevertheless *Contemned*.

Chap. 14.

Of the Manners *of* Youth.

OF *Passions* we have already spoken. We are next to speak of *Manners*.

Manners are distinguished by *Passions*, *Habits*, *Ages*, and *Fortunes*.

What kind of *Manners* proceed from *Passions*, and from *Vertues* and *Vices* (which are *Habits*,) hath been already shewed.

There remains to be spoken of the *Manners*, that are peculiar to severall *Ages* and *Fortunes*.

The *Ages* are *Youth*, *Middle-Age*, *Old-Age*.

And first of *Youth*.

Young men are,

Violent

Violent in their desires.

Prompt to execute their desires.

Incontinent.

Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before.

Longing mightily, and soon satisfied.

Apt to anger, and in their anger Violent: and ready to execute their anger with their hands.

Lovers of Honor, and of Victory more then Money, as having not been yet in Want.

Well natured, as having not been acquainted with much malice.

Full of hope, both because they have not yet bee often frustrated, & because they have by naturall heat that disposition that other *Ages* have by Vvine; *Youth* being a kind of naturall drunkenes. Besides, Hope is of the time to come, whereof *Youth* hath much, but of the time past little.

Credulous, because not yet often deceived.

Easily deceived, because full of Hope.

Valiant, because apt to Anger and full of Hope; whereof this begets confidence, the other keeps off Fear.

Bash-

Baſhfull, becauſe they eſtimate the Honour of Actions by the precepts of the Law.

Magnanimous, becauſe not yet dejected by the misfortunes of humane life.

And lovers of Honour more than of Profit, becauſe they live more by Cuſtom than by Reaſon; & by Reaſon we acquire Profit, but Vertue by Cuſtom.

Lovers of their Friends and Companions.

Apt to err in the exceſs, rather then the defect, contrary to that precept of *Chilon*, *Ne quid nimis*; for they overdo every thing: they Love too much, and Hate too much, becauſe thinking themſelves wiſe, they are obſtinate in the opinion they have once delivered.

Doers of Injury rather for Contumely then for dammage.

Mercifull, becauſe meaſuring others by their own Innocence, they think them better than they be, and therefore leſs to merit what they ſuffer; which is a cauſe of Pity.

And Lovers of Mirth, and by conſequence ſuch as love to jeſt at others.

Jeſting is witty Contumely.

CHAP.

CHAP. 15.

Of the Manners *of* Old Men.

THe *Manners* of *Old men* are in a manner the contraries of those of *Youth*.

They determine nothing: they do every thing less vehemently then is fit: they never say they know; but to every thing they say, perhaps and peradventure; which comes to pass from that having lived long, they have often mistaken and been deceived.

They are peevish because they interpret every thing to the worst.

And suspicious through Incredulity, and Incredulous by reason of their Experience

They Love and Hate, as if they meant to continue in neither.

Are of poor spirits, as having been humbled by the chances of life.

And Covetous, as knowing how easie 'tis to lose, and hard to get.

And Timorous, as having been cooled by years.

And greedy of life: for good things seem

seem greater by the want of them.

And Lovers of themselves out of Pusillanimity.

And seek profit more than Honour, because they love themselves; and Profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for ones self.

And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming.

And hope little; knowing by Experience that many times good Counsell has been followed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.

And live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof *Old men* have good store.

And are full of Talk, because they delight in their Memory.

And Vehement in their anger; but not stout enough to execute it.

They have weak, or no desires, and thence seem Temperate.

They are slaves to Gain.

And live more by reason then Custome; because reason leads to Profit, as Custome to that which is Honorable.

And do Injury to indammage, and not in Contumely.

And are mercifull by Compaſsion, or imagination of the ſame Evils in themſelves; which is a kind of Infirmity, and not Humanity, as in *Young Men*, proceeding from a good opinion of thoſe that ſuffer Evill.

And full of complaint, as thinking themſelves not far from evill, becauſe of their Infirmity.

Seeing then every man loves ſuch men, and their diſcourſes, which are moſt agreeable to their own *Manners*; 'tis not hard to collect, how the Orator, and his Oration may be made acceptable to the Hearer, whether *Young* or *Old*.

CHAP. 16.

Of the *Manners* of *Middle-aged* men.

THe *Manners of Middle-aged men*, are between thoſe of *Youth*, and *Old Men*: and therefore,

They neither dare, nor fear too much: but both as is fit.

They neither believe all; nor reject all; but judge.

They ſeek not only what is Honourable,

rable, nor only what is Profitable; but both.

They are neither Covetous, nor Prodigall; but in the mean.

They are neither easily angry; nor yet stupid: but between both.

They are Valiant, and withall Temperate.

And in generall, whatsoever is divided in *Youth*, and *Old Men*: is compounded in *Middle-age*.

And whereof the Excesse, or Defect is in *Young* or *Old men*; the Mediocrity is in those of *Middle-age*.

Middle-age for the Body, I call the time from thirty to five and thirty years: for the Mind, the nine and fortieth, or thereabouts.

Chap. 17.

Of the Manners *of the* Nobility.

OF *Manners* that proceed from the severall *Ages* we have already spoken.

We are next to speak of those that rise from severall *Fortunes*.

The *Manners* of the *Nobility* are

To be Ambitious.

To undervalue their Anceſtors Equals. For the goods of Fortune ſeem the more precious for their Antiquity.

Nobility is the Vertue of a Stock.

And *Generoſity*, is not to degenerate from the vertue of his Stock.

For as in Plants; ſo in the Races of Men, there is a certain progreſſe; and they grow better and better to a certain point; and change, *viz.* Subtill Wits into Madneſſe; and ſtaid wits into ſtupidity and Blockiſhneſſe.

Chap. 18.

Of the Manners *of the* Rich.

Rich men are Contumelious, and Proud. This they have from their *Riches* For ſeeing every thing may be had for Mony, having Mony, they think they have all that is good.

And Effeminate; becauſe they have wherewithall to ſubminiſter to their Luſt.

And Boaſters of their Wealth: and ſpeak in high terms fooliſhly. For men willingly talk of what they love and admire; and think others affect

the same that they do: and the truth is, all sorts of men submit to the Rich.

And think themselves worthy to to command, having that by which men attain Command.

And in general, they have the *Manners* of Fortunate Fools.

They do Injury, with intention not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through Incontinence.

There is a difference between *New* and *Ancient Riches*: for they that are *newly* come to Wealth have the same faults in a greater degree: for *new riches* are a kind of rudeness and apprentiship of *Riches*.

Chap. 19.

Of the Manners *of Men in* Power, *and of* such as prosper.

The *Manners* of Men in *Power*, are the same, or better then those of the Rich.

They have a greater sense of Honour then the Rich; and their *Manners* are more Manly.

They are more Industrious then the

the Rich: for *Power* is ſuſtained by Induſtry.

They are Grave, but without Auſterenetie: for being in place conſpicuous, they carry themſelves the more modeſtly; and have a kind of gentle and comely Gravity, which the *Greeks* call σεμνότης.

When they do Injuries, they do great ones.

The *Manners* of *Men that proſper*, are compounded of the *Manners* of the *Nobility*, the *Rich*, and thoſe that are in *Power*; for to ſome of theſe all *Proſperity* appertains.

Proſperity in Children, and goods of the Body, make men deſire to exceed others in the goods of Fortune.

Men that *Proſper* have this ill, to be more proud, and inconſiderate then others

And this good; that they worſhip God; truſting in him, for that they find themſelves to receive more good then proceeds from their Induſtry.

The *Manners* of *Poor Men*, *Obſcure Men*, *Men without Power*, and *Men in Adverſity*, may be collected from the Contrary of what has been ſaid.

CHAP. 20.

Common Places *or* Principles *concerning what* May be Done, *what* Has been Done, *and what* Shall be Done; *or of Fact* Possible, Past *and* Future. *Also of* Great *and* Little.

WE have hitherto set down such *Principles* as are peculiar to several kindes of *Orations*.

Now we are to speak of such *Places* as are *Common* to them all; as these, *Possible, Done* or *Past, Future, Great, Small.*

Possible is that

The Contrary whereof is Possible.

And the like whereof is Possible.

And then which some harder thing is Possible.

And the beginning whereof is Possible.

And the end whereof is Possible.

And the usuall consequent whereof is Possible.

And whatsoever we desire.

And the beginning whereof is in the

the power of those whom we can either compell or perswade.

And part whereof is Possible.

And part of the whole that is Possible.

And the Generall if a Particular.

And a Particular if the Generall.

And of Relatives, if one, the other.

And that which without Art and Industry is *Possible*, is much more so with Art and Industry.

And that which is *Possible* to Worse, Weaker, and Unskilfuller men, is much more so to Better, Stronger, and more Skilfull.

The *Principles* concerning *Impossible* are the Contraries of these.

That *Has been done.*

Then which a harder thing has been Done.

And the Consequent whereof Has been done.

And that which being Possible, he had a will to, and nothing hindred.

And that which was Possible, to him in his Anger.

And that which he longed to Do.

And that which was before upon the point of Doing.

And whoſe antecedent has been Done; or that, for which it uſes to be Done.

And if that, for whoſe cauſe we do this, then this,

The *Principles* concerning *Not done* are the Contraries of theſe.

That *Shall be done.*

Which ſome man can, and means to do.

And which ſome man can, and deſires to Do.

And which is in the way, and upon the point to be Done.

And the antecedents whereof are Paſt.

And the Motive whereof is paſt.

Of *Great* and *Small*, *More* and *Leſs*, ſee Chap. 7. Book. 1.

CHAP. 21.

Of Example, Similitude, and Fables.

OF the *Principles* both generall and ſpeciall from whence *Prooſes* are to be drawn, has been already ſpoken.

Now follow the *Prooſes* themſelves, which

which are *Examples* or *Enthymemes*.

An *Example* is either an Example properly ſo called (as ſome Action paſt:) or a *Similitude* (which alſo is, called a Parable:) or a *Fable* (which contains ſome Action fained.)

An *Example* properly ſo called, is this; *Darius came not into* Greece, *till he had firſt ſubdued* Ægypt. *Xerxes alſo conquered* Ægypt *firſt; then afterwards croſſed the* Helleſpont. *We ought therefore to hinder the* King *of* Perſia *from conquering* Ægypt.

A *Similitude*, or *Parable*, is ſuch as followeth: *They who chooſe their Magiſtrates by Lot, are like them that chooſe for their Champions thoſe on whom the Lot ſhall fall, rather then thoſe who have the greateſt ſtrength; and for their Pilot, not him that hath skill; but him whoſe name is drawn out of the Urne.*

A *Fable* is in this manner. *The Horſe deſiring to drive out the Stag from his common paſture, took a man to aſſiſt him and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his back, obtained his intent, but became ſubject to the Man. So you of* Himæra, *having (in hope to be revenged of your Enemies)*

given unto Phalaris *Soveraign Authority, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouthes; if you shall also give him a gard to his person, that is, let him get up upon your backs, you become his slaves presently past recovery.*

To find out *Examples*, that is, Actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard, because not in our power.

But to find *Fables* and *Similitudes*, is easier; because by conversing in *Philosophy*, a man may fain somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.

Examples, *Similitudes* and *Fables*, where *Enthymemes* are wanting, may serve us in the beginning of an *Oration* for *Inductions*; otherwise are to be alledged after *Enthymemes* for *Testimonies*.

CAP. 22.

Of a Sentence.

A *Sentence* is an universall Proposition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided, in the Actions or Passions of the common life. As,

A

A wise man will not suffer his Children to be over-learned.

And is to an *Enthymeme* in *Rhetorick*, as any *Proposition* is to a *Syllogisme* in *Logick*.

And therefore a *Sentence*, if the reason be rendred, becomes a *Conclusion*, and both together make an *Enthymeme*.

As for Example.

To be over-learned, besides that it begets effiminacy, procures envy. Therefore he that's wise will not suffer his Children to be over-learned.

Of *Sentences* there be four sorts.

For they either require *Proofs*, or not: that is, are manifest, or not.

Such as are manifest, are either so, assoon as they are uttered; as,

Health is a great Good.

Or as soon as they are considered; as,

Men use to hate, whom they have hurt.

Such as are not manifest, are either Conclusions of *Enthymemes*; as

He that's wise, will not suffer his Children, &c.

Or else are *Enthymematicall*; that is, have in themselves the force of an *Enthymeme*; as

Mortal men ought not to carry immortal anger.

A *Sentence* not Manifeſt, ought to be either *Inferr'd*, or *Confirm'd*.

Inferr'd thus.

'Tis not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envied by ones fellow Citizens. A wiſe man therefore will not have his Children over-learned.

Confirm'd thus.

A wiſe man will not have his Children over-learned, ſeeing too much learning both ſoftens a mans mind, and procures him envy among his fellow Citizens.

If a reaſon be added to a manifeſt *Sentence*, let it be ſhort.

Sentences become not every man; but only old men, and ſuch as be well verſed in buſineſſe. For to hear a young man ſpeak *Sentences*, is ridiculous; and to hear an ignorant man ſpeak *Sentences*, is abſurd.

Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpoſe, ought not to be neglected, becauſe they paſſe for truths. And yet they may be denied, when any laudable cuſtome, or humour may thereby be made appear in the Denyer.

The commodities of *Sentences*, are two. One

One proceeding from the Vanity of the Hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the Hearer holds.

Another is, that *Sentences* do discover the manners and disposition of the Speaker; so that if they be esteemed good *Sentences*, he shall be esteemed a good man; and if evill, an evill man.

Thus much of *Sentences*, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.

Cap. 23.

Of the Invention of Enthymemes.

SEeing an *Enthymeme* differs from a *Logicall Syllogisme*, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote *Principles*; the *Places* of it, from whence a man may argue ought to be certain, and determinate.

And because whosoever makes a

Syllogisme

Syllogiſme Rhetoricall, or other, ſhould know all, or the moſt part of that which is in queſtion; as, whoſoever is to adviſe the *Athenians* in the queſtion, whether they are to make war or no, muſt know what their revenues be; what, and what kind of power they have: and he that will praiſe them, muſt know their acts at *Salamis*, *Marathon*, &c. It will be neceſſary for a good ſpeaker to have in readineſſe the choiceſt particulars of whatſoever he foreſees he may ſpeak of.

He that is to ſpeak *ex tempore*, muſt comprehend in his ſpeech as much as he can of what is moſt proper in the matter in hand.

Proper, I call thoſe things which are leaſt common to others; as, He that will praiſe *Achilles*, is not to declare ſuch things as are common both to him, and *Diomedes*; as that he was a Prince, and warred againſt the *Trojans*; but ſuch things as are proper only to *Achilles*; as that he killed *Hector* and *Cygnus*; went to the warre young, and voluntary.

Let this therefore be one generall *Place*, from *that which is Proper*.

CHAP.

CHAP. 24.

Of the Places *of* Enthymemes Ostensive.

FOrasmuch as *Enthymemes* either infer truely, or seeme onely so to do; and they which do infer indeed, be either *Ostensive*; or such as bring a man to some *impossibility*; we will first set down the *Places* of *Enthymemes Ostensive*.

An *Ostensive Enthymeme* is, wherein a man concludes the question from somwhat granted.

That *Enthymeme* which brings a man to an *impossibility* is an *Enthymeme* wherein from that which the Adversary maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly *impossible*.

All *Places* have been already set down in a manner in the precedent Propositions of *Good*, *Evill*, *Just*, *Unjust*, *Honourable* and *Dishonourable*: namely, they have been set down as applied to *particular* Subjects, or in *Concrete*.

Here they are to be set down in another

ther manner; namely in the *Abstract* or *Universall*.

The first *Place* then let be from *Contraries*, which in the *Concrete* or Particulars is exemplified thus. *If Intemperance be hurtfull, Temperance is profitable: and if Intemperance be no hurtfull; neither is Temperance profitable.*

Another *Place* may be from *Cognomination* or affinity of words: as in this Particular. *If what is* Just *be* Good; *then what is* Justly *is* well: *but* Justly *to die is* not well: *therefore not all that is* Just *is* Good.

A third from *Relatives*; as, *This man has Justly* Done, *therefore the other has Justly* suffered. But this *Place* sometimes deceives: for a man may suffer *justly*, yet not from *him*.

A fourth from *Comparison*, three wayes.

From the *Great to the Lesse*; as, *He has stricken his* father; *and therefore* this man.

From the *Less to the Greater*: as, *The Gods know not all things*; *much less man.*

From *Equality*: as, If Captains be

not

not alwayes the worse esteemed for losing a victory; why should Sophisters?

Another from the *Time*: as *Philip* to the *Thebans*: *If I had required to passe through your Country with my army, before I had ayded you against the* Phocæans, *there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you:*

A Sixth from *what the adversary sayes of himself*: as, Iphicrates *asked* Aristophon, *whether he would take a bribe to betray the Army*: *and he answering no*; *What* (*sayes he*) *is it likely that* Iphicrates *would betray the Army*; *and* Aristophon *not?*

This *Place* would be ridiculous, where the *Defendant* were not in much more estimation then the *accuser*.

A seventh from the *Definition*; as that of *Socrates*; *A Spirit is either God, or the Creature of God*: *and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are Spirits.*

An eighth from the *distinction of an ambiguous word*.

A ninth from *Division*: as, *If all men do what they do for one of three causes*,

ſes, whereof two are impoſſible; and the Accuſer charge not the Defendant with the third; it followes that he has not done it.

A tenth from *Induction*: as, *At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, &c. And therefore every where.*

An eleventh from *Authority*, or precedent ſentence; as that of *Sappho*, that *Death is evill, for that the Gods have judged it ſo, in exempting themſelves from mortality.*

A twelfth from the *Conſequence*: as, *'Tis not good to be envied; Therefore neither to be learned. 'Tis good to be wiſe, therefore alſo to be inſtructed.*

A thirteenth from *two contrary Conſequences*; as, *'Tis not good to be an Orator, becauſe if he ſpeak the truth, he ſhall diſpleaſe men: if he ſpeak falſely, he ſhall diſpleaſe God.*

Here is to be noted, that ſomtimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, *If you ſpeak truth, you ſhall pleaſe God; if you ſpeak untruth you ſhall pleaſe men; therefore by all means be an Orator.*

A fourteenth from the *quality* that *men have to praiſe one thing, and approve another*: as, *We ought not to war againſt*

the Athenians *upon no precedent injury; for all men discommend injustice.* Again, *We ought to warre against the* Athenians; *for otherwise our Liberty is at their mercy, that is, is no liberty: but the preservation of liberty is a thing that all men will approve.*

A fifteenth from *Proportion*: as, *seeing we naturalize strangers for their vertues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?*

A sixteenth from *the similitude of Consequents*: as, *He that denies the immortality of the Gods, is no worse then he that has written the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none.*

A seventeenth from *that, that men change their mind*: as, *If when we were in banishment, we fought to recover our Countrey, why should we not fight now to retain it?*

An eighteenth from *a fained end*: as, *that* Diomedes *chose* Ulysses *to go with him, not as more valiant then another; but as one that would partake lesse of the glory.*

A nineteenth from the *Cause*; as if he would infer he did it from this, *that he had cause to do it.*

A

A twentieth from *that which is Incredible, but True*: as, that *Lawes may need a Law to mend them; as well as Fish breed in the salt water, may need salting.*

Chap. 25.

Of the Places *of* Enthymemes *that lead to Impossibility.*

Let the first *Place* be from *inspection of Times, Actions*, or *Words*, either of the *Adversary*, or of the *Speaker*, or *Both*. Of the *Adversary*; as, *He sayes, he loves the People, and yet he was in the conspiracy of the Thirty.* Of the *Speaker*; as, *He sayes, I am contentious, and yet I never began suit.* Of *Both*; as *He never conferr'd any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth, whereas I have ransomed divers citizens with mine own money.*

A second from *shewing the cause of that which seemed amisse*, and serves for men of good reputation that are accused; as, The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen imbracing her Son, was absolved as soon as she made appear, that she imbraced him upon his arrivall from far, by way of Salutation.

A third, from *rendring of the cause*; as, *Leodamas*, to whom it was objected,

cted, that he had, under the thirty Tyrants, defaced the Inscription (which the People had set up in a Pillar) of his Ignominy; answered, *He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to indear himself to the Tyrants, by the testimony of the Peoples hatred.*

A fourth from *better Counsel*; as, *He might have done better for himself; therfore he did not this.* But this *Place* deceives, when the *better Counsel* comes to mind after the Fact.

A fifth, from *the Incompatibility of the things to be done*; as, They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the Funerall of *Leucothea*, were told, that *if they thought her a Goddesse, they ought not to mourn; and if they thought her a Mortall, they ought not to sacrifice.*

A sixth (which is proper to *Judicial* Orations) from *an Inference of Errour*; as, *If he did it not, he was not wise, therfore he did it.*

Enthymemes that lead to *Impossibility*, please more then *Ostensive:* for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and more

more conſpicuous to the Auditor.

Of all *Enthymemes*, they be beſt, which we aſſent to as ſoon as hear. For ſuch conſent pleaſeth us; and makes us favourable to the ſpeaker.

Chap. 26.

Of the Places *of* ſeeming Enthymemes.

Of *ſeeming Enthymemes*, one Place may be from *the form of ſpeaking*; as when a man has repeated divers Sentences, he brings in his concluſion, as if it follow'd neceſſarily, though it do not.

A ſecond from *an ambiguous word*.

A third from *that which is true divided, to that which is falſe joyned*; as that of *Oreſtes*, *It was juſtice that I ſhould revenge my Fathers death, and it was juſtice my Mother ſhould die for killing my Father, therefore I juſtly killed my Mother.* Or from that which *is true joyned, to that which is falſe divided*; as, *one cup of Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurtfull; therefore one cup of Wine is hurtfull.*

A fourth from *amplification of the Crime.*

Crime. For neither is the *Defendant* likely to have committed the *Crime* he *amplifies*; nor does the *Accuſer* ſeem, when he is Paſſionate, to want ground for his Acculation.

A fifth from *ſignes*; as, when a man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life.

A ſixth from *that which comes by Chance*, as if from this, that the Tyranny of *Hipparchus* came to be overthrown from the love of *Ariſtogeiton* to *Harmodius*, a man ſhould conclude, that in a free Common-wealth loving of Boyes were profitable.

A ſeventh from *the Conſequence*, as *Baniſhment is to be deſired becauſe a baniſh'd man has choice of places to dwell in.*

An eighth from *making that the cauſe which is not*; as, *In* Demoſthenes *his government, the war began*; *therefore* Demoſthenes *governed well. With the* Peloponneſian war *began the* Plague, *therefore* Pericles *that perſwaded that war, did ill.*

A ninth from *the omiſſion of ſome Circumſtance*, as, Helen *did what was lawfull, when ſhe ran away with* Paris, *becauſe ſhe had her Fathers conſent to*

choose

chuſe her owne Husband; which was true onely during the time that ſhe had not choſen.

A tenth, from *that which is probable in ſome caſe, to that which is probable ſimply*; as, *'Tis probable, be fore-ſeen, that if he did it, he ſhould be ſuſpected; therefore 'tis probable he did it not.*

From this *Place* one may inferre both ways, that *he did it not.* For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought *he did it not*: again, if he were likely to do it, it may be thought *he did it not*, for this, that *he knew he ſhould be ſuſpected.*

Upon this *Place* was grounded the Art, which was ſo much deteſted in *Protagoras*, of making the better cauſe ſeem the worſe; & the worſe the better.

CHAP. 27.

Of the wayes to anſwer the Arguments *of the Adverſary.*

AN *Argument* is anſwered by an oppoſite *Syllogiſme*, or by an *Objection.*

The *Places* of oppoſite *Syllogiſmes* are the ſame with the *Places* of *Syllogiſmes*;

gisme, or *Enthymemes*: for a *Rhetoricall Syllogisme* is an *Enthymeme*.

The *Places* of *Objections* are four.

First, from *the same*, as, To the *Adversary* that proves Love to be good by an *Enthymeme*, may be *objected*, that *no want is good, and yet Love is want*; or particularly thus; *The Love of Myrrha uber Father was not good.*

The second from *Contraries*: as, if the *Adversary* say, *A good man does good to his friends*, an *Objection* might be made, that then *an evill man will do also evill to his friends.*

3. From *Similitude*: as thus, if the *Adversary* say, all men that are injured, do hate those that have injured them, it may be *Objected*, that then, *all men that had received benefits should love their benefactors*, that is to say, be gratefull.

The fourth from the *authority of famous men*; as when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardoned those acts they do in their drunkennesse, because they know not what they do; the *Objection* may be, that Pittacus *was of another mind, that appointed for such acts a double punishment; one for the Act, another for the Drunkennesse.*

And

And forasmuch as all *Enthymemes* are drawn from *Probability*, or *Example*, or from a *Signe fallible*, or from a *Signe infallible*: an *Enthymeme* from *Probability*, may be confuted *Really*, by shewing that for the most part it falls out otherwise; but *Apparantly*, or *Sophistically*, by shewing only that it does not fall out so alwayes; whereupon the Judg thinks the *Probability* not sufficient to ground his Sentence upon.

[The Reason whereof is this, That the Judge, while he hears the fact proved *Probable*, conceives it as *true*. For the Understanding has no Object but *Truth*. And therfore by and by, when he shall hear an *Instance* to the contrary; and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it *true*, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it *false*, and consequently not so much as *Probable*. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both *Probable* and *False*: and he that sayes a thing is *Probable*, the meaning is, he thinkes it *True*, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.]

An *Enthymeme* from a *fallible signe*,

is answered, by shewing the *signe to be fallible.*

An *Enthymeme* from an *Example*, is answered, as an *Enthymeme* from *Probability*; Really, by shewing more *Examples* to the contrary; *Apparently*, if he bring *Examples* enough to make it seem *not necessary.*

If the *Adversary* have more *Examples* then we, we must make appeare, that they are not applicable to the Case.

An *Enthymeme* from an *infallible Signe*, if the Proposition be *true*, is unanswerable.

Chap. 28.

Amplification *and* Extenuation *are not* Common Places. Enthymemes *by which Arguments are answered, are the same with those by which the matter in question is proved, or disproved.* Objections *are not* Enthymemes.

The first, that *Amplification* and *Extenuation* are not *Common Places*

appears by this, that *Amplification*, and *Extenuation* do prove a fact to be *great*, or *little*; and are therefore *Enthymemes*, to be drawn from *Common Places*, and therefore are not the *Places* themselves.

The second, that *Enthymemes*, by which Arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by the other.

The third, that an *Objection* is no *Enthymeme*, is apparent by this, that an *Objection* is no more but an *Opinion*, *Example*, or other *Instance*, produced to make appear, that the Adversaries Argument does not conclude.

Thus much of *Examples*, *Sentences*, *Enthymemes*, and generally of all things that belong to *Argumentation*; from what *Places* they may be drawn, or answered.

There remains *Elocution*, and *Disposition* to be spoken of in the next Book.

The

The third Book.

Chap. I.

Of the Originall of Elocution *and* Pronunciation.

THree things being neceſſary to an *Oration*, namely *Proof*, *Elocution* and *Diſpoſition*; we have done with the firſt, and ſhall ſpeak of the other two in that which followes.

As for *Action*, or *Pronuntiation*, ſo much as is neceſſary for an *Orator* may be fetcht out of the *Book* of the *Art of Poetry*, in which we have treated of the *Action* of the *Stage*.

For *Tragedians* were the firſt that invented ſuch *Action*, and that but of late; and it conſiſteth in governing well the *Magnitude*, *Tone*, and *Meaſure* of the *Voice*; a thing leſs ſubject to

Art, then is either *Proofe*, or *Elocution*.

And yet there have been Rules delivered concerning it, as far forth as serve for *Poetry*.

But *Oratoricall Action* has not been hitherto reduced to *Art*.

And *Orators* in the beginning, when they saw that the *Poets* in barren and faigned Arguments, nevertheless attained great Reputation; supposing it had proceeded from the choice, or connexion of words, fell into a Stile, by imitation of them, approaching to Verse, and made choice of words.

But when the *Poets* changed their Stile, and laid by all words that were not in common use, the *Orators* did the same, and lighted at last upon words and a government of the Voice and Measures proper to themselves.

Seeing therefore *Pronuntiation*, or *Action* are in some degree necessary also for an *Orator*, the Precepts thereof are to be fetcht from the *Art of Poetry*.

[In the mean time this may be one generall Rule. If the *Words*; *Tone*, *Greatness* of the Voice, *Gesture* of the body and Countenance, seem

ſeem to proceed all from one Paſſion, then 'tis well pronounced. Otherwiſe not.

For when there appear more paſsions then one at once, the mind of the Speaker appears unnaturall and diſtracted. Otherwiſe, as the mind of the ſpeaker, ſo the mind of the Hearer alwayes.]

Chap. 2.

Of the choiſe of Words *and* Epithets.

THe vertues of a *Word* are two; the firſt, that it be *perſpicuous*; the ſecond, that it be *decent*; that is, neither *above*, nor *below* the thing ſignified; or, neither too humble, nor too fine,

Perſpicuous are all *Words* that be *Proper*

Fine Words are thoſe, that are *borrowed*, or *tranſlated* from other ſignifications; of which in the *Art of Poetry*.

The reaſon why *borrowed Words* pleaſe, is this. Men are affected with *Words*, as they are with *Men*, admiring in both that which is *forrain* and *new*.

To make a *Poem* gracefull, many things help; but few an *Oration*.

For to a *Poet* it ſufficeth with what *Words* he can to ſet out his *Poem*: but an *Orator* muſt not only do that: but alſo ſeem not to do it: for elſe he will be thought to ſpeak unnaturally, and not as he thinks; and thereby be the leſs beleeved; whereas *beelefe* is the ſcope of his *Oration*.

The *Words* that an *Orator* ought to uſe are of three ſorts. *Proper*; Such as are *Received*; and *Metaphors*.

Words taken from forrain languages, Words compounded, and Words new coyned are ſeldome to be uſed.

Synonimaes belong to *Poets*, and *Equivocall* words to *Sophiſters*.

An *Orator*, if he uſe *Proper* words, and *Received*, and *good Metaphors*, ſhal both make his *Oration beautifull*, and not ſeem to intend it; and ſhall ſpeak *perſpicuouſly*. For in a *Metaphor* alone there is *perſpicuity*, *Novity*, and *Sweetneſſe*.

Concerning *Metaphors* the Rules are theſe.

1. He that will make the beſt of a thing,

thing, let him draw his *Metaphor* from ſomwhat that is better. As for Example, let him call a *Crime*, an *Error*. On the other ſide, when he would make the worſt of it, let him draw his *Metaphor* from ſomwhat worſe, as, calling *Error*, *Crime*.

2. A *Metaphor* ought not to be ſo far fetcht, as that the Similitude may not eaſily appear.

3. A *Metaphor* ought to be drawn from the nobleſt things, as the *Poets* do that chooſe rather to ſay, *Roſy-finger'd*; then *Red finger'd Aurora*.

In like manner the Rule of *Epithets* is,

That he that will adorn, ſhould uſe thoſe of the better ſort; and he that wil diſgrace, ſhould uſe thoſe of the worſe: as *Simonides* being to write an *Ode* in honor of the victory gotten in a Courſe by certain *Mules*, being not well paid, called them by their name [Ἡμίονος] that ſignifies their propinquity to Aſſes: but having received a greater reward, Stiles them *the ſons of ſwift footed Courſers*.

Chap. 3.

Of the things that make an Oration Flat.

THe things that make an *Oration flat*, or *insipide*, are four.

1. *Words Compounded*; [and yet a Man may Compound a word, when the Composition is necessary, for want of a simple word; and easie, and seldom used.]

2. *Forrain words*. As for example, such as are newly derived from the Latine; which though they were proper among them whose tongue it is, are forrain in another Language: and yet these may be used, so it be moderately.

3. *Long*, *impertinent*, and *often* Epithets.

4. *Metaphors*, *indecent*, and *obscure*. *Obscure* they are, when they are far fetcht. *Indecent* when they are *ridiculous*, as in *Comedies*; or *too grave*, as in *Tragedies*.

Chap. 4.

Of a Similitude.

A *Similitude* differs from a *Metaphor* only by ſuch *Particles* of *Compariſon* as theſe, *As*; *Even as*; *So*; *Even ſo*, &c.

A *Similitude* therefore is a *Metaphor dilated*; and a *Metaphor* is a *Similitude Contracted* into one Word.

A *Similitude* does well in an Oration, ſo it be not too frequent; for 'tis *Poeticall*.

An example of a *Similitude*, is this of *Pericles*; that ſaid in his Oration, *that the* Bæotians *were like to ſo many Oaks in a Wood, that did nothing but beat one another*.

Cap. 5.

Of the Purity *of Language.*

EOure things are neceſſary to make Language Pure.

1. The *right rendring* of thoſe *Particles*

ticles which some antecedent *particle* does require: As to a *Not only*, a *Not also*; and then they are rendred right, when they are not suspended too long.

2. *The use of proper Words*, rather then *Circumlocutions*, unless there be motive to make one do it of purpose.

3. That there be nothing of *double construction*, unless there be cause to do it of purpose. As the *Prophets* (of the Heathen) who speak in generall terms, to the end they may the better maintaine the truth of their *Prophecies*; which is easier maintained in *generals*, then in *particulars*. For 'tis easier to divine, whether a number be *even* or *odd*, then *how many*; and that a thing *will be*, then *when it will be*.

4. Concordance of Gender, Number, and Person; as not to say Him for Her; Man for Men; Hath for Have.

In summe; a Mans Language ought to be easie for another to read, pronounce, and point.

Besides, to divers *Antecedents*, let divers *Relatives*, or one Common to them all, be correspondent: as, *He saw the Colour; He heard the Sound*; or *he* per-

perceived both Colour and Sound: but by no means, *He heard, or ſaw both.*

Laſtly, that which is to be interpoſed by *Parentheſis*, let it be done quickly: as, *I purpoſed, having ſpoken to him (to this, and to this purpoſe) afterward to be gone.* For to put it off thus; *I reſolved, after I had ſpoken to him, to be gone; but the ſubject of my ſpeech was to this and this purpoſe*, is vitious.

CHAP. 6.

Of the Amplitude *and* Tenuity *of Language.*

A Man ſhall adde *Amplitude*, or *Dignity* to his language, but by ſuch means as theſe.

1. By changing the *Name* with the *Definition*, as occaſion ſhall ſerve. As, when the *Name* ſhall be Indecent, by uſing the *Definition*; or Contrary.

2. By *Metaphors.*

3. By uſing the *plurall* Number for the *ſingular.*

4. By *privative Epithets.*

CHAP.

CHAP. 7.

Of the Convenience, or Decency of Elocution.

ELocutions are made *Decent*,

1. By ſpeaking *Feelingly*; that is, with ſuch Paſſion as is fit for the matter he is in; as *Angerly* in matter of *Injury*.

2. By ſpeaking as becomes the *Perſon* of the *Speaker*; as for a *Gentleman* to ſpeak *Eruditely*.

3. By ſpeaking *proportionably* to the matter; as of *great affaires* to ſpeak in a *high*; and of *mean*, in a *low* ſtile.

4. By abſtaining from *Compounded*, and from *Out-Landiſh Words*; unleſſe a man ſpeak *Paſſionately*, and have already moved, and, as it were, inebriated his Hearers. Or *Ironically*.

It confers alſo to perſwaſion very much, to uſe theſe ordinary formes of ſpeaking, *All men know*; *'Tis confeſſed by all*; *No man will deny*, and the like. For the Hearer conſents, ſurprized with the fear to be eſteemed the onely Ignorant man.

'Tis good alſo, having uſed a word that

that ſignifies more then the matter requires, to abſtain from the *Pronunciation* and *Countenance* that to ſuch a word belongs; that the *Diſproportion* between it and the matter may the leſſe appear. And when a man has ſaid too much, it will ſhew well to correct himſelfe: For he will get beliefe by ſeeming to conſider what he ſayes.

[But in this a man muſt have a care not to be too preciſe in ſhewing of this Conſideration. For the oſtentation of Carefulneſſe is an argument oftentimes of lying; as may be obſerved in ſuch as tell particularities not eaſily obſerved, when they would be thought to ſpeak more preciſe truth then is required.]

CHAP. 8.

Of two ſorts of Stiles.

THere be two ſorts of *Stiles*.

The one *continued* or to be *comprehended at once*; the other *divided*, or *diſtinguiſhed* by Periods.

The firſt ſort was in uſe with ancient Writers; but is now out of date.

An

An example of this *Stile* is in the Hiſtory of *Herodotus*; wherein there is no Period till the end of the whole Hiſtory.

In the other kind of *Stile*, that is diſtinguiſhed by Periods, a *period* is ſuch a Part as is perfect in it ſelfe; and has ſuch length, as may eaſily be comprehended by the underſtanding.

This later kind is pleaſant; the former unpleaſant, becauſe this appeares finite, the other infinite: in this the Hearer has alwayes ſomewhat ſet out, and terminated to him; in the other he fore-ſees no end, and has nothing finiſhed to him: this may eaſily be committed to memory, becauſe of the meaſure and cadence (which is the cauſe that verſes be eaſily remembred;) the other not.

Every Sentence ought to end with the *period*, and nothing to be interpoſed.

Period is either *ſimple*, or *divided* into Parts.

Simple is that which is *Indiviſible*; as, *I wonder you fear not their ends, whoſe actions you imitate.*

A *Period divided*, is that which not only

only has perfection and length convenient for reſpiration, but alſo *Parts*. As, *I wonder you are not afraid of their ends, ſeeing you imitate their actions*: where in theſe words, *I wonder you are not afraid of their ends*, is one *Colon*, or *Part*; and in theſe, *Seeing you imitate their actions*, another: and both together make the Period.

The *parts*, or *members*, and *periods* of ſpeech ought neither to be *too long*, nor *too ſhort*.

Too long are they, which are produced beyond the expectation of the Hearer.

Too ſhort, are they that end before he expects it.

Thoſe that be *too long*, leave the Hearer behind, like him that walking, goes beyond the uſuall end of the walk, and thereby out-goes him that walkes with him.

They that be *too ſhort*, make the Hearer ſtumble; for when he looks farre before him, the end ſtops him before he be aware.

A *period* that is *divided* into Parts, is either *divided only*; or has alſo an *Oppoſition* of the *parts* one to another.

Divi-

Divided onely is such as this; *This the Senate knowes; the Consull sees; and yet the man lives.*

A *Period* with *Opposition* of *Parts*, called also *Antithesis*, and the parts *Antitheta*, is when *contrary parts* are put together; or also joyned by a third.

Contrary parts are put together, as here, *The one has obtained Glory, the other Riches; both by my benefit.*

Antitheta are therefore acceptable; because not only the *parts* appear the better for the *opposition*; but also for that they carry with them a certain appearance of that kind of *Enthymeme*, which leads to *Impossibility*.

Parts, or *Members* of a *Period*, are said to be *equall*, when they have altogether, or almost equall Number of Syllables.

Parts, or *Members* of a *period*, are said to be *like*, when they *begin*, or *end* alike: and the more *Similitudes*, and the greater *equality* there is of Syllables, the more gracefull is the Period.

CHAP.

Chap. 9.

Of those things that grace an Oration, and make it delightfull.

Forasmuch as there is nothing more delightfull to a man, then to finde that he apprehends and learns easily; it necessarily follows, that those *Words* are most *gratefull* to the Eare, that make a man seem to see before his eyes the thing signified.

And therefore *forrain Words* are unpleasant, because *Obscure*; and *Plain Words*, because *too Manifest*, making us learn nothing new: but *Metaphors* please; for they beget in us by the *Genus*, or by some *common* thing to that with another, a kind of *Science*: as when an *Old Man* is called *Stubble*; a man suddainly learns that he growes up, florisheth, and withers like Grass, being put in mind of it by the qualities common to *Stubble*, and to *Old Men*.

That which a *Metaphor* does, a *Similitude* does the same; but with less *grace*, because with more *prolixity*.

Such

Such *Enthymemes* are the moſt *graceful*, which neither are preſently very Manifeſt, nor yet very hard to be underſtood; but are comprehended, while they are uttering, or preſently after, though not underſtood before.

The things that make a ſpeech *graceful*, are theſe; *Antitheta*, *Metaphors*, and *Animation*.

Of *Antitheta*, and *Antitheſis* hath been ſpoken in the precedent Chapter.

Of *Metaphors* the moſt *graceful* is that which is drawn from *Proportion*.

[*Ariſtotle* (in the 12 Chapter of his *Poetry*) defines a *Metaphor* to be the tranſlation of a name from one ſignification to another; whereof he makes four kinds, 1. From the *Generall* to the *Particular*. 2. From the *Particular* to the *Generall*. 3. From one *Particular* to another. 4. From *Proportion*.]

A Metaphor from Proportion is ſuch as this, A *State without Youth*, *is a Year without a Spring*.

Animation is that expreſſion which makes us ſeem to ſee the thing before our

our eyes; as he that ſaid, *The Athenians powred out their City into Sicily*, meaning, they ſent thither the greateſt Army they could make; and this is the greateſt *grace* of an *Oration*.

If therefore in the ſame Sentence there concur both *Metaphor*, and this *Animation*, and alſo *Antitheſis*, it cannot chooſe but be very *gracefull*.

That an *Oration* is *graced by Metaphor*, *Animation* and *Antitheſis*, hath been ſaid: but how 'tis *graced*, is to be ſaid in the next Chapter.

Cap. 10.

In what manner an Oration is graced by the things aforeſaid.

'Tis graced by *Animation*, when the actions of living Creatures are attributed to things without life; as when the ſword is ſaid to *devoure*.

Such *Metaphors* as theſe come into a Mans minde by the obſervation of things that have ſimilitude and proportion one to another. And the more unlike, and unproportionable the things

things be otherwiſe, the more *grace* hath the *Metaphor*.

A *Metaphor* without *Animation*, adds *grace* then, when the Hearer finds he learns ſomewhat by ſuch uſe of the word.

Alſo *Paradoxes* are *graceful*, ſo men inwardly do beleeve them: for they have in them ſomewhat like to thoſe jeſts that are grounded upon the ſimilitude of words, which have uſually one ſenſe, and in the preſent another; and ſomwhat like to thoſe jeſts which are grounded upon the deceiving of a mans expectation.

And *Paragrams*; that is, alluſions of words are gracefull, if they be well placed; and in Periods not too long; and with *Antitheſis*: for by theſe means the ambiguity is taken away.

And the more of theſe; namely, *Metaphor*, *Animation*, *Antitheſis*, *Equality of members* a Period hath, the more gracefull it is.

Similitudes grace an *Oration*, when they contain alſo a *Metaphor*.

And *Proverbes* are gracefull, becauſe they are *Metaphors*, or tranſlations of words from one *ſpecies* to another.

And

And *Hyperboles*, becauſe they alſo are *Metaphors*: but they are youthfull, and bewray vehemence; and are uſed with moſt grace by them that be angry; and for that cauſe are not comly in Old men.

CHAP. II.

Of the difference between the Stile to be uſed in Writing, *and the Stile to be uſed in* Pleading.

THe *Stile* that ſhould be *Read* ought to be more exact and accurate.

But the *Stile* of a *Pleader* ought to be ſuted to Action and Pronuntiation.

Orations of them that *Plead*, paſs away with the Hearing.

But thoſe that are *Written* men carry about them, and are conſidered at leaſure; and conſequently muſt endure to be ſifted and examined.

Written Orations appear flat in *Pleading*.

And *Orations* made for the *Barr*, when the Action is away, appear in *Reading* inſipide.

In

In *Written Orations* Repetition is justly condemned.

But in *Pleadings*, by the help of Action, and by some change in the *Pleader*, Repetition becomes Amplification.

In *written Orations* Disjunctives do ill; as, *I came, I found him, I asked him*: for they seem superfluous, and but one thing, because they are not distinguished by Action.

But in *Pleadings* 'tis Amplification; because that which is but one thing, is made to seem many.

Of *Pleadings*, that which is *Judiciall* ought to be more accurate, then that which is *before the people*.

And an *Oration to the people* ought to be more accommodate to Action, then a *Judiciall*.

And of *Judiciall Orations*, that ought to be more accurate, which is uttered to *few* Judges; and that ought to be more accommodate to Action, which is uttered to *Many*. As in a *Picture*, the farther he stands off that beholds it, the less need there is that the colours be fine: so in *Orations*, the farther the Hearer stands off, the less need there is for his *Oration* to be Elegant.

There-

Therefore *Demonſtrative Orations* are moſt proper for *writing*, the end whereof is to be *Read*.

CHAP. 12.

Of the parts of an Oration, and their Order.

THe neceſſary *Parts* of an *Oration* are but two; *Propoſitions*, and *Proof*; which are as it were the *Probleme*, and *Demonſtration*.

The *Propoſition* is the explication, or opening of the Matter to be *proved*.

And *Proof* is the *Demonſtration* of the Matter *propounded*.

To theſe neceſſary *parts*, are ſometimes added two other, the *Proeme* and the *Epilogue*, neither of which are any *proof*.

So that in ſum, there be four *parts* of an *Oration*; the *Proeme*, the *Propoſition*, or (as others call it) the *Narration*, the *Proofes* (which contain *Confirmation*, *Confutation*, *Amplification*, and *Diminution*;) and the *Epilogue*.

Chap. 13.

Of the Proem.

THe *Proem* is the Beginning of an *Oration*, and, as it were, the preparing of the way before one enter into it.

In ſome kinds of *Orations* it reſembles the *Prelude* of *Muſicians*, who firſt play what they liſt, and afterwards the Tune they intended.

In other kinds it reſembles the *Prologue* of a *Play*, that contains the Argument.

Proems of the firſt ſort, are moſt proper for *Demonſtrative Orations*; in which a Man is free to fore-tell, or not, what points he will inſiſt upon; and for the moſt part 'tis better not: becauſe when a man has not obliged himſelfe to a certain matter, *Digreſſion* will ſeem *Variety*: but if he have ingaged himſelfe, *Variety* will be accounted *Digreſſion*.

In *Demonſtratives* the matter of the *Proem* conſiſteth in the *Praiſe* or *Diſpraiſe* of ſome *Law* or *Cuſtome*, or in

Exhor-

Exhortation, or *Dehortation*; or in something that serves to incline the Hearer to the purpose.

Proemes of the second kind are most proper for *Judiciall Orations*. For as the *Prologue* in a *Dramatick*, and the *Exordium* in an *Epique* Poeme, setteth first in few words the Argument of the Poeme: so in a *Judicial Oration* the *Orator* ought to exhibit a Modell of his *Oration*, that the mind of the Hearer may not be suspended, and for want of fore-sight, erre or wander.

Whatsoever else belongs to a *proeme*, is drawn from one of these four; From the *Speaker*, From the *Adversary*, From the *Hearer*, or from the *Matter*.

From the *Speaker* and *Adversary* are drawn into *Proems* such Criminations and Purgations as belong not to the cause.

To the *Defendant* 'tis necessary in the Proeme to answer to the accusations of his *Adversary*; that those being cleared, he may have a more favourable entrance to the rest of his *Oration*.

But to the *Plaintife* 'tis better to cast his Criminations all in to the *Epilogue*, that the Judge may the more easily remember them.

From the *Hearer* and from the *Matter* are drawn into the *proem* such things as ſerve to make the *Hearer* favourable or angry; attentive, or not attentive, as need ſhall require.

And *Hearers* uſe to be attentive to *perſons* that are reputed *good*; to things that are of *great Conſequence*, or that *concern themſelves*, or that are *ſtrange*, or that *delight*.

But to make the *Hearer* attentive, is not the part of the *proeme* only, but of any other part of the *Oration*, and rather of any other part, then of the *proeme*. For the *Hearer* is every where more remiſſe then in the beginning. And therfore whereſoever there is need, the *Orator* muſt make appear both the *probitie* of his own *perſon*, and that the *matter* in hand is of *great Conſequence*; or that it concerns the *Hearer*; or that it is *new*; or that it is *delightfull*.

He that will have the *Hearer* attentive to him, but not to the *Cauſe*, muſt on the other ſide make it ſeem that the *matter* is a *trifle*, without relation to the *Hearer*, *common*, and *tedious*.

That the *Hearer* may be favourable to the *Speaker*, one of two things is required;

red; that he *love* him, or that he them.

In *Demonſtrative Orations*, he that *praiſes*, ſhall have the *Hearer* favourable e think himſelf, or his own manners, courſe of life, or any thing he loves, mprehended in the ſame *praiſe*.

On the contrary, he that *diſpraiſes*, ll be heard favourably, if the *Hearer* d his *enemies*, or *their courſes*, or any ing he *hates*, involv'd in the ſame *ſpraiſe*.

The *Proeme* of a *Deliberative Ora-* is taken from the ſame things, from hich are taken the *proemes* of *Judicial rations*. For the matter of a *Delibe-ative Oration* needeth not that naturall *roeme*, by which is ſhewen what we re to ſpeake of; for that is already nown: the Proeme in theſe, being ade onely for the *Speakers*, or *Ad-erſaries* ſake; or to make the *Matter* ap-ear *great*, or *little*, as one would have it, and is therefore to be taken from he *perſons* of the *Plaintife* or *Defen-dant*; or from the *Hearer*, or from the *Matter*, as in *Orations Judiciall*.

CHAP. 14.

Places of Crimination, and Purgation.

1. ONe is from the *removall* of *ill opinion* in the Hearer, imprinted in him by the Adversary, or otherwise.

2. Another from this, That the thing done is *not hurtfull*, or *not to him*, or *not so much*, or *not unjust*, or *not great*, or *not dishonourable*.

3. A third from the *Recompence*; as, *I did him harm, but withall I did him honour.*

4. A fourth from the *Excuse*; as, *It was Errour, Mischance*, or *Constraint.*

5. A fifth from the *Intention*; as, *One thing was done, another meant.*

6. A sixth, from the *Comprehension of the Accuser*; as, *What I have done, the Accuser has done the same*; or his *Father, Kinsman*, or *Friend.*

7. From the *Comprehension of those that are in Reputation*; as, *What I did, such, and such have done the same, who never-*

nevertheleſſe are good men.

8. From *Compariſon* with ſuch as have been *falſly accuſed*, or *wrongfully ſuſpected*, and nevertheleſſe *found upright.*

9. From *Recrimination*; as, *The Accuſer is a man of ill life, and therfore not to be believed.*

10. From that *the Judgement belongs to another Place*, or *Time*; as, *I have already anſwered, or am to anſwer elſe-where to this Matter.*

11. From *Crimination of the Crimination*; as, *It ſerves onely to pervert Judgement.*

12. A twelfth, which is common both to *Crimination* and *Purgation*, and is taken from *ſome ſigne*; as Teucer *is not to be believed, becauſe his Mother was* Priam's *Siſter*. On the other ſide, Teucer *is to be believed, becauſe his Father was* Priam's *enemy.*

13. A thirteenth, proper to *Crimination* onely, from *praiſe and diſpraiſe mixt*; as, To praiſe ſmall things, and blame great ones; or to praiſe in many words, and blame with effectuall ones; or to praiſe many things that are good, and then

adde one evill, but a great one.

14. A fourteenth, common both to *Crimination* and *Purgation*, is taken from the *interpretation of the fact*: for he that *purgeth* himself *interpreteth the fact* alwaies in the best sense; and he that *Criminates*, alwaies in the worst; as when *Ulysses* said, *Diomedes chose him for his companion, as the most able of the* Grecians, *to aid him in his exploit*: but his *Adversary* said, *He chose him for his cowardize, as the most unlikely to share with him in the Honor.*

CAP. 15.

Of the Narration

THe *Narration* is not alwaies continued and of one Peece; but sometimes, as in *Demonstratives*, interrupted, and dispersed through the whole *Oration*.

For there being in a *Narration* something that falls not under Art; as namely, the Actions themselves, which the *Orator* inventeth not; he must therefore bring in the *Narration* of them where he best may. As for exam-

ample, if being to praiſe a Man, you would make a *Narration* of all his Acts immediately from the beginning, and without interruption, you will finde it neceſſary afterwards to repeat the ſame Acts again, while from ſome of them you praiſe his Valour, and from others his Wiſdom; whereby your *Oration* ſhall have leſs variety, and ſhall leſs pleaſe.

'Tis not neceſſary alwaies that the *Narration* be ſhort. The true *meaſure* of it muſt be taken from the *matter* that is to be laid open.

In the *Narration*, as oft as may be, 'tis good to inſert ſomwhat commendable in ones ſelf, and blameable in ones Adverſary: As, *I adviſed him, but he would take no Counſell.*

In *Narrations*, a man is to leave out whatſoever breeds compaſſion, indignation in the Hearer beſides the purpoſe; as *Ulyſſes* in *Homer*, relating his Travels to *Alcinous*, to move compaſſion in him, is ſo long in it, that it conſiſts of divers books: but when he comes home, tells the ſame to his wife in thirty Verſes, leaving out what might make her ſad.

The *Narration* ought also to be in such words as argue the *Manners*; that is, some vertuous or vicious habit in him of whom we speak, although it be not expresst; As, *setting his arms a kenbold, he answered, &c.* by which is insinuated the Pride of him that so answered.

In an *Oration* a man does better to shew his affection then his judgment: that is, 'Tis better to say, *I like this*, then to say, *This is* better. For by the one you would seem *wise*, by the other *good*. But *favour* followes *Goodness*; whereas *wisdome* procures *envy*.

But if this Affection seem incredible, then either a reason must be rendred, as did *Antigone*. For when she had said, *She loved her brother better than her Husband, or children*; she added, *for husband and children I may have more; but another brother I cannot, my Parents being both dead*. Or else a man must use this forme of speaking; *I know this affection of mine seems strange to you; but nevertheless it is such*. For 'tis not easily beleeved, that any man has a mind to doe any thing that is not for his own good.

Be-

Besides in a *Narration*, not onely the Actions themselves; but the Passions, and signes that accompany them, are to be discovered.

And in his *Narration* a man should make himself and his Adversary be considered for such, and such, as soon, and as covertly as he can.

A *Narration* may have neede somtimes not to be in the beginning.

In *Deliberative Orations*; that is, whereseoever the question is of things to come; a *Narration*; which is alwayes of things past, has no place: and yet things past may be recounted, that men may *Deliberate* better of the future: But that is not as *Narration*, but *Proof*; for 'tis *Example*.

There may also be *Narration* in *Deliberatives*, in that part where *Crimination* and *Praise* come in: But that part is not *Deliberative*, but *Demonstrative*.

CHAP. 16.

Of Proofe, or Confirmation, and Refutation.

PROOFS are to be applied to ſomething Controverted.

The Controverſie in *Judiciall Orations* is, *Whether it has been don; whether it has been hurtfull; whether the matter be ſo great, and whether it be Juſt, or no.*

In a queſtion of *Fact*, one of the Parties of neceſſity is faulty (for ignorance of the *Fact* is no excuſe) and therefore the *Fact* is chiefly to be inſiſted on.

In *Demonſtratives*, the *Fact* for the moſt part is ſuppoſed: but the *honour* and *profit* of the *Fact* are to be *proved.*

In *Deliberatives*, the queſtion is, Whether the thing be *like to be, or likely to be ſo Great*; or whether it be *Juſt*; or whether it be *profitable.*

Beſides the application of the *proofe* to the queſtion, a man ought to obſerve, whether his Adverſary have lyed

ed in any point without the Cauſe. For 'tis a ſigne he does the ſame in the Cauſe.

The *proofes* themſelves are either *Examples*, or *Enthymemes*.

A *Deliberative Oration*, becauſe 'tis of things to come, requireth rather *Examples*, then *Enthymemes*.

But a *Judiciall Oration*, being of things paſt, which have a neceſſity in them, and may be concluded *Syllogiſtically*, requireth rather *Enthymemes*.

Enthymemes ought not to come too thick together: for they hinder one anothers force by confounding the Hearer.

Nor ought a man endeavour to *prove* every thing by *Enthymeme*, leſt like ſome *Philoſophers*, he collect what is *known*, from what is *leſſe known*.

Nor ought a man to uſe *Enthymemes*, when he would move the Hearer to ſome affection: For ſeeing divers motions do mutually deſtroy or weaken one another, he will loſe either the *Enthymeme*, or the *affection* that he would move.

For the ſame reaſon, a man ought not to uſe *Enthymemes* when he would expreſſe *Manners*. But

But whether he would move *affection*, or insinuate his *Manners*, he may withall use *Sentences*.

A *Deliberative Oration* is more difficult then a *Judiciall*, because 'tis of the *future*, whereas a *Judiciall* is of that which is *past*, and that consequently may be known; and because it has *principles*, namely the *Law*; and it is easier to *prove* from *principles*, then without.

Besides, a *Deliberative Oration* wants those helps of *turning to the Adversary*, of *speaking of himself*; of *raising passion*.

He therefore that wants matter in a *Deliberative Oration*, let him bring in some *person* to *praise* or *dispraise*.

And in *Demonstratives* he that has nothing to say in *commendation* or *discommendation* of the *principall party*, let him *praise* or *dispraise* some body else, as his *Father*, or *Kinsman*, or the very *vertues* or *vices* themselves.

He that wants not *proofes*, let him not only *prove* strongly, but also insinuate his *Manners*: but he that has no *proofe*, let him nevertheless insinuate his *Manners*. For a *good man* is

as

as acceptable, as an exact *Oration*.

Of *proofs*, those that *lead to an absurdity*, please better then those that are *direct* or *ostensive*; because from the comparison of Contraries, namely, *Truth* and *Falsity*, the force of the *Syllogisme* does the better appear.

Confutation is also a part of *proofe*.

And he that speaks first, puts it after his own *proofs*, unlesse the Controversie containe many and different matters. And he that speakes last, puts it before.

For 'tis necessary to make way for his own *Oration*, by removing the Objections of him that spake before. For the mind abhors both the *Man*, and his *Oration*, that is damned before-hand.

If a man desire his *Manners* should appear well, (lest speaking of himselfe he become odious, or troublesome, or obnoxious to obtrectation; or speaking of another, he seem contumelious, or scurrilous) let him introduce another person.

Last of all, lest he cloy his Hearer with *Enthymemes*, let him vary them sometimes with *Sentences*; but such as have the same force. As here

is

is an *Enthymeme*. *If it be then the best time to make peace when the best conditions of peace may be had, then the time is now, while our Fortune is entire.* And this is a *Sentence* of equall force to it. *Wise men make peace, while their Fortune is entire.*

CHAP. 17.

Of Interrogations, Answers, and Jests.

THe times wherein 'tis fit to ask ones Adversary a *question* are chiefly four.

1. The first is, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, he has already uttered one; and we would by *Interrogation* draw him to confesse the other.

2. The second, when of two Propositions that conclude an Absurdity, one is manifest of it selfe, and the other likely to be fetch'd out by a *question*; then the *Interrogation* will be seasonable; and the absurd Conclusion is presently to be inferr'd, without adding that Proposition which is manifest.

3. The third, when a man would make appear that his Adversary does contradict himselfe. 4. The

4. The fourth, when a man would take from his adversary such shifts as these, *In some sort 'tis so; In some sort 'tis not so.*

Out of these Cases 'tis not fit to *Interrogate*. For he whose *question* succeeds not, is thought vanquished.

To equivocal *questions* a man ought to *answer* fully, and not to be too brief.

To *Interrogations* which we fore-see tend to draw from us an *Answer*, contrary to our purpose, we must, together with our *Answer*, presently give an *Answer* to the objection which is implied in the *question*.

And where the *question* exacteth an *answer* that concludeth against us, we must together with our *answer* presently *distinguish*.

Jests are dissolved by serious and grave discourse: and grave discourse is deluded by *Jests*.

The severall kinds of *Jests* are set down in the *Art* of *Poetry*.

Whereof one kind is *Ironia*, and tends to please ones selfe.

The other is *Scurrility*, and tends to please others.

The later of these has in it a kind of baseneſſe: the former may become a man of good breeding.

Cap. 18.
Of the Epilogue.

THe *Epilogue* muſt conſiſt of one of theſe four things.

Either of *inclining* the Judg to *favour* his own, or *diſfavour* the Adverſaries ſide: For then when all is ſaid in the cauſe, is the beſt ſeaſon to *praiſe*, or *diſpraiſe* the Parties.

Or of *Amplification* or *Diminution*. For when it appears what is good or evill, then is the time to ſhew *how great, or how little* that good or evill is.

Or in *moving* the Judge to *Anger*, *Love* or other *Paſſion*. For when 'tis manifeſt of what kind, and how great the good or evill is, then it will be opportune to *excite* the Judg.

Or of *Repetition*, that the Judge may remember what has been ſaid.

Repetition conſiſteth in the *matter*, and the *manner*. For the *Orator* muſt ſhew, that he has performed *what* he promiſed in the beginning of his *Oration*, and *how*: Namely, by comparing his Arguments one by one with his Adverſaries, repeating them in the ſame order they were ſpoken.

FINIS.

THE ART OF RHETORICK

Plainly ſet forth;

With

Pertinent EXAMPLES for the more eaſie underſtanding, and Practice of the ſame.

By a concealed Author.

LONDON,
Printed by *Thomas Maxey*,
1651.

The ART Of Rhetorick.

Rhetorick is an Art of ſpeaking finely.

It hath two parts.

1. Garniſhing of ſpeech, called *Elocution.*

2. Garniſhing of the manner of utterance, called *Pronunciation.*

Garniſhing of ſpeech is the firſt part of Rhetorick, whereby the ſpeech it ſelf is beautified and made fine.

It is either,

1. The fine manner of words, called a Trope, or,

2. The fine ſhape or frame of ſpeech, called a Figure.

The

The fine manner of words is a garnishing of Speech, whereby one word is drawn from his first proper signification, to another; as in this sentence: *Sin lyeth at the door*: where *Sin* is put for the punishment of sin adjoyned unto it: *Lyeth at the doore* signifieth at hand; as that which lieth at the Door, is ready to be brought in.

This changing of words was first found out by necessity, for the want of words; afterward confirmed by Delight, because such words are pleasant and gracious to the ear. Therefore this change of signification must be shamefa'ced, and, as it were, maidenly, that it may seem rather to be led by the hand to another signification, to be driven by force unto the same: yet sometimes this fine manner of *Speech* swerveth from this perfection, and then it is,

Either

1. The abuse of this fine Speech, called *Katachresis*, or
2. The excess of this fineness, call'd *Hyperbole*.

Be not too just, nor too wicked: which speech, although it seem very hard, yet

yet it doth not, without ſome fineneſs of Speech, utter thus much, *That one ſeek not a righteouſneſs beyond the Law of God; and that when none can live without all ſin, yet that they take heed that ſin bear not Dominion over them*: As, *My tears are my meat day and night. Thoſe that hate me are mo in number, than the hairs of my head.* Both which do utter by an expreſſe of Speech, a great ſorrow, and a great number of enemies.

The abuſe of Speech, is, when the change of ſpeech is hard, ſtrange, and unwonted, as in the firſt example.

The exceſs of ſpeech is, when the change of ſignification is very high and loftie, as in the ſecond Example, and *Pſ. 6. 7.*

But the excellencie, or fineneſs of Words, or Tropes, is moſt excellent, when divers are,

Shut up in one; or,
Continued in many.

An Example of the firſt ſort is in the 2 *Kings*: *I pray thee, let me have a double portion of thy Spirit*: where by *Spirit*, is meant the gift of the Spirit; and by *thy Spirit*, the gift of the Spirit like to thine. The

The continuance of Tropes, called an Allegorie, is, when one kind of Trope is ſo continued; as, look with what kind of matter it be begun, with the ſame it be ended. So in the 23. *Pſal. The care of God towards his Church, is ſet forth in the words proper to a Shepherd.* So in the whole book of *Canticles, the ſweet conference of Chriſt and his Church*, is ſet down by the words proper to the *Husband* and the *Wife*. So old age is ſet down by this garniſhing *of ſpeech*, Eccleſ. 12. 5, 6.

Hitherto of the properties of a fine manner of words, called a Trope.

Now the divers ſorts do follow.

They are thoſe which note out,

1. No Compariſon, and are with ſome Compariſon; or,

2. No reſpect of Diviſion, or ſome reſpect.

The firſt is double:

1. The change of name, called a *Metonymie.*

2. The mocking ſpeech, called an *Ironie.*

The change of name, is where the name of a thing, is put for the name of a thing agreeing with it.

It

It is double,

1. When the cauſe is put for the thing cauſed, and contrariwiſe,

2. When the thing to which any thing is adjoyned, is put for the thing adjoyned; and contrariwiſe.

The change of name of the cauſe, is when,

Either the name of the Maker, or the name of the Matter, is put for the thing made.

Of the Maker, when the finder out, or the Author of the thing, or the inſtrument wherby the thing is done, is put for the thing made. So *Moſes* is put for his Writings: ſo Love is put for Liberality, or beſtowing Benefits, the fruit of Love: ſo Faith the Cauſe, is put for Religious ſerving of God, the thing cauſed. *Rom.* 1. So the tongue, the inſtrument of ſpeech, is put for the Speech it ſelf. Rule thy tongue, *James* 3.

Of the Matter: *Thou art duſt, and to duſt ſhalt thou return*; that is, *one made of duſt.*

Now on the other ſide, when the thing

thing cauſed, or the effect is put for any of theſe cauſes. *So the Goſpel of God is called the Power of God to Salvation*; That is, the inſtrument of the power of God. *So love is ſaid to be bountifull*; becauſe it cauſeth one to be bountiful. S. *Paul* ſaith, *The Bread that we break, is it not in the Communion of the Body and Bloud of Chriſt?* That is, an inſtrument of the Communion of the body of Chriſt. *So, the body is ſaid to be an earthly Tabernacle:* That is, a Tabernacle made of earth.

The change of Name, or *Metonymie*, where the ſubject, or that which hath any thing adjoyned, is put for the thing adjoyned, or adjoynt. So the place is put for thoſe, or that in the place: *Set thine houſe in an order*: That is, thy Houſhold matters. *It ſhall be eaſier for* Sodom *and* Gomorra: that is, the People in *Sodom* and *Gomorra*. So *Moſes Chair* is put for the *Doctrine*, taught in *Moſes Chair*. So, *all* Jericho *and* Jeruſalem *came out*: That is, all the men in *Jericho* and *Jeruſalem*. So, before, *Sin* was put for the puniſhment of *ſin*: *Let his bloud reſt upon us and our children*: That is the puniſhment which

which shall follow his death. So Christ said, *This is my bodie*, That is, a sign or Sacrament of my body. *This wine is the new Testament in my bloud*; That is, a Sign or Seal of the New Testament in my bloud. So *John* saith, *He saw the Spirit descending in the likeness of a Dove*: That is, the sign of the Spirit.

On the other side, the Adjunct is put for the thing to which it is Adjoyned. As Christ is called *our hope*. 1. *Tit.* That is, on whom our hope did depend: So, *we are justified by Faith*, That is, by Christ, applyed by Faith: So, *Love is the fulfilling of the Law*, That is, those things to which it is Adjoyned. *Hope for the things hoped for*, Rom. 8. 28. So in the Epist. to the *Eph. The daies are evil*: That is, the Manner, Conversation, and Deeds of men in the daies.

Hitherto of the *Metonymie*, or change of name.

Now followeth the Mocking speech, or *Ironie*.

CHAP. 2.

THE mocking Trope is, when one contrary is signified by another, as God said, *Man is like to one of us.* So Christ saith, *sleep on*; and yet by and by, *Arise, let us go*: so *Paul* saith, *you are wise, and I am a fool.*

This Trope is perceived, either by the contrariety of the Matter, or the Manner of utterance, or both: so *Elias* said to the Prophets of *Baal*, *Cry aloud*, &c. So the Jews said unto Christ; *Hail, King of the Jews.*

Hitherto appertaineth the passing by a thing, which yet with a certain elegancy noteth it: so *Philemon*, 19. *That I say not, thou owest thy self unto me.*

Hitherto of the fineness of words which respect no division.

Now followeth that which respecteth division, called *Synechdoche.*

A *Synechdoche* is when the name of the whole is given to the part; or

or the name of the part to the whole.

And it is double;

1. When the whole is put for the Member, and contrarily.

2. when the General, or whole kind is put for the Special, or contrarily.

So *S. John*, *Not onely for our sins, but for the sins of the whole world.* So Righteousnes, a member of Goodnes, is put for all goodnes: so Unrighteousnes is put for all manner of sins.

Examples of the second sort, as these: So *Israel is put for those of Juda sometimes:* So *Nations for the Heathen: A Minister of Christ, for an Apostle of Christ*, Rom. 1. *A Minister put for a distributer*, Rom. 12.

On the other side, one sort or special is put for the whole sort, or general, in the Examples following. In the Lords Prayer, *Bread*, one help of life, is put for all helps: *This day*, one time, for all times: so *Solomon* saith, *The thing of the day in his day*; That is, the thing of the time, in his time.

So sometimes les is spoken, and yet more is understood; which is called

Diminution, or *Meiosis*: As *James* ſaith, to him *that knoweth how to do wel, and doth not, it is ſin*: That is, a great ſin. So our Saviour Chriſt ſaith, *If they had not known, they had had no ſinne*: that is, no ſuch great ſin as they have now. Likewiſe the denial by Compariſon: ſo *Solomon* ſaith, *Receive my words, and not ſilver*: That is, my words rather than ſilver: ſo *Paul* ſaith, *I was ſent to Preach, and not to Baptiſe*: That is, not ſo much to Baptiſe, as to Preach.

Hitherto of the fineneſs of words, which note out no Compariſion. Now followeth the fineneſs of words which noteth out Compariſon, called a *Metaphor*.

Chap. III.

A *Metaphor* is when the like is ſignified by the like: as 1 *Cor.* The Apoſtle ſaith, *Doctrine muſt be tried by fire*; That is, the evidence of the Word, Spirit, *trying Doctrine*, as fire doth Metals. So Chriſt is ſaid to *Baptize with fire*; where *Fire* is put for the power of the Holy Ghoſt, purging as fire: ſo Chriſt ſaith, *None*

ſhall

ſhall enter into the Kingdom of God, but he that is born of the Holy Ghoſt and Water: ſo *Paul* calleth himſelf the Father of the *Corinths*, who ſaith, *That he begat them in Chriſt*: ſo he calleth *Timothy* and *Titus* his Natural ſons in the Faith.

Hitherto of a Trope, or Garniſhing of ſpeech in one word, where the Metaphor is moſt uſual; then the change of name; then the *Synechdoche*; and laſt of all, the *Ironie*. Now followeth the fine frame or ſhape of ſpeech, called a *Figure*.

A Figure is a Garniſhing of ſpeech; wherein the courſe of the ſame is changed from the more ſimple and plain manner of ſpeaking, unto that which is more full of Excellency and Grace. For as in the fineneſs of words, or a Trope, words are conſidered aſunder by themſelves: ſo in the fine ſhape or frame of ſpeech or a figure, the apt and pleaſant joyning together of many words is noted.

The garniſhing of the ſhape of ſpeech or a Figure, is garniſhing of ſpeech in Words, or in a Sentence.

The garnishing of speech in words, called *Figura dictionis*, is wherein the speech is garnished by the pleasant and sweet sound of words joyned together.

This is either,

1. In the measure of sounds; or
2. In the repetition of sounds.

The measure of sounds is belonging either to,

1. Poets, with us called Rhymers; or,
2. Orators, with us called Eloquent Pleaders.

The first is the measure of sounds by certain and continual spaces: And it is either,

1. Rhyme; or,
2. Verse.

Rhyme is the first sort, containing a certain measure of Syllables ending a like, and these in the Mother Tongues are most fit for Psalms, Songs, or Sonnets.

Verses are the second sort, containing certain Feet fitly placed.

A Foot is a measure framed by the length and shortness of Syllables: For the several sorts whereof, as also of the verses of them, because

becauſe we have no worthy examples in our Engliſh tongue, we judge the larg handling of them ſhould be more curious then neceſſary.

The meaſure of ſounds belonging to Orators is that which, as it is not uncertain, ſo it differeth altogether from rime and verſe, and is very changeable with it ſelfe. Therefore in that eloquent ſpeech you muſt altogether leave rime and verſe, unleſs you alledge it for authority and pleaſure.

In the Beginning of the Sentence little care is to be had, in the midle leaſt of all, and in the end chiefeſt regard is to be had, becauſe the fall of the ſentence is moſt marked, and therefore leſt it fall out to be harſh and unpleſant both to the minde and eare, there muſt be moſt variety and change.

Now this change muſt not be above ſix ſyllables from the end, and that muſt be ſet downe in feet of two ſyllables.

And thus much of garniſhing of ſpeech by the meaſure of ſounds, rather to give ſome taſt of the ſame to the Readers, then to draw any to the curious and unneceſſary practiſe of it.

Now followeth the repeating of ſounds.

Cap. 4.

Repetition of ſounds is either of the *Like*, or the *Unlike* ſound.

Of the *Like*, is either *continued* to the end of, or *broken* off from the ſame, or a *diverſe* ſentence.

Continued to the end of the ſame ſentence is, when the ſame ſound is repeated without any thing coming between, except a parentheſis; that is, ſomething put in, without the which, notwithſtanding the ſentence is full. And it is a joyning of the ſame ſound, as Rom. 1. *As unrighteouſneſſe, fornication, wickedneſſe.* And in the prayer of Chriſt, *My God, my God. From men by thine hand, O Lord, from men, &c.* Pſal. 17.

Continued in a diverſe ſentence is, either a Redoubling, called *Anadyploſis*; or A pleaſant climing, called *Clymax.*

Redoubling is when the ſame ſound is repeated in the end of the former ſentence, and the beginning of the ſen-

tence

tence following. As, Pſal. 9.8. *The Lord alſo will be a refuge to the poor, a refuge, I ſay, in due time.* Pſal. 81. 14. *For this God is our God.* But more plain in *Pſ.* 8. *As we have heard, ſo have we ſeen in the city of our God. God will eſtabliſh it for ever.*

A pleaſant climing is a redoubling continued by divers degrees or ſteps of the ſame ſounds: As Rom. 8. 17. *If we be children, we be heirs, even heirs of God, annexed with Chriſt.* Rom. 8. 30. *Whom he predeſtinated, them alſo he called; and whom he called, them alſo he juſtified; and whom he juſtified, them alſo he glorified.* Alſo Rom. 9. 14. 15.

And hitherto of the ſame ſound continued *to the end.*

Now followeth the ſame ſound broken off.

CHAP. 5.

THE ſame ſound broken off is a repetition of the ſame in the *Beginning*; or *In the end.*

In the *Beginning* it is called *Anaphora*, a bringing of the ſame again; As *Rom.* 8. 38.

Nor death, nor life, nor Angels, &c. nor any other creature ſhal be able to ſeparate us, &c. So likewiſe Ephe.4.11. *Some to be Apoſtles, ſome preachers, &c.* So Gal. *Nor Few, nor Gentile, &c.* So likewiſe Hebr. 11.1.2.

Repetition of the ſame ſound *in the end* is called *Epiſtrophe*, a turning to the ſame ſound in the end. So Ezech. *Behold greater abominations then theſe.* Lament.3.41. *Let us lift up our hearts with our hands unto God in the heavens; we have ſinned, and have, rebelled therefore thou haſt not ſpared.*

When both of theſe are joyned together, it is called a coupling or Symplote. As, 2 Cor.6.4.to the 11. *But in all things we approve our ſelves, as the Miniſters of God, in much patience, in afflictions, &c.* See alſo 2 Cor.22.23.

Hitherto of the repetitions in the *ſame place.*

Now of thoſe that do interchange their place.

They are either *Epanalepſis*, which ſignifieth to take back; or *Epanados* which ſignifieth a turning to the ſame tune.

The firſt is when the ſame ſound is re-

repeated in the beginning and the ending, as *My ſon Abſolom, my ſon,* 2Sam. 19. 1.

Epanados is when the ſame ſound is repeated in the beginning and the middle, in the middle and the end, *Ezech.* 35. 6. *I will prepare thee unto blood, and blood ſhall purſue thee: except thou hate blood, even blood ſhal perſue thee.* And 2. Theſ. 2. *So that he that doth ſit as God, in the temple of God, ſheweth himſelf that he is God.*

Hitherto of the repetition of thoſe ſounds which are like.

Now of thoſe that are unlike.

Chap. 6.

Unlike A ſmall changing of the name, as *Paronomaſia.* A ſmall changing of the end or caſe, as *Polyptoton.*

A ſmall change of name is, when a word by the change of one letter or Syllable, the ſignification alſo is changed, As, *Patience, experience.* Rom. 5. 4. 19. *We walk after the fleſh, not war in the fleſh. So by honor and diſhonor, as unknown and yet known.*

A ſmall changing of the end or caſe, is when words of the ſame beginning rebound by divers ends: *Chriſt being raiſed from the dead, dieth no more, death hath no more power over him. He that doth righteouſneſs is righteous. If ye know that he is righteous, know ye that he that doth righteouſly, is born of him.* And of both theſe there are many in the Scripture, but the tranſlations cannot reach them.

Hitherto of the garniſhing of the ſhape of ſpeech in words.

Now followeth the garniſhing of the ſhape of ſpeech in a ſentence.

CHAP. 7.

GArniſhing of the frame of ſpeech in a ſentence, is a garniſhing of the ſhape of ſpeech, or a figure; which for the forcible moving of affections, doth after a ſort beautifie the ſenſe and very meaning of a ſentence. Becauſe it hath in it a certain manly majeſty, which far ſurpaſſeth the ſoft delicacy or dainties of the former figures.

It is either the garniſhing of ſpeech *Alone*; or *with others*.

The garniſhing of ſpeech alone,

is

is when as the ſentence is garniſhed without ſpeech had to other. And it is either in regard of the *Matter*; or of the *Perſon*.

In regard of the *Matter*, it is either

1. A crying out, called *Exclamation*; or

2. A pulling or calling back of himſelf, called *Revocation*.

A crying out or *Exclamation* is the firſt, which is ſet forth by a word of calling out: Sometimes of wonder, As, Rom. 8. *O the depth of the Judgments of God!* Pſa. 8. *O Lord, how excellent is thy Name!*

Sometimes of pity; alſo theſe words, *Behold*, *Alas*, *Oh*, be ſignes of this figure: As, *O Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, which ſtoneſt the prophets.* Sometimes of deſperation; As, *My ſin is greater then can be forgiven. Behold, thou driveſt me out, &c.* Sometimes of wiſhing: As, *O Lord of hoſts, how amiable are thy tabernacles?* Sometimes of diſdayning: As, Rom. 7. in the end, *O miſerable wretch that I am, who ſhall deliver me from this body of ſin?* Sometimes of mocking: as they which ſaid to our Saviour Chriſt, *Ah, thou that, &c.*

Som-

Somtimes of *cursing* and *detestation*, as in *David*, *Let their table be made a snare, and bow down their back alwaies*. Also when this Figure is used in the end of a sentence, it is called a shooting out of the voyce, or *Epiphonema*; as when the sins of *Jezabel* were spoken against, this is added at the end, *Seemed it a little to her to do thus and thus*.

So after the high setting forth of the name of God, *David* shutteth up his praise with this: *Blessed be his glorious name, and let all the earth be filled with his glory*. Somtimes here is used a certain liberty of speech, wherein is a kind of secret crying out: As *Peter*, Act. 3. saith: *Ye men of Israel, hear these words*. And Paul, 1. Cor. 11. *Would to God you could suffer a little my foolishnes, and indeed ye suffer me*.

Thus much of crying out.

Now followeth the Figure of calling back, or *Revocation*.

Revocation is when any thing is calcal back, and it is as it were a cooling and quenching of the heat of the exclamation that went before.

And this is either A *correction* of ones self, called *Epanorthrosis*; A *holding* of

of ones *peace*, called *Aposiopesis*.

Epanorthrosis is correction, when some thing is called back that went before: as *Paul* correcteth his doubtfulness of *Agrippa's* beleefe, when he saith, *Beleevest thou, King Agrippa, I know thou beleevest. So*, 1. Cor. 15. *I laboured more aboundantly then they all, yet not I*, &c.

A *keeping of silence* or *Aposiopesis* is, when the course of the sentence bygon is so stayed, as thereby some patt of the sentence not being uttered, may be understood. So our Saviour Christ saith, *My soul is heavy: what shall I say?* John. 12. 27.

Thus much of a Figure garnishing the speech alone in regard of the matter.

Now followeth the garnishing of the speech alone in regard of the person.

Chap. 8.

Garnishing of the speech alone in regard of the person is double.

Either in Turning to the person, called *Apostrophe*, or Faining of the person, called, *Prosopopœia*.

Apostrophe or turning to the person, is when the speech is turned to another person, then the speech appointed did

did intend or require. And this *Apostrophe* or turning is diverſly ſeene, according to the diverſity of perſons. Sometimes it turneth to a mans perſon; As *David* in the 6. *Pſalme*, where having gathered arguments of his ſafety, turneth haſtily to the wicked, ſaying, *Away from me, all yee workers of iniquity, for the Lord hath heard the voice of my petition.*

Sometimes, From a man to God, as *Pſal.* 3. *David* being diſmayed with the number of his enemies, turneth himſelf to God, ſaying: *But thou art my buckler, &c.*

Somtimes to unreaſonable creatures without ſenſe. *Eſai.* 1. & *Eſai.* 20. 1.

Proſopopœia or a feigning of the perſon, is whereby we do feigne another perſon ſpeaking in our ſpeech; And it is double; *Imperfect*, and *Perfect*.

Imperfect is when the ſpeech of ano perſon is ſet downe lightly and indirectly, As in the *Pſal.* 10. *David* bringeth in the wicked, *Who ſay unto my Soul, Fly as the Bird unto yonder hill.*

A perfect *Proſopopœia* is when the whole feigning of the perſon is ſet down in our ſpeech, with a fit entring into

into the ſame, and a leaving it off. So *Wiſd. Pro.* 8. Where the entrance is in the firſt Verſes, her ſpeech in the reſt of the Chapter.

Hitherto of the figures of ſentences concerning one ſpeaking alone.

Now follow the other, which concerne the ſpeeches of two.

CHAP. 9.

THey which concerne the ſpeeches of two, are either In *Asking*; or in *Anſwering*.

That of *Asking*, is either in *Deliberation*; or, in *preventing* an Objection.

Deliberation is when we do ever now and then ask, as it were, reaſons of our conſultation, whereby the minde of the hearers wavering in doubt, doth ſet downe ſome great thing.

This deliberation is either in *Doubting*; or in *Communication*.

A *Doubting* is a deliberating with our ſelves, as *Paul.* 1. Philip. 22. doubting whether it were better to die then to live, he garniſheth his ſpeech on this manner: *For I am greatly in doubt on both*

both sides, desiring to be loosed, and to be with Christ, which is best of all: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needfull for you.

Communication is a deliberation with others. *Gal.* 3. 1, 2. *O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you,* &c.

And hitherto of the figure of speech between two, called Deliberation.

Now followeth the figure of speech between two, called the preventing of an Objection, or occupation.

Occupation is when wee do bring an objection, and yeeld an answer unto it: Therfore this speech between two in the first part, is called the Setting down of the Objection or Occupation. In the later part, an Answering of the Objection, or the subjection: as Rom. 6. *What shall we say then? Shall we continue still in sin that grace may abound?* In which words is set downe the Objection: the answering in these words, *God forbid.* And here this must be marked, that the Objection is many times wanting, which must be wisely supplyed by considering the occasion and answere of it: As, 1. *Tim.* 5. *They will*

will marry, having condemnation. Now leaſt any might ſay, what, for marrying? He anſwereth: No, *For denying their firſt faith.*

Hitherto of the figures of *Asking.*

Now followeth the figures of *Anſwering.*

They are either in *Suffering* of a deed, called *Permiſſion*; or, *Granting* of an argument, called *conceſſion.*

Suffering of a deed or permiſſion is, when mockingly we give liberty to any deed; being never ſo filthy, as Rev. *Let him that is filthy be filthy ſtill.* And 1. Cor. 14. *If any be ignorant, Let him be ignorant.*

Conceſſion or granting of an argument is, when a argument is mockingly yeelded unto, as, Eccle. 11. *Rejoyce, O young man in thy youth, and let thy heart chear thee, &c.*

[Hitherto of the firſt part of *Rhetorick*, of the garniſhing of *Speech*: the ſecond part, which is the garniſhing of *Utterance*, becauſe it is not yet perfect (for the precepts for the moſt part pertain to an Orator) which when it ſhal be perfect, it ſhall either only con-

tein

tain common precepts for the garnishing of *Utterance* in all, or also proper precepts for the same in Magistrates, Ambassadours, Captains, and Ministers; therefore untill it be so perfected, we think it unnecessary to be translated into English.

Although

Although the Rules of SOPHISTRY *be needleſſe for them that be perfect in* LOGICK; *yet becauſe the knowledge of them bringeth ſome profit to young beginners, both for the ready anſwering of the ſubtil arguments, and the better practiſing of* Logick *and* Rhetorick, *we have thought good to turn it into the* Engliſh *Tongue.*

Sophiſtry is the feigned art of Elneches, or coloured reaſons.

A colourable reaſon, or *Elench*, is a ſhew of reaſon to deceive withall.

It is either When the deceit lyeth in the *Words*; or in the default of Logick, called a *Sophiſm*.

In words is, either when the deceit lyeth in *one word*; or in *Words joyned* together.

In

if it were, it ſhouldbe, *Whoſoever.*

In *one word*, is either the *darkneſſe* of a word; or, the *doubtfulneſſe* of a word.

The *darkneſſe* of a word, or an inſolencie deceiveth, when by a reaſon the meaning is not underſtood, whether the ſtrangeneſſe be through the oldneſſe, newneſſe, or ſwelling vanity of the words; and of the laſt ſort, is that ſpoken of in 2 *Pet.* 2. 18.

By this fallacie the Papiſts conclude, the Fathers to be on their ſide, for deſerving by good works.

Whoſoever ſaith mans merits are crowned, they ſay mans works do deſerve.

But the Fathers ſay, mans merits are crowned.

Therefore the Fathers ſay, mans works do ſerve.

Where *Merits* is an old word, put for any works done under the hope of reward, whether it come by deſart, or freedom of promiſe.

Doubtfulneſſe of a word, *Likeneſſe* of name, is either called *Homonymia*; or by a *Trope* or fineneſſe of ſpeech.

The *Likeneſſe* of name, or *Homonymia*, is when one word is given to ſignifie divers things: As,

He

He that believeth ſhall be ſaved.

The Hypocrites to whom our Saviour Chriſt would not commit himſelf, believed.

Therefore they ſhall be ſaved.

Where faith doth note out both a juſtifying faith, and a dead faith.

Doubtfulneſſe by a Trope, is when a word is taken properly, which is meant figuratively, or contrarily: As

That which Chriſt ſaith is true.

Chriſt ſaith that bread is his body.

Therefore it is true.

Where by body is meant the Signe or Sacrament of his body.

Unto the firſt, a perfect Logician would anſwer, that the propoſition is not an axiome neceſſarily true, according to the rule of truth, becauſe of the doubtfulneſſe of the old and new ſignification of *merit*. And if the word be farre worn out of uſe, that it be not underſtood, then the anſwer muſt be, I underſtand it not, or put your axiome in plain words.

To the ſecond, he would anſwer, that the propoſition or firſt part, is not according to the rule of righteouſneſſe, becauſe the proper ſubject and adjunct are not joyned together: which

hath

hath justifying faith, or believeth sincerely, shall be saved; and then the assumption being in the same sense inferred, is false.

Unto the third he would answer, that the assumption is not necessarily true, because if the word *Body* be taken properly, it is not then true that is set down: but if it be taken figuratively, it is true, and therfore would bid him make the assumption necessarily true, and then say, Christ saith in proper words, *It is my body*; and then it is false.

Hitherto of the fallacies in single words.

Now of those that are joyned together.

It is either *Amphibolia*, or the doubtfulnesse of speech: or, *Expositio*, or unapt setting down of the reason.

The first is, when there is doubtfulnesse in the frame of speech; as thus, *If any obey not our word by a letter, note him*: where some referre *by a letter*, to the first part of the Sentence, and some to the later, where the signification of the word, and right pointing

doth

doth ſhew, that it muſt be referred to the firſt.

The anſwer is, that the right & wiſe placing of the Sentence is perverted.

Unapt ſetting down of the Reaſon, is, when the parts of the queſtion and the reaſons intreated, is not ſet down in fit words: as,

All ſinne is evill.

Every child of God doth ſinne.

Therefore every child of God is evill.

Here the anſwer according to Logick, is that the aſſumption doth not take the argument out of the propoſition, but putteth in another thing, and ſo it is no right frame of concluding, as appeareth by the definition of the aſſumption.

Hitherto of the deceits of reaſon which lie in words.

Now of the default of Logick, called *Sophiſme*.

It is either Generall, or Speciall.

The Generall are thoſe which cannot be referred to any part of Logick. They are either begging of the queſtion, called the petition of the principle, or bragging of no proof.

Begging of the queſtion is when

nothing is brought to prove but the queſtion, or that which is doubtful: As,

That righteouſneſſe which is both by faith and works, doth juſtifie.

But this righteouſneſſe, is inherent righteouſneſſe: Ergo.

Here the propoſition in effect is nothing but a queſtion.

If together with the bloud of Chriſt we muſt make perfect ſatisfaction for our ſins, before we come to Heaven.

Then there muſt be purgatory for them that die without perfection.

But the firſt is ſo. Ergo. Where the argument they bring is as doubtfull, and needeth as much proofe as the queſtion.

The anſwer is this out of the definition of the Syllogiſme that there is no new argument invented, therefore it cannot be a certain frame of concluding.

Bragging of no proofe, is when that which is brought is too much, called *Redounding.*

It is either impertinent to another matter, called *Heterogenium*; or a vain repetition, called *Tautologia.*

Impertinent, or not to the purpoſe,

is when any thing is brought for a proofe, which is nothing near to the matter in hand, whereunto the common proverb giveth answer; *I ask you of cheese, you answer me of chalk.*

A vain repetition is, when the same thing in effect, though not in words, is repeated; as they that after long time of prayer say, *Let us pray.* And this fallacie our Saviour Christ condemneth in prayer, *Mat.* 5. and this is a fault in Method.

Speciall are those which may be referred to certain parts of Logick, and they are of two sorts.

Such as are referred to the spring of reasons, called *invention*; or to judgement.

Those referred to Invention are, when any thing is put for a reason, which is not, as no cause for a cause, no effect for an effect, and so of the rest.

In the Distribution this is a proper fallacie, when any thing simply or generally granted, thereby is inferred a certain respect or speciall not meant nor intended: as,

He that saith, there are not seven Sacraments, saith true.

He that saith, there are onely three, saith, there are not seven.

Therefore he that saith, there are three, saith true.

The right answer is, that the proposition is not necessarily true, for there may be a way to say, there are not seven, and yet affirm an untruth.

Fallacies of judgement are those that are referred to the judgement of of one sentence, or of more.

Of one Sentence, either to the Proprieties of an Axiom; or to the Sorts.

To the proprieties, as when a true is put for a false, and contrarily: and affirmative for a negative, and contrarily. So some take the words of Saint *John, I do not say concerning it, that you shall not pray,* for no deniall; when as it doth deny to pray for that sin.

To the Sorts are referred, either to the Simple, or Compound.

The first when the generall is taken for the speciall, and contrarily. So the Papists by this fallacy do answer to that generall saying of *Paul; We are justified by faith without the works of the law.* Which they understand of works done before faith, when that was never called in doubt. The

The fallacies which are referred to a compound Axiome, are those which are referred either to a *disjoyned*, or *knitting* Axiome.

To a *disjoyned* Axiome when the parts indeed are not *disjoyned*: As, *Solomon was either a King, or did bear rule.*

To a *Knitting* axiome is, when the parts are not necessarily knit together, As,

If Rome be on fire, the Popes chayre is burnt.

And hitherto of the first sort of fallacies referred to judgment.

Now followeth the second.

And they be either those that are referred To a Syllogism.; or To *Method.*

And they again are *Generall*, and *Speciall.*

Generall which are referred to the generall properties of a Syllogisme.

It is either when all the parts are *Denied*; or are *Particular.*

All parts denied: As,

No Pope is a Divell.

No man is a Divell. Therefore.

No man is a Pope.

And this must be answered, that it

is not according to the definition of a Negative ſyllogiſme, which muſt have alwayes one affirmative.

All particular: As,

Some unlawfull thing muſt be ſuffered, as namely that which cannot be taken away.

The ſtews is ſome unlawfull thing.

Therefore the ſtews muſt be ſuffered.

This is anſwered by the definition of a ſpeciall ſyllogiſm, which is that hath one part generall.

The ſpeciall are thoſe which are *Simple*, or *Compound*.

The *Simple* is of two ſorts.

The firſt is *more Plain*.

The ſecond *leſs Plain*.

More plain is when the aſſumption is denied, or the queſtion is not particular: As,

Every Apoſtle may preach abroad:

Some Apoſtle is not a Pope,

Therefore.

Some Pope may not preach abroad.

Alſo.

Every Pope is a Lord:

Some Pope may give an univerſall licence.

Therefore every Lord may give an univerſal licence.

Leſs

Leſs plain hath one fallacy in cõmon when the propoſition is ſpeciall. As,

Some player is a rogue:
Every vagabond is rogue,
Therefore, every player is a vagabond.

Alſo,

Some player is a rogue:
Every vagabond is a player.
Therefore every player is a Rogue.

The fallacie of the firſt kind is when all the parts be affirmative: As,

All Pauls Biſhops were ordained for unity.
All Arch-Biſhops be ordained for unity.
Therefore, all Arch-Biſhops are Pauls Biſhops.

The fallacie of the ſecond kind is when the aſſumption is denied: As,

Every puritane is a Chriſtian.
No L. Biſhop is a puritane.
Therefore, No L. Biſhop is a Chriſtian.

Hitherto of the fallacies referred to a ſimple Syllogiſm.

Now follow thoſe which are referred to a compound, which are thoſe which are referred either To the *Connexive*, or To the *diſjoyned*.

Of the firſt ſort one is when the firſt part

part or antecedent is denied, that the second or consequent may be so likewise: As,

If any man have two benefices, he may escape unpunished at the Bishops hands.

But he may not have two benefices,

Therefore.

He may not escape unpunished at the Bishops hands.

The second part is affirmed, that the first may be so also. As,

If every ignorant minister were put out of the Church, and a Preacher in his place, we should have good order:

But we have good order, Therefore

Every ignorant minister is put out of the Church; and a Preacher in his place.

Of those referred to the disjoyned, the first is, when all the parts of the disjunction or proposition are not affirmed: As,

Every ignorant minister is to be allowed, or not.

But he is not.

Therefore he is.

The second kind is when the second part of the copulative negative axiome is denied, that the first may be so; As,

A non-

A non-reſident, is either a faithfull, or unfaithfull Miniſter.

But he is unfaithfull, Ergo, &c.

And thus much of the fallacies in a Syllogiſme.

The fallacie in Method is when, to deceive withall, the end is ſet in the beginning, the ſpeciall before the generall, good order be gone, confounded: And finally, when darkneſſe, length and hardneſſe is laboured after.

FINIS.